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INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY IN 
AMERICA 
Carl Tobias* 
Interspousal tort immunity remains an untidy corner of the law. 
That rule prohibits husbands and wives from successfully pursuing 
a civil cause of action against each other for personal injuries. Im-
munity has a rich and instructive history; it spans Blackstone's 
enunciation of the unity fiction that women's legal identities 
merged into their husbands' upon wedlock and the modem 
women's movement. The immunity doctrine, first recognized in the 
United States during the 1860s, was maintained intact nationwide 
for the succeeding half century. But it was abolished by seven ju-
risdictions between 1914 and 1920, eroded gradually in the ensuing 
fifty years, and has been transformed dramatically from a majority 
to a minority rule since 1970.1 
Despite increasing judicial willingness to abrogate immunity, few 
courts have analyzed carefully why it should be abolished, and a 
number of jurisdictions retain the doctrine in whole or in part.2 
Most tort law commentators have denounced the rule since its ini-
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' "Rule" and "doctrine" are used synonymously to mean "interspousal tort immunity," 
which is immunity from suit for interspousal torts inflicted negligently or intentionally. 
"Abolition" and "abrogation" are employed interchangeably to mean elimination of immu-
nity. "Complete" and "total" are used synonymously to describe abolition and abrogation 
and mean elimination of both negligence and intentional tort immunity. 
• The states that appear to retain interspousal tort immunity completely are Delaware 
and Hawaii. The following states have partial immunity: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, Nevada, and Vermont. 
For recent listings of the nationwide status of interspousal tort immunity, see Burns v. 
Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1211-12 (Miss. 1988); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987) 
(citations to cases). See generally W. PROSSER & W.P. KEET'oN, THE LAw OF TORTS § 122 
(5th ed. 1984). 
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tial abrogation but have failed to assess incisively either the his-
tory of immunity or the reasons for its elimination. Thus, a stan-
dard historical treatment developed and a stock litany of 
arguments favoring abolition has come to be recited. Moreover, the 
doctrine has not evoked recent scholarly interest; no comprehen-
sive, critical evaluation of immunity has been undertaken in the 
last quarter century.3 Nonetheless, there has been burgeoning re-
search, in fields such as women's legal history and feminist juris-
prudence, that has important implications for tort immunity. It is 
appropriate, therefore, to apply this new work to the longstanding 
doctrine, while exploring the rule's history, reexamining the ratio-
nales that underlie the doctrine's continued application and abro-
gation, analyzing whether immunity should be eliminated fully, 
and considering the consequences of total abolition. 
The first Part of this Article is a review of the origins and devel-
opment of interspousal tort immunity. It initially examines the le-
gal status accorded women in the United States before 1840 and 
passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, while discussing 
the consequences of both for immunity. The century and a quarter 
of case law then is analyzed by emphasizing evolving currents in 
judicial decisionmaking, developments in tort jurisprudence and 
societal views of women, wedlock, wives, and the family, as well as 
their interrelationships. 
Although the question of whether interspousal tort immunity 
should be abrogated or retained has become today a debate over 
the public policy reasons for the respective positions, those ratio-
nales have their origins in earlier developments. Because the policy 
concepts now are so significant, but have been accorded inadequate 
evaluation by judges and writers, Part II of the Article provides an 
assessment at once more systematic and rigorous. This examina-
tion yields the conclusions that, although the arguments favoring 
abolition are only somewhat more persuasive than those against it, 
the continued application of immunity serves little useful purpose. 
• The last comprehen~ive, critical piece was Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 
9 VAND. L. REV. 823 (1956). The seminal article was McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in 
Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030 (1930). See generally Casenote, Alone at Last: 
Oregon Abolishes lnterspousal Immunity for Negligent Torts in Heino v. Harper, 25 W1L· 
LAlllETIE L. REV. 429 (1989); Comment, lnterspousal Tort Immunity: The Rule Becoming 
the Exception, 27 How. L.J. 995 (1984); Note, Piercing the Marital Veil: lnterspousal Tort 
Immunity After Harris v. Harris, 36 MERCER L. REV. 1013 (1985). 
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Accordingly, complete abrogation appears advisable and probable 
by the year 2000. 
The :final Part of the Article explores important implications of 
totally eliminating the rule. This analysis indicates that abolition 
would vindicate numerous purposes of tort jurisprudence, benefit 
wives in specific situations, and afford females certain advantages. 
The evaluation also demonstrates, however, that abrogation may 
have some adverse impact on the tort law system and is unlikely to 
increase women's power, improve significantly the conditions of 
wives, or enhance substantially male-female relations. 
I. THE HISTORY OF !NTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY 
Interspousal tort immunity has a lengthy and interesting history. 
This Part descriptively analyzes significant aspects of the rule's 
history by examining its origins and early relevant developments, 
wives' legal status in America before 1840, implications of the Mar-
ried Women's Acts for the doctrine, and case law development in 
the United States. 
A. Origins and Early Developments 
The origins of, and nascent developments pertinent to, inter-
spousal tort immunity warrant only brief treatment." At common 
law unmarried females' legal status was similar to, but somewhat 
less favored than, that of single males.11 The women could contract; 
litigate and be sued; own, manage and convey realty and person-
alty; and were entitled to the fruits of their labor and income de-
rived from their property.6 Marriage drastically altered the legal 
status of women, however. Upon wedlock, husbands acquired pos-
sessory rights to their wives' property and could use its rents and 
• This section briefly summarizes the common-law origins of interspousal tort immunity. 
For a more thorough treatment, see generally W. PROSSER & W:P. K!il:roN, supra note 2, § 
122; McCurdy, supra note 3. 
• See L. KANowITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 35 (1969); Johnston, Sex and Property: The 
Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum and Developments Tou:ard Equality, 
47 N.Y.UL. REv. 1033, 1045 (1972). This was true in both mid-nineteenth century England, 
see J. WHARTON, AN EXPOSITION OF THE LAws RELATlNG TO THE W01 .. tEN OF ENGLAND 173 
(1853), and mid-nineteenth century America, see Walker, The Legal Condition of Women, 
in THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN LAw 317 (C. Haar ed. 1965). 
• See H. CLARK, DoMESTlC REI.ATlONS CASES AND PROBLEMS 57, 725 (3d ed. 1980); L. KA-
NOWITZ, supra note 5, at 35; Johnston, supra note 5, at 1045. 
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profits.7 A married man also was entitled to his spouse's chattels 
and earnings as well as her choses in action, which became the hus-
band's personalty once reduced to possession.8 Moreover, married 
women, in their own names, could not contract, file claims or be 
sued, or transfer real property.9 Although some exceptions to these 
incapacities developed in England and colonial America, princi-
pally through equity, the disabilities imposed at law remained 
substantial.10 
Numerous practical and theoretical explanations exist for the 
common law's relegation of women to this legal status upon mar-
riage. One idea derived from Roman law is the position occupied 
by the pater-familias, who as head of the family exercised almost 
absolute control over its members.11 Other explanations, feudal in 
• See Griswold v. Penniman, 2 Conn. 564, 565 (1818) (holding that possession of estate 
vested in intestate heir's husband); Beale v. Knowles, 45 Me. 479 (1858) (holding convey-
ance by wife void); Mattocks v. Stearns, 9 Vt. 326, 335 (1837) (holding that husband's inter· 
est in wife's estate could satisfy creditor's claims); w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 122, at 860 (4th ed. 1971); McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1031. 
• See Bell v. Bell, 1 Ga. 637, 640 (1846) (holding that wife was entitled in equity to what 
the husband had not reduced to his possession); Wells v. Tyler, 25 N.H. 340, 342 (1852) 
(holding that husband might reduce wife's bequest to his possession); Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 
396, 399 (1858) (holding that wife could not maintain debt action against husband); W. 
PROSSER, supra note 7, § 122, at 860. 
• See Anderson v. Anderson, 74 Ky. 327, 330 (1875) (holding that wife could not maintain 
battery action without husband); Concord Bank v. Bellis, 64 Mass. 276, 277 (1852) (holding 
that wife could not mortgage land); Manby v. Scott, 86 Eng. Rep. 781, 783 (1663) (holding 
husband not liable to pay for goods for which wife had no right to contract); W. PROSSER, 
supra note 7, § 122, at 859. For a discussion of the legal status of English wives throughout 
history, see N. BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY IN NINE· 
TEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK 17-22, 27 (1982) (legal status of wives in England better before 
the common law thus contravening "theories that locate the changing legal status of married 
women on a path of steady improvement"); A OAKLEY, WOMAN'S WORK 28-30 (1974); W. 
O'NEILL, THE WOMAN MOVEMENT 17 (1969). Cf. Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything 
that Grows": Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819, 820 (traditional 
American family law historians describe evolution of family law as progression from patrinr· 
chal to egalitarian family whose members individually enjoy rights protected by the state, 
but author advocates peering beneath traditional view by exploring social experience rather 
than law on the books). 
'° For a discussion of the separate estate, a typical equitable device, see M. SALMON, 
WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 81-140 (1986). For more discussion of 
equity, see N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 20-21, 72-74; L. KANOWITZ, supra note 5, at 38-39. For 
more discussion of disabilities imposed at law, see M. BEARD, WOMAN AS FORCE IN HISTORY 
92-95 (1946); P. RABKIN, FATHERS TO DAUGHTERS: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF FEMALE EMAN· 
CIPATION 25-30 (1980). 
11 See McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1035. For further discussion of the concept of the pater-
familias, see M. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW §§ 38, 40 (1927); Hollister, Parent-Child 
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origin, include the notion of "natural male dominanceni2 and the 
character of feudal tenures, the "chief duties of which, suit and 
service, were by their nature not readily performed except by 
men.ms The superior physical strength possessed by husbands is 
pro:ff ered, 14 as is the idea that a woman upon marriage became her 
spouse's property, if not his slave.111 Marriage also is said to have 
been a unique type of contract, not governed by the rules that or-
dinarily apply to such instruments, but one which invariably bene-
fited the superior party to the agreement-the husband.10 Several 
prominent commentators have contended that the concept of 
guardianship is most accurate.17 
But the most influential reason, premised partially on the Bibli-
cal notion that wedded individuals are "one .flesh,"18 is that the 
female's legal identity merges into the male's upon marriage.19 
Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REY. 489, 490-91 (1982). 
22 See M RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO·AMERICAN LEGAL HlsToRY 524 (1936). Accord l J. 
BISHOP, LAW OF 11-iARRIED WOMEN § 47 (1875). Cf. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130, 
141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (concluding that "Man is, or should be, woman's protec· 
tor and defender."). 
13 M RADIN, THE COMMON LAW OF THE FAMILY, VI NATIONAL LAw LmRARv, LEGAL RELA-
TIONS 177 (1939). Accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 17; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 19-20. 
" See Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in 1 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTIIAM 355·56 (J. 
Bowring ed. 1838), reprinted in Johnston, supra note 5, at 1048-49; Mill, The Subjection of 
Women, in ON LmERTY AND OTHER EssAYS 194 (E. Neff ed. 1936), reprinted in Johnston, 
supra note 5, at 1051; McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1035. Cf. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 
420-23 (1908) (treating women's physical weakness as premise for upholding "special treat-
ment" legislation). 
'" See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 37-38; Johnston, supra note 5, at 1051. Cf. Tinker v. 
Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485 (1904); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 522, 105 S.E. 206, 210 
(1920) (judicial articulation of notion that wives were husbands' property). 
16 See Johnston, supra note 5, at 1047-48. For a discussion or marriage as n contract, see 
B. BABCOCK, A FREEDMAN, E. NoRTON & S. Ross, Sex Drscrut!INATJON AND THE LAw 561-66 
(1975) [hereinafter B. BABCOCK]; L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT xix-xxi (1981). Cf. 
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1888) (stating that marriage is more than mere con-
tract; rights and obligations depend upon law, not agreement or the parties). 
17 See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 435 (2d ed. 1903); 
Haskins, The Estate by the Marital Right, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 345, 346-47 (1949); Williams, 
The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, 10 Moo. L. REv. 16, 18 (1947). Cf. Abbott v. Abbott, 
67 Me. 304, 307 (1877) (husband as guardian may put "gentle restraints" upon wire's lib-
erty), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A2d 71 (Me. 1980). 
16 See Johnston, supra note 5, at 1046; McCurdy, supra note 3, nt 1035; Williams, supra 
note 17, at 16-18. Cf. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130, 141 (Bradley, J., concur-
ring) (common-law maxim that woman "had no legal existence separate from her hus-
band"); M DALY, THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX 74-84 (1968) (Biblicnl origins or notion). 
2
• See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 614-16 (1910) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mc-
Curdy, supra note 3, at 1035; Williams, supra note 17, at 16-17. Cf. Carroll v. Reidy, 5 App. 
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This idea is captured best by William Blackstone in his eighteenth 
century Commentaries on the Laws of England: "By marriage, the 
husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or 
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or 
at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of her husband, 
under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every-
thing."20 Thus, the unity notion, and Blackstone's enunciation of 
it, could be described most accurately only as maxims or fictions 
created to justify and perpetuate the status quo and power rela-
tionships within the eighteenth century English family.21 Although 
a "general theory that will fully account for the common law sys-
tem" has yet to be formulated,22 the merger idea and Blackstone's 
articulation were crucial in conceptualizing wives' legal status for 
the purpose of treating interspousal tort immunity until the early 
twentieth century.23 
The notion of the single identity of a wedded man and woman 
had both substantive and procedural implications for potential in-
terspousal personal injury litigation, suits which were unknown at 
common law.24 Unitary legal status prevented one spouse from ac-
quiring a tort cause of action against the other for harm perpe-
trated. 25 Even if a claim could have been stated, the husband 
D.C. 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1894) (merger was feudal notion). 
20 1 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442, reprinted in w. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 122, 
at 859. For an oft-cited, remarkably similar yet considerably earlier articulation of this idea, 
see THE LAWES RESOLUTIONS OF WOMENS RIGHTS (1632), reprinted in M. BLOOMFIELD, Ar.rnn-
ICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at 94-95 (1976). 
•
1 See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 43-54; D. BooRSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE 
LAW: AN ESSAY ON BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (1941); Chused, Married Women's Prop· 
erty Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEo. L.J. 1359, 1385-89 (1983). Cf. L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 3 
(1967) (discussion of Blackstone's use of legal fictions). 
•• Johnston, supra note 5, at 1051. 
•• See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. For additional discussion of Blackstone 
and his effect on the development of American law, see N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 43-54; M. 
BEARD, supra note 10, at 78-121; Chused, supra note 21, at 1385-89; Kennedy, The Struc· 
ture of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979). See also Watson, The 
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 97 YALE L. J. 795 (1988). 
24 See Haglund, Tort Actions Between Husband and Wife, 27 GEO. L.J. 697, 704 (1939). 
•• See Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 306 (1877) (holding that "real substantial ground" 
for refusing to permit wife to sue husband was "general principle of the common law that 
husband and wife are one person"), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 
1980); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 69-70, 100 So. 591, 592 (1924); Schultz v. Christopher, 
65 Wash. 496, 118 P. 629 (1911) (holding wife could not maintain action against husband for 
communicating venereal disease to her), overruled, Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 
P.2d 771 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984); Phil-
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would have been plaintiff as well as defendant in any litigation 
pursued.26 Thus, at early common law, the 
combination of the various incidents of marriage, some 
substantive, some procedural, some conceptual, made it 
impossible for one spouse ever to be held civilly liable as 
a tortfeasor, in any situation, and without exception, to 
the other for any act, antenuptial or during marriage, 
causing personal injury which would have been a tort but 
for the marriage. 27 
In 1876, the Queen's Bench affirmed the validity of the common-
law immunity concept and thereby ensured its modern-day appli-
cation in England.28 
B. American Developments 
1. Before 1840. Variations within and among colonies and states, 
as well as between those entities and England, complicate general-
ization about wives' legal status in America prior to 1840.29 Yet 
lips v. Barnet, 1 Q.B.D. 436, 438 (1876) (concluding wife could not maintain assault action 
against husband). 
2
• See Abbott, 67 Me. at 308; W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 122, at 860; accord McCurdy, 
supra note 3, at 1033. 
27 McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 Vll.L. L. REv. 303, 307 (1959). 
Accord 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAw OF TORTS§ 8.10, 562 (1986) [hereinafter 
F. HARPER]. Cf. Heino v. Harper, 306 Or. 347, 353, 759 P.2d 253, 256 (1988) (unclear whether 
real impediment to interspousal tort actions at common law was substantive or procedurol). 
26 Phillips, 1 Q.B.D. at 438. For discussions of interspousal immunity's subsequent his-
tory in England, see S. ATKINS & B. HoGGETT, WOMEN AND THS LAw 132-16 (1984); Williams, 
supra note 17, at 26-27. 
•• See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 22; M GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE liEARTH: LAw .um 
THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 5 (1985); l\l SALMON, supra note 10, at 3-13. 
These and other recent works enhance the ability to generalize, especially with respect to 
the period from 1780 to 1840. But more work is needed on the earlier period, particularly 
the seventeenth century, before generalizations can be drawn with confidence. Cf. Chused, 
supra note 21, at 1360 n.2, 1385 n.102; Salmon, The Legal Status of Women in Early 
America: A Reappraisal, 1 LAW & HIST. Rsv. 129 (1983) (both present valuable suggestions 
for more research). 
The analysis of families and wives' legal status during this period o.nd through 1900 prin· 
cipally treats whites, the upper and middle classes, and nonimmigro.nts. Cf. M BLOO?JFJELD, 
supra note 20, at 122-35; J. TEN BROEK, FAMILY LAw AND THE POOR (J. Ho.ndler ed. 1964) 
(the poor); E. Fox-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND WHJTE 
WOMEN oF THE OLD SouTH (1988); E. GENOVESE, RoLL. JoRDAN, Rou.: THE WORLD THE 
SLAVES MADE (1976) (blacks); J. JONES, LABOR OF LoVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, 
WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT (1985) (blacks); Minow, supra note 9, 
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more informed accounts than have been postulated can be 
afforded. 
a. The Colonial Period. The traditional historical view30 de-
scribes the legal status enjoyed by colonial married women, espe-
cially in commercial contexts, as considerably better than that of 
English wives, a circumstance attributable primarily to burgeoning 
commercial activity in the New World.31 For example, American 
wedded females were said to have greater freedom to convey real 
property and to contract than their counterparts in the mother 
country.32 It also has been asserted that the different social and 
economic conditions that prevailed in the New World rendered ob-
solete the "concept of the unity of husband and wife in marriage to 
form one legal personality."33 The traditional perspective holds 
that the "individual status of the married woman in the law of lia-
at 862-77 (working and working-class women); Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 
Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 62-64 (1987) (problems en· 
tailed in attempting to speak from one perspective for all women). 
I realize that legal status comprised little of wives' experience, especially given the status 
they were afforded, and that the story of that status reads like a march of progress from 
patriarchal domination to enjoyment of individual rights. Thus, I have tried to treat somo· 
what women's social and economic status by drawing on recent work on women's history, 
much of which is controversial. See, e.g., infra note 49. I have also attempted to account for 
variability, gaps, and departures from the traditional views of these issues. Moreover, I ap· 
preciate that the realities of women's experience could challenge both legal status and ac· 
cepted images of social and economic status. I understand as well that any effort to survey 
such a long period for clues about tort immunity involves numerous subtle and complex 
issues of law, society, and historiography. Furthermore, I am not necessarily adopting the 
account provided, but trying to tailor it to tort immunity to best capture what is expressed 
in the judicial articulations of this idea. For a recent valuable analysis of many issues of 
historiography and other difficult questions raised above in the context of family law his· 
tory, see Minow, supra note 9. 
30 R. MORRIS, STUDY AND HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 126-200 (2d ed. 1959), was widely 
accepted as the definitive work on wives' legal status in colonial America during the half· 
century following its 1930 publication. See Salmon, supra note 29. Recent historical re· 
search questions many of Morris' conclusions, although debate is ongoing and controversial. 
See infra notes 36 & 49 and accompanying text. 
31 R. MORRIS, supra note 30, at 128-29. 
•• Id. at 128-29, 175-76. Accord G. LERNER, THE WOMAN IN AMERICAN HISTORY 13·14 
(1971). 
33 See R. MORRIS, supra note 30, at 129. Cf. N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 69 ("metaphor of 
enormous power" that survived "dislocations of colonization and revolution .•• to penetrate 
nineteenth century American thought"); M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 14 (unity represented 
little more than ideal in Anglo-American law and as legal concept underwent almost contin· 
ual change in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). 
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bility" increasingly was recognized,3' although the "rights and lia-
bilities in tort of the colonial woman followed upon her proprietary 
and contractual rights, and at a much slower pace."3 G Recent his-
torical research, however, questions the validity of these perspec-
tives, especially their general and overly optimistic nature and the 
failure to consider thoroughly geographic or temporal variations.30 
The following account now appears more accurate. Married 
women were somewhat less constrained at the beginning of the co-
lonial period.37 "Early variations in colonial practice and different 
traditions in colonial administration left opportunities open for 
novel American practices to develop,''38 especially in specific lo-
cales, during particular periods, as to the various indicia of cover-
ture, and at equity.39 Few colonies permitted husbands to give 
their spouses "moderate correction" or to administer "domestic 
chastisement."'0 Most American courts would have protected in-
34 R MoRRis, supra note 30, at 197. This assertion is premised on an early, but essentially 
inconclusive, colonial case. 
•• Id. at 185. 
•• See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 22-25; Chused, supra note 21, at 1391 n.155; Norton, 
The Evolution of White Women's Experience in Early America, 89 AM. HIST. Rl:v. 593 
(1984); Salmon, supra note 29. Cf. M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 3-13 (helpful background 
discussion); Minow, supra note 9, at 865 (need to consider familial variability and social 
roles of wives, which indicate wives had more power in certain contexts and family was not 
patriarchal enclave). 
37 See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 23-24; L. FmEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AM&ruCAN LAw 185 
(1973); Chused, supra note 21, at 1389·90; Johnston, supra note 5, at 1058-59. 
38 Chused, supra note 21, at 1390. Accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 23·24. 
•• The best treatment of geographic and temporal variability is l\1 SALMON, supra note 
10, at 3-13. For discussion of the indicia of property, contract, and others, see N. BASCH, 
supra note 9, at 15-112; M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 14-57; Chused, supra note 21. Equity 
concepts that developed as exceptions to the unity idea and permitted women "to own, 
manage, convey, and devise property represented a radical breakthrough for women." l\1 
SALMON, supra note 10, at 81. But the use of equity had certain limitations. For example, 
because equity rules were supervised by equity courts and never defined by statute they 
were inaccessible to most women. Cf. id. at 81-184 (full discussion of equity); Minow, supra 
note 9, at 858-59 (need for more research on equity). 
•• Blackstone stated that the "old common law" permitted a husband to restrain his v.ife 
by domestic chastisement and to give her moderate correction but that in the "reign of 
Charles the Second, this power of correction began to be doubted," and she could in 1770 
"have security of the peace against her husband." 1 W. BLACKSTONE. Coi.WENTAJUES •443-45. 
Moreover, a 1641 Massachusetts statute provided that "[e]very married woman shall be free 
from bodily correction or stirpes by her husband." S. SPEISER. C. KRAUSE & A GANS, 2 Tm: 
AMERICAN LAw OF ToRTS § 6:44, at 215 n.84 (1985). Cf. E. PLECK. Doi.IESTlc T\"RANm·: Tira 
MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TJ!JES TO 
THE PRESENT 21-27 (1987) (discussing that statute and other legislation against family vio-
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tentionally injured wives, at least when they suffered severe harm 
or when their husbands seriously misbehaved;0 
Nevertheless, the married woman's legal status was not "miracu-
lously transformed when it crossed the Atlantic."42 Colonial 
America generally followed English common law;'3 and the law re-
specting married women apparently was one of the areas least al-
tered." More specifically, the "traditional English pattern of the 
husband's dominance certainly governed in most places during the 
late seventeenth and the greater part of the eighteenth century."•G 
The mother country's "common law model of marital property, 
along with its ameliorating exceptions, did take root, grow and 
:flourish until it eventually crowded out most informal non-English 
practices" in the New World.46 A married man also was entitled to 
impose restraints on his spouse's liberty, a "right" with which colo-
nial judges were reluctant to interfere." These factors as well as 
the substantive and procedural disabilities under which married 
lence). But cf. infra note 47 and accompanying text (husband's right to impose "gentle re-
straint" and other conflicting ideas). 
41 One writer has observed that "should the colonial man be so foolhardly as to deal bru· 
tally with his wife the colonial court would interfere in woman's behalf." M. RYAN, WOMAN· 
HOOD IN AMERICA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 43 (1975). Accord s. BOTEIN, 
EARLY AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 42 (1983). Cf. M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 77 (when 
husband so cruel that wife forced to leave home, courts required husband to support her in 
living elsewhere). But cf. infra note 47 and accompanying text (right to impose restraints on 
spouse's liberty). 
•• N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 22. Accord Johnston, supra note 5, at 1059. 
•• See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 4-9 (1977); 
Chused, .~upra note 21, at 1389 n.139 and accompanying text, 1385 n.102 and accompanying 
text, and 1391-92; Johnston, supra note 5, at 1058 n.103 and accompanying text. 
•• See 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 12, at § I, reprinted in Johnston, supra note 5; J. GOEBEL, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 1-2 (1946). 
•• Chused, supra note 21, at 1390. Accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 22-23; M. BLOOM· 
FIELD, supra note 20, at 97; M NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERI· 
ENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN 1750-1800, at 50, 61-65 (1980); W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF 
THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY 1760-1830, at 
103 (1975); Johnston, supra note 5, at 1058-59. 
•• N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 22-23. Accord Johnston, supra note 5, at 1059. 
•• Colonial "judges were reluctant to intervene in family affairs, even to protect a wife or 
child from physical abuse." M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 20, at 97. Cf. 2 J. KENT, CoMMENTA· 
RIES ON AMERICAN LAW *181 (12th ed. 1896) (recognition of husband's right to impose "gen· 
tie restraints" on wife's liberty); 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW 1120 (12th ed. 1932) (refer· 
ences in common law survey to right of chastisement and to criminal prosecution only of 
husbands who were guilty of malignant cruelty or permanently injuring wives). Much more 
work must be done before it will be possible to say with certainty what relief was available 
to a colonial wife abused physically by her husband. 
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females labored made it quite improbable that an American court 
would have recognized a wife's tort suit against her husband. 48 
b. From Independence to 1840. Although it might seem that the 
American Revolution, "which unleashed an aggressively egalitarian 
ideology antithetical to the very concept of coverture," should have 
created a favorable climate for enlarging the freedom of women, 
wives' rights actually were not significantly expanded after Inde-
pendence. 49 Separation from Britain directly caused "only a few 
changes," and these were "gradual, conservative, and frequently 
based upon English developments"; the merger idea survived the 
Revolution essentially intact.150 Thus, at the turn of the century, 
the legal status of married women was improved little over that 
enjoyed considerably earlier. For instance, husbands were entitled 
to their spouses' personal property once reduced to possession, as 
well as to the control and management of wives' realty held in a 
legal estate.151 
•• None of the sources consulted above states that interspousal tort litigation was at-
tempted. Moreover, one writer who comprehensively analyzed the question has observed 
that such actions were "unknown at common law," a factor attributable to the "fiction of 
unity" and the "impossibility of the same person being both plaintiff and defendant in the 
same suit." Haglund, supra note 24, at 704. It is important to remember that a wife's social 
and economic status and her position in the family may have been better than her Jegal 
status, and the family environment was probably less patriarchal than previously thought. 
See J. DEMOS, A LITrLE COMMONWEALTH: FAAULY LIFE lN PLYMOUTH CoLONY 94-95 (1970); L. 
ULRICH. Goon WIVES: !MAGE AND REALITY IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN IN NORTHERN NEW ENG-
LAND, 1650-1750, at 35-50 (1982); Minow, supra note 9, at 852-65. These views remain con-
troversial, however. See, e.g., !t.finow, supra note 9, at 828 n.24. 
•• N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 25. Accord M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 20, at 104; L. KER-
BER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY lN REVOLUTIONARY A!JEruCA 9-10, 
115-55 (1980); W. NELSON, supra note 45, at 103. Indeed much said above respecting colo-
nial wives' legal status applies to the period between 1776 and 1840, including the difficu)ty 
of drawing definitive conclusions. One complication is attempting to treat such a long, im-
portant period of American histocy. Another is that after 1815, the situation of women de-
pended in part on where they lived. See G. LERNER, supra note 32, at 54. There is much 
helpful recent research, such as N. BASCH, supra note 9; l\t SALMON, supra note 10; Chused, 
supra note 21. Much of the work is revisionist and contradictory. 
00 See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 24; L. KERBER, supra note 49, at 10 (merger intact); 
Salmon, "Life, Liberty, and Dower": The Legal Status of Women After the American 
Revolution in WOMEN, WAR, AND REVOLUTION 86, 87, 99-100 (C. Berkin & C. Lovett eds. 
1980) (quoted ideas). Cf. M SALMON, supra note 10, at xv, 118, 191 (finding the "law became 
more willing to grant women independent rights to property"); Minow, supra note 9, at 858-
59 (world of legal practices in early republic period more fluid than recitation of Blackstone 
would suggest). 
•• See Chused, supra note 21, at 1361. Accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 26·27; W. NEL-
SON, supra note 45, at 104. It would be unfair, however, to characterize wives' legal status as 
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From 1800 to 1840, however, certain changes in the legal status 
of married women did occur. "The legal separateness of the wife in 
specific situations was sharpened somewhat in both statutes and 
judicial decisions," and a number of norms which had economic 
effects on married women were altered.52 "Several reforms, includ-
ing the liberalization of inheritance rules and divorce laws and the 
enlargement of benefits for widows and abandoned women, ap-
peared in the early decades of the nineteenth century."Ga More-
over, quite a few jurisdictions explicitly limited the husband's right 
to administer domestic chastisement. 54 
Nonetheless, wives' legal status was not enhanced markedly dur-
ing the four decades. Most judges and commentators continued to 
treat married females as if their legal identities remained merged 
with their husbands', reflecting Blackstone's influence. 66 A re-
vealing illustration was Justice Story's pronouncement in the 1819 
Dartmouth College case:56 a "man has as good a right to his wife as 
"declining" between 1780 and 1800. There were some slow, subtle improvements. See supra 
note 50. Moreover, women's status within society and the family seems to have improved. 
See s. LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG: STATUS AND CULTURE IN A SOUTHERN 
TOWN 1784-1860 (1984); M. NORTON, supra note 45, at 228-94; E. PLECK, supra note 40, at 
34-48; M SALMON, supra note 10, at 118, 191. Cf. Minow, supra note 9, at 852-65 (women's 
status appears improved but in reality the colonial period was better than previously 
thought). For a discussion of "Republican Motherhood," which has been used to character· 
ize wives between 1780 and 1800, see N. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S 
SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND 1780-1835, at 104-06, 147-48 (1977); L. KERBER, supra note 49; M. 
NORTON, supra note 45, at 228-94. Cf. M. GROSSBERG, supra note 29, 3-31 (the "Republican 
Family," legal order, and law of domestic relations). See generally L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 
37, at 93-98 (discussing English laws' reception during period). 
02 N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 25. Accord M. GROSSBERG, supra note 29, at 24-27. For 
discussion of numerous norms that affected wives, see Chused, supra note 21. 
•• Chused, supra note 21, at 1361, 1397. Accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 25-26; W. 
NELSON, supra note 45, at 103-04; M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 58-184. 
04 See Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156, 158 (1824) (holding husband must show chastisement 
confined to reasonable bounds to evade liability to wife). See also Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 
143, 147 (1871) (concluding husband may exercise "gentle restraint" but "barbarous cus-
tom" of "wife whipping" not state law); T. REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 65 (1st ed. 
1816) ("the right of chastising a wife is not claimed by any man" in Connecticut). Develop· 
ments in adoption and child custody were also said to herald the emergence of a modern 
American family law during this period. See M. GROSSBERG, supra note 29, at 234-85; 
Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, 
and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1038, 1084-89 (1979). 
•• For discussion of merger, its strength and resilience, and Blackstone's influence upon it, 
see supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text. For more on merger and for analysis of the 
views of most of the authorities discussed below, see N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 15-69. 
•• Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
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to the property acquired under a marriage contract. He has a legal 
right to her society and her future."67 Other legal figures, writing 
contemporaneously and as late as the 1840s, agreed with Story's 
views and essentially recognized patriarchal arrangements, if not 
unity. 6 8 Chancellor Kent, in his celebrated Commentaries on 
American Law, stated that a wedded male was afforded "reasona-
ble superiority and control over" his spouse's person and might 
"put gentle restraints upon her liberty."69 Courts in some jurisdic-
tions expressly subscribed to these propositions,60 while judges in a 
few states even refused to punish men who practiced domestic 
chastisement.61 Most telling, however, is Tapping Reeve's observa-
tion in the initial, indigenous legal treatise on marriage, The Law 
of Baron and Femme: The "nature of the connexion between [hus-
band and wife is] such that no [battery] can give either a right of 
action to recover damages. "62 
These considerations, especially the strength and resilience of 
the merger fiction and the substantial disabilities imposed upon 
wedded females, probably explain the absence of a single reported 
case in which an American court was asked to permit an inter-
spousal tort suit throughout the forty years. 63 Commencing around 
07 Id. at 596-97. The pronouncement is particularly telling, given Justice Story's eminence 
as a jurist and writer. For a valuable biography, see R. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC (1985). 
08 See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, THE LEGAL RIGHTS, LIABILITIES AND DUTIES OF WOMEN (1845); 
Walker, supra note 5, at 318-20. For additional discussion of these writers and others, see N. 
BASCH, supra note 9, at 43-54; M GROSSBERG, supra note 29, at 3-31. But cf. l\finow, supra 
note 9, at 842 n.84 (questioning what legal fiction meant to wives in daily lives). 
•• J. KENT, supra note 47, at *181. The Commentaries were written in the 1820s. Cf. N. 
BASCH, supra note 9, at 60-69 (discussion of Kent's treatment of wives). 
•
0 See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 589 (1858) (noting thnt, except in divorce 
cases, wife cannot bring lawsuit unless joined with husband because "she is deemed to be 
under the protection of her husband"); cases cited in N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 219; W. 
NELSON, supra note 45, at 103-04. 
•• The case most often cited for this proposition is State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 456-57 
(1868) (state will not interfere with husband's moderate correction of \\ife even if there had 
been no provocation for it), modified, State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61 (1874) ("husband has 
no right to chastise his wife under any circumstances"). But cf. supra note 54 and accompa-
nying text (states rejecting idea); Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Cul-
ture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 177 n.8 (1982) (most. states repu-
diated chastisement but refused to entertain routine assault cases). 
•• T. REEVE, supra note 54, at 65. Cf. N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 57-60 (analysis of \\ives' 
treatment in Reeve's treatise). 
63 The first reported case seems to be Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 367-70 
(N.Y. 1863) (wife sought to maintain assault action against husband based on Married 
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1840, however, a complex mix of factors led to the passage of Mar-
ried Women's Property Acts. These measures were enacted in 
every jurisdiction by approximately 1875,6" and this development 
had significant implications for interspousal tort immunity.66 
Women's Property Act). Accord Haglund, supra note 24, at 704 ("no adjudicated prece· 
dent" until "married women's acts • . . generally enacted" because of merger fiction and 
impossibility of same person being plaintiff and defendant in same suit). Cf. Abbott v. Ab· 
bott, 67 Me. 304, 308-09 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 
1980); supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (substantive and procedural disabilities 
under which wives labored until Acts' passage). It is also possible that there were unre-
ported, unappealed adverse trial court decisions or settlements. 
64 See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 27-28; M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 20, at 117; Chusod, 
supra note 21, at 1398. Professor Chused observes that the "acts began to appear in 1835," 
but he considers 1840 as an appropriate "approximation of the beginning of a transition 
period." Id. at 1361 n.3. See generally id. at 1398 n.204 (helpful suggestions for working 
with Acts). 
•• It is very difficult to generalize briefly about societal views of women, marriage, wives, 
and the family for such a long, complex, and important period as 1800 to 1840. For helpful, 
concise discussions, see N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 29-41; Chused, supra note 21, at 1412·23. 
See generally M. GROSSBERG, supra note 29, M. SALMON, supra note 10; Minow, supra note 
9, at 866-84 (fuller treatment). 
During the late eighteenth century, women fashioned the notion of Republican Mother· 
hood, marriage became somewhat more companionate and less hierarchical, and females' 
social status improved somewhat. See supra note 51. Moreover, when industrial capitalism 
forced production out of homes between 1800 and 1850, wives' special roles were "intensi· 
fied, sentimentalized, and transformed into the cult of domesticity," whereby women occu-
pied lofty spheres that were "complementary to but clearly separate from the world of men" 
in which they redefined and expanded their roles. N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 40, 30. Accord 
M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 191. But see Lerner, The Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in 
the Status of Women in the Age of Jackson, 10 MIDCONTINENT A. STUD. J. 5-15 (1969) 
(women's status declined). For additional discussion of the cult of domesticity, see A. Douo-
LAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE (1977); Welter, The Cult of True Woman· 
hood: 1800-1860, in B. WELTER, DIMITY CONVICTIONS: THE AMERICAN WOMAN IN THE NINE· 
TEENTH CENTURY 21-41 (1976). For discussion of the separate sphere ideology, see C. DEGLER, 
AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 26·65 
(1980); K O'DoNOVAN, SEXuAL D1v1s10NS IN LAW 59-158 (1985). Cf. Olsen, The Family and 
the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (reform 
efforts to help women limited by separate spheres of market and family); Powers, Sex Seg· 
regation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 55, 
70-78 (legal recognition of public and private spheres). For more discussion of how women 
redefined and expanded their roles, see N. COTT, supra note 51; Smith-Rosenberg, Beauty, 
the Beast and the Militant Woman: A Case Study in Sex Roles and Social Stress in Jack· 
sonian America, 23 AM. Q. 562 (1971). Cf. A. KoLODNY, THE LAND BEFORE HER: FANTASY AND 
EXPERIENCE OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIERS, 1630-1860 (1984) (frontier women's experience at 
odds with cult of domesticity and separate spheres); Minow, supra note 9, at 869 (working 
women's experience at odds with cult of domesticity and separate spheres). For a discussion 
of the transition from Republican Motherhood to the cult of domesticity, see M. RYAN, 
supra note 41, at 139-91. The period between 1830 and 1840 has also been described as one 
of "extraordinary ferment," characterized by a "generalized reform spirit," in which some 
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2. After 1840. 
a. The Married Women's Property Acts. The Married Women's 
statutes were important because they provided a basis for recog-
nizing personal injury actions between husbands and wives. The 
typical legislation authorized a married woman to "maintain an ac-
tion in her own name, for damages, against any person ... for any 
injury to her person or character, the same as if she were sole."66 
The statutes, therefore, made it plausible to contend that cover-
ture had been destroyed and independent legal status bestowed or, 
at least, that common-law disabilities had been removed or indicia 
of legal personality provided, so that interspousal tort litigation 
should be permitted.67 Consequently, during the 1860s, the attor-
neys who filed the initial cases seeking recognition of wives' tort 
suits against husbands seized upon the statutes. Indeed, the mea-
sures figured prominently in nearly every judicial determination 
regarding immunity until the mid-twentieth century.08 Thus, it is 
important to analyze carefully the enactments because of the im-
plications they had for interspousal tort immunity.69 
women participated, especially through religious organizations, in such activities ns abolition 
of slavery. W. O'NEILL, supra note 9, at 18-21. Accord W. CHAFE. WOMEN AND EQUALITY: 
CHANGING PATIERNs IN AMERICAN CULTURE 24 {1977); c. CLINTON, Tm: OTHER CML WAR: 
AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY 166·87 (1984); W. LEACH, TRUE L<>n: AND 
PERFECT UNION: THE FEMINIST REFORM OF SEX AND SocIETV {1980); Minow, supra note 9, at 
877-84 (women applied ethos of caring in public sphere through voluntary activities). 
•• The quoted language is in an 1862 amendment to the New York Married Women's 
legislation and was relied upon by an attorney who brought one of the first cnses seeking 
recognition of an interspousal tort cause of action. See N.Y. Laws of 1862, ch. 172, § 3, 
quoted in Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, 642 (N.Y. 1865). 
67 See Freethy, 42 Barb. at 642. 
68 Modem courts generally do not treat the legislation as dispositive, although some rely 
on it. See, e.g., Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 647-50 (Mo. 1986) (discussing 
"overdue recognition that .•. General Assembly attempted to abrogate this common law 
doctrine in the Married Women's Act"); Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 306-10, 433 A.2d 859, 
862-64 (1981) (concluding that words "separate property" within Married Persons Property 
Act provided claim for tort damages). 
•• This task is complex and controversial because the reforins effected by the Acts were 
mammoth in scope, diverse in origins and purpose, and extended over space and time. Con-
sequently, a comprehensive analysis has not yet been performed. Moreover, prior research 
has engendered confusion. Some observers viewed the Acts ns instigated by women's rights 
advocates for the purpose of modifying coverture. These perspectives now seem inaccurate, 
especially in light of recent work. See, e.g., N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 113-99; P. RABKIN, 
supra note 10, at 52-99; Speth, The Married Women's Property Acts, 1839-1865: Reform, 
Reaction, or Revolution, in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW 69 (0. Weisberg ed. 1982); Chused, 
supra note 21; Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married Women's Property Law: Recep-
tion of the Early Married Women's Property Acts by Courts and Legislatures, 29 AM. J. 
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The statutes were passed in at least three waves, which occurred 
at different times for numerous, changing reasons and at the be-
hest of shifting, diverse interests. The measures included varying 
language both within and among states and were amended contin-
uously, even as late as the twentieth century.70 Most Acts modified 
one or more specific incidents of wives' legal status, but very few 
enactments simultaneously changed a substantial number of 
indicia.71 
It is difficult to determine from the phraseology in most statutes, 
even when all of the amendments in a jurisdiction are considered 
together, exactly what implications the legislation had for immu-
nity. The wording of the measures varied, but most statutes specif-
ically protected wives' property from their spouses' creditors and 
wives' earnings from their husbands. The enactments also provided 
wives with independent ownership of and control over their prop-
erty, permitted wives to contract, and enabled them to litigate and 
be sued without joining their spouses. The language of the New 
Hampshire statute is typical: 
Every woman shall hold to her own use, free from the 
interference or control of any husband she may have, all 
property at any time earned, acquired or inherited by, 
bequeathed, given or conveyed to her, either before or af-
ter marriage. . . . Every married woman shall have the 
same rights and remedies, and shall be subject to the 
same liabilities in relation to property held by her in her 
LEGAL HIST. 3 (1985); Johnston, supra note 5, at 1061-69. Cf. E. WARBASSE, THE CHANGING 
LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN, 1800-1861 (1987) (recent issuance of valuable 1960 doc-
toral thesis on married women's property rights). 
10 See Johnston, supra note 5, at 1061-92. "The process was piecemeal and erratic; it was 
also progressive and irreversible." M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 20, at 117. 
71 A state legislature might first attempt to free wives' estates from their spouses' debts; 
four years later to establish separate estates for wives; six years later to speak to proscrip· 
tions upon wives conveying property; eleven years later to adopt other provisos pertaining to 
wives' property; fourteen years later to treat their earnings or contracts; and twenty years 
after first legislating in the area, to provide for wives' litigation. For example, the Connect!· 
cut legislature initially adopted a Married Women's Property Act in 1845 and amended it 
ten times during the ensuing 22 years. Not until 1877 were wives afforded complete domin· 
ion over their property. See Johnston, supra note 5, at 1067-68 (description of Connecticut's 
Act); cf. Speth, supra note 69, at 47 (descriptions of other states' Act). Moreover, there was 
an astounding lack of cross-jurisdictional uniformity; indeed, "it was extremely unlikely at 
anytime during the period of reform that any two states shared exactly the same law." 
Johnston, supra note 5, at 1062; accord Chused, supra note 21, at 1398. 
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own right, as if she were unmarried and may convey, 
make contracts, and sue and be sued, in all matters in 
law and equity, and upon any contract by her made, or 
for any wrong by her done, as if she were unmarried.72 
375 
Some legislation specifically mentioned litigation between hus-
bands and wives. For example, the South Carolina measure explic-
itly prescribed interspousal claims: "A married woman may sue 
and be sued as if she were unmarried. When the action is between 
herself and her husband she may likewise sue or be sued alone. "'3 
The Hawaii enactment, in contrast, proscribed interspousal ac-
tions: "A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner 
as if she were sole; but this section shall not be construed to au-
thorize suits between husband and wife.""' 
Quite a few statutes permitted personal injury litigation by wed-
ded females, as the Maryland measure illustrates: "Married women 
shall have power [to sue] for torts committed against them, as fully 
as if they were unmarried . . . "7 rs But no legislation, as originally 
passed or even as amended until the twentieth century, specifically 
provided both for personal injury actions and for such suits be-
tween husbands and wives.76 
The Acts' imprecise phraseology and the paucity of legislative 
history, such as committee reports or floor debates, that accompa-
nied the statutes' enactment,77 make it difficult to discern whether 
legislatures intended to alter immunity. Most legislators probably 
72 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:1,2 (1983). 
?> S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-170 (Law. Co-op. 1977). 
?• HAw. REV. STAT. § 573-5 (1985), repealed by L. 1987, c. 46, § 4. 
?• Mn. ANN. CoDE. art. 45, § 5 (1957), repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 296, § 1. 
?• McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1050. In 1959, Professor McCurdy observed that Illinois, 
New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin statutes specifically addressed interspousal tort 
suits; however, these measures are all twentieth century amendments. See McCurdy, supra 
note 27, at 312, 320-21. For similar amendments, see D.C. CODE ANN.§ 30-201 (1981); Mor.'T. 
CODE ANN.§ 40-2-109 (1981); ND. CENT. CODE§ 14-07-05 (1981); VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.02-220.1 
(1981). 
" One explanation for the dearth of legislative history was the noncontroversial nature of 
much of this legislation, so that no legislative history was created. Sec infra notes 97-99 and 
accompanying text. Moreover, few states recorded, compiled or maintained that type of data 
during the nineteenth century. See Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 
24 IND. L.J. 335, 348 (1949); cf. J. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE, 1908-1940, at 73-74 
(1981) (federal legislative history compiled throughout nineteenth century). Little of the 
data that was prepared has been collected or analyzed, although the sources mentioned at 
supra note 69 comprise a helpful start. 
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never considered the exact question. Had they thought about the 
issue, few lawmakers, particularly during earlier periods, would 
have meant to modify interspousal tort immunity, especially in 
light of contemporary societal views of women, wedlock, wives, and 
the family.7s The purposes of the Acts that are more readily identi-
fiable, however, are analyzed below to ascertain the measures' im-
plications for potential interspousal tort litigation. 
(i) The First Wave. Much of the first wave of Married Women's 
statutes was adopted almost entirely during the 1840s.70 Those 
measures were directed primarily at protecting wives' assets from 
their husbands' creditors, thereby creating a discrete fund for fam-
ily use, while leaving coverture and marital estates essentially 
intact.so 
The Acts were commercial in the sense that widespread eco-
nomic difficulties had led to many alterations of debtor's law and 
had engendered great concern about exempting property from at-
tachment by creditors.s1 A number of other commercial factors 
may explain passage of particular pieces of legislation. Between 
1780 and 1840, the development of a modern scheme of commer-
cial law facilitated the rapid expansion and industrialization of the 
American economy.s2 Moreover, there was considerable need for 
readily available capital. This could be satisfied partially by freeing 
wives' resources from common-law limitations and from what 
78 Indeed, most Acts were compatible with and reinforced the views. See infra note 95. 
For a discussion of the views, see infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. 
70 I rely substantially here on N. BASCH, supra note 9; P. RABKIN, supra note 10; Chused, 
supra note 21. 
80 See Chused, supra note 21, at 1361, 1398, 1400. Accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 226· 
27; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 154-55; Speth, supra note 69, at 72-73. Professor Chused 
observes, however, that "legislation chipping away at a number of the harsher consequences 
of coverture law had been enacted in earlier parts of the century" so that "[i]f further re-
form was to occur, the institution of coverture had to become the focus of attention." 
Chused, supra note 21, at 1400. 
81 See Chused, supra note 21, at 1400; Speth, supra note 69, at 72-73. See also N. BASCH, 
supra note 9, at 226 ("Precipitous dips in an increasingly complex economy encouraged 
legislators to pass statutes that insulated the wife's property. From the creditor's perspec-
tive, clarity was preferable to ambiguity."). 
82 See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 39-40; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 85-105, 153-54; 
Johnston, supra note 5, at 1060-61; Powers, supra note 65, at 79 n.111. All of these sources 
cite, and Johnston and Powers rely substantially upon, the research of K. Thurman, The 
Married Women's Property Acts (unpublished LL.M. Thesis, University of Wisconsin Law 
School, 1966). See generally M. HORWITZ, supra note 43 (discussing development of modern 
scheme of commercial law). 
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probably were seen as increasingly burdensome, costly, and ineffec-
tive devices, such as "powers of attorney, antenuptial contracts, 
private laws, and equitable remedies," created to circumvent those 
strictures.83 A related idea is that the statutes were one component 
of a more comprehensive effort to defeudalize and modernize real 
property law and make land an item of commerce. 8' 
Another reason for passage of the statutes may have been the 
desire of fathers to protect their daughters' inherited assets or 
family funds from disadvantageous fluctuations in the economy or 
from profligate sons-in-law who might squander these resources on 
gambling, alcohol, or ill-advised investments.81i The passage of the 
legislation, therefore, might have been responsive principally to ne-
cessities dictated by a commercial age. 
Enactment of the statutes also may have been attributable to 
the endeavors of women's rights advocates who envisioned the es-
tablishment of a separate legal identity for wives as one means for 
enhancing their condition. As early as the 1790s, Mary Woll-
stonecraft protested the inferior legal status to which females had 
been relegated.86 Moreover, the women's movement grew, so that 
by the time of the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention, activists were 
vociferously denouncing Blackstone, coverture, and wives' sub-
servient status and were petitioning legislatures to adopt Married 
Women's Acts.87 Although these proponents did not influence di-
rectly the enactment of most of the initial set of statutes,88 evolv-
ing societal views of women probably did provide a conducive cli-
83 Johnston, supra note 5, at 1060-61. See also N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 113·35; L. 
FruEDMAN, supra note 37, at 186; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 85-105, 153-54 . 
.,. See P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 10, 153; accord Speth, supra note 69, at 76-77. 
83 See C. DEGLER, supra note 65, at 333; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 12-13, 78, SS.89, 95-
96; K. Thurman, supra note 82, at 14-16; Chused, supra note 21, at 1403. 
66 See generally M WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN 109-69 
(1792); M BEARD, supra note 10, at 95-100; M NORTON, supra note 45, at 251·55 (analyses 
of Wollstonecraft's work and its effect) . 
.., See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 161, 168, 170; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 110-11; 
Speth, supra note 69, at 79-80. 
66 See Chused, supra note 21, at 1361, 1400; Speth, supra note 69, at 72-79; cf. N. BASCH, 
supra note 9, at 136-61; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 10, 74 (women's movement not primar-
ily responsible for New York's 1848 Act). The question of what impact women's rights pro-
ponents had on passage of the early Acts warrants more comprehensive treatment. For a 
thorough analysis of New York's Act, see Basch and Rabkin, who conclude that the Acts 
"gave impetus to the women's movement by providing a focus for presutTrnge demands." P. 
RABKIN, supra note 10, at 11; accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 166-99. 
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mate for the measures' passage. 
As industrial capitalism pushed production out of the 
home in the first half of the nineteenth century, empha-
sis on the wife's special role was intensified, sentimental-
ized, and transformed into the cult of domesticity 
[whereby women] occupied a lofty sphere that was com-
plementary to but clearly separate from the world of men 
[and in which] women redefined and expanded their 
roles.89 
The "emergence of the modern American family," characterized by 
the companionate ideal of marriage, increased responsibility and 
autonomy for females in the household, and greater emphasis on 
child rearing and the special needs of young children, enabled 
wives to expand their authority in the private sphere.90 Women's 
literacy rates increased substantially and their educational oppor-
tunities grew.91 Women participated in a number of voluntary, 
moral reform, and religious organizations designed to improve soci-
ety. 92 Thus, "when distressed economic times appeared after 1839, 
the moment was right for legislatures to codify a portion of the 
equitable separate estates tradition by insulating wives' property 
from their spouses' creditors."93 
In short, the earliest group of Married Women's Acts did not 
affect coverture, much less emancipate wedded females or afford 
them equality or important rights, such as the vote or the opportu-
nity to serve as jurors.94 Indeed, nearly all of the legislation was 
89 N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 40, 30. Accord M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 191; sources 
cited supra note 65. 
90 See N. COTT, supra note 51, at 200; C. DEGLER, supra note 65, at 8·9, 28, 111·43; 
Zainaldin, supra note 54, at 1084-89. 
91 See L. KERBER, supra note 49, at 193-221; M. NORTON, supra note 45, at 256·72; 
Chused, supra note 21, at 1416-17. Cf. Minow, supra note 9, at 866-77 (experiences of work· 
ing and frontier women). 
•• See C. CLINTON, supra note 65, at 166-87; W. O'NEILL, supra note 9, at 18-21. Cf. B. 
EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF DOMESTICITY: WOMEN, EVANGELISM, AND TEMPERANCE IN NINE• 
TEENTH- CENTURY AMERICA (1981). The 1830s was a period of "extraordinary ferment," char· 
acterized by a "generalized reform spirit," during which time women were involved in anti· 
slavery activities. W. O'NEILL, supra note 9, at 18-21; accord C. CLINTON, supra note 65, at 
166-87; Minow, supra note 9, at 877-84. 
93 Chused, supra note 21, at 1361. 
.. For historical analyses of the denial of rights in the public sphere, see K. O'DONOVAN, 
supra note 65, at 59-158; Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and 
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compatible with, and even reinforced, prevailing societal views of 
women, marriage, wives, and the family. eG Enactment of the stat-
utes was not particularly controversial, especially in contrast to the 
bitter, and even volatile, "century of struggle" over suffrage.e6 
Most of the measures passed easily in all-male legislatures, with 
limited lobbying by women,e7 engendering minimal discussion in 
statehouses and little public debate.es 
(ii) The Second Wave. The second wave of enactments a:ff orded 
wives separate estates, thereby commencing the long process of 
dismantling coverture and providing independent legal identity. 
These Acts were passed over a lengthy period, which started in the 
1840s and ended after the Civil War; thus, their adoption over-
lapped the first wave. Creation of separate estates was the most 
important aspect of the second group, although employment of 
this mechanism had contradictory implications.ee For example, the 
the Role of the Law, ch. 6, in Tm: PoLmcs OF LAW {D. Kairys ed. 1982); Powers, supra note 
65, at 70-73, 79-88. Analysts nearly unanimously agree that the Acts were not intended to 
afford wives' equality or rights or to affect marriage. See B. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 597; 
N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 41; M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 20, at 113, 122; P. RABKJN, supra 
note 10, at 13; Chused, supra note 21, at 1359-61. 
•• See Chused, supra note 21, at 1361, 1423-25; K. Thurman, supra note 82, at 7; cf. 
supra notes 65 & 89-93 and accompanying text {discussion of prevailing societul views of 
women, marriage, wives, and the family); N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 142-43 (proponents of 
Act argued it would improve marriage); P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 89, 154-55 (Acts 
strengthened family as economic unit). 
96 See P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 10; Powers, supra note 65, at 79 n.111; cf. E. FLEXNRR. 
CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: Tm: WOMEN'S RIGHTS MOVEblENT IN THE UNITED STATES 62-102 
{1975) {discussing suffrage struggle). 
97 See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 156; M. BEARD, supra note 10, at 171-72; M. BLOOM-
FIELD, supra note 20, at 117; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 98; Chused, supra note 21, at 1361. 
•• See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 136; C. DEGLER, supra note 65, at 333; P. RABKJN, supra 
note 10, at 153; K. Thurman, supra note 82, at 50. The above account of passage of the first 
wave of Acts necessarily is general. One or a combination of the factors examined above may 
have affected passage of specific Acts. Moreover, these explanations are not an exhaustive 
catalog. For example, passage may have been part of broader codification and lnw reform 
efforts, as manifested specifically in the effort to democratize equity. See N. BASCH, supra 
note 9, at 116, 126, 226-27; and P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 10-11, 31-90 {discussing codifi-
cation and law reform effort); N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 136-61; l\t BLOOMFIELD, supra note 
20, at 113 {discussing equity's democratization) . 
.. The "early statutes inevitably needed refinement to account for ambiguity, enlarged 
goals, or hostile judicial reception." Chused, supra note 21, at 1398 n.202; accord N. BASCH, 
supra note 9, at 136-61; M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 20, at 117. Much work remains to be 
done on the second wave, but Professors Basch and Chused have done the most. and I rely 
here upon them. There is widespread agreement that the judiciary narrowly construed the 
Acts. See sources cited in N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 202 n.2; Chused, supra note 21, at 1400 
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use of separate estates indicates that wives' property was seen pri-
marily as a family asset or as protection for abandoned or widowed 
women and that wives were to have more power to dispose of sepa-
rate property. Nonetheless, the "very device used to confirm 
women's special sphere ... created a wedge in the coverture bas-
tion, and confirmed for women a small degree of independence 
from their marriage partners.moo Although women's rights advo-
cates lobbied actively for this legislation, particularly in states such 
as New York, and for some of the subsequent measures,101 even 
these "statutes were neither driven by the Women's Movement nor 
indicated a commitment to women's rights."102 This is only one of 
"myriad contradictions" reflected in most legislation passed after 
the first set of Acts.103 
(iii) The Third Wave. The third series of measures, passed pri-
marily in the 1870s, principally protected wives' earnings from 
their husbands, further eroding the unity concept and enhancing 
married women's legal personalities. These statutes probably were 
premised more on an "ideology lauding the capacity of womei;i to 
n.211 (high probability of mixed picture). But cf. Johnston, supra note 5, at 1069 (much 
more evidence needed to conclude "general pattern" existed in which judiciary "deliberately 
sabotaged legislative attempts to implement broad reforms"). 
10° Chused, supra note 21, at 1412. 
101 
"Only after this initial wave of debtor protection measures appeared did the women's 
movement get deeply and successfully involved in substantial reform of coverture law." 
Chused, supra note 21, at 1361. Accord Speth, supra note 69, at 72-85. For discussion of the 
role of the women's movement in New York, see N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 162-99; P. 
RABKIN, supra note 10, at 106-17. Cf. M. BEARD, supra note 10, at 128-33; Speth, supra note 
69, at 82-83 (other states). 
102 Telephone interview with Richard Chused, Professor of Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center (May 3, 1985). Accord Speth, supra note 69, at 83-84. 
10
• Chused, supra note 21, at 1412. The most prominent contradiction was mentioned in 
supra note 102 and accompanying text. Another contradiction is that separate estates af-
forded incentives to hide family resources from creditors in the wives' estates. These devel· 
opments eventually evoked legislative responses. See Chused, supra note 21, at 1412; 
Chused, supra note 69, at 23, 35. Much said above regarding the first wave of Acts applies to 
the second wave. For discussion of societal views of women, marriage, wives, and the family 
at this time, see E. FI.EXNER, supra note 96, at 78-144; T. HAREVEN & M. VINOVSKIS, FAMILY 
AND POPULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1978) [hereinafter T. HAUEVEN]; J. 
HIGHAM, FROM BOUNDLESSNESS TO CONSOLIDATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMElllCAN CUL· 
TURE (1969); M. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS, THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW 
YoRK, 1790-1865, at 145-229 (1981). Cf. supra notes 65 & 89-93 and accompanying text 
(views during earlier part of period); N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 162-99; C. CLINTON, supra 
note 65, at 40-71; Welter, supra note 65, at 24-41 (views during latter part of period). 
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make finer moral judgments," particularly regarding children, 104 
than on solicitude for working wives' needs. This was evidenced by 
decreasing interest in the legislation of women's rights propo-
nents105 and the enhanced vitality of the "cult of domesticity" dur-
ing the Victorian era.106 
After this period in every jurisdiction legislatures continually 
amended the enactments. Merger was dismantled gradually with 
the alteration of specific indicia of legal identity. Some incidents of 
legal personality, like the capacity to litigate, undoubtedly were 
necessary to effectuate indicia already granted.107 Although a num-
ber of measures legalized wives' relationships with "anyone,'' few 
explicitly provided for much interspousal legal activity.108 Some of 
the legislative initiatives may have been responsive to unpalatable 
judicial construction, the lobbying efforts of moral reformers or 
104 Chused, supra note 21, at 1424. Much work remains to be done on the third wave of 
Acts, but Professor Chused has done the most. See id.; Chused, supra note 69. I substan-
tially rely on his work here. 
10
• The earnings legislation might have been responsive to working wives' needs. Jn fact, 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton did urge passage on their behalf. See P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 
113. Professor Basch persuasively refutes this idea, however. See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 
164-99. Cf. P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 139-46 (impact on working wives of Earnings Act 
judicial construction). E. PLECK, supra note 40, at 49-66 (women's movement of 18-003 ex-
posed domestic abuses and promoted legislation that would add physical cruelty as grounds 
for divorce in New York State). 
An important reason for the reformers' decreasing interest in the legislation was their 
increasing focus on suffrage, an interest attributable partly to work on the Acts. See N. 
BASCH, supra note 9, at 207-08; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 156. New York is anomalous in 
several ways; its Earnings Act passed in 1860 and was instigated by the women's movement. 
See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 162-99; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 106-17. 
106 See Chused, supra note 21, at 1423-24; cf. supra note 65 (discussing cult of domestic-
ity). For discussion of societal views of women, marriage, wives, and the family at this time, 
see E. Fi.EXNER, supra note 96, at 115-44; T. liAREVEN, supra note 103; R. WIEBE. THE 
SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920, at 1-110 (1967). 
'
07 See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 165. States frequently included the capacity to litigate 
and additional indicia in their civil procedure codes. See, e.g., the Acts at issue in Peters v. 
Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 35, 103 P. 219, 220-21 (1909), overruled, Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 
P.2d 65 (1962); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1920); Chused, supra note 69, 
at 33 n.116. Much work remains to be done on the Acts passed after the third wave. For 
helpful discussion of these Acts, see Johnston, supra note 5, at 1070-89. 
10
• See, e.g., 1860 N.Y. Laws ch. 90, 11 2; D.C. Code § 1155 (1901), quoted and construed 
in Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1910). Cf. 1884 N.Y. Laws ch. 384 (\\ives 
could contract as if single but not with husbands). Indeed, much nineteenth century litiga-
tion over the Acts involved family creditors who sued one of the spouses, not interspousal 
actions. See P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 126, 155; Chused, supra note 69 (impact of family 
debtor-creditor problems on Married Women's law in Oregon); Speth, supra note 69, at 79. 
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women's rights activists, or to a number of other forces.10° For in-
stance, the practice of employing the separate estate device to hide 
family assets from creditors led numerous jurisdictions to adopt 
statutes permitting creditors to reach both spouses' property.110 
This final group of enactments was so disparate that it may not 
even comprise a wave. It, like the second and third, only eroded 
unity to the extent that a specific disability of coverture was modi-
fied and did not provide significant rights, such as suffrage. None-
theless, these measures probably were most important to the even-
tual abolition of immunity.111 
This survey of the Married Women's statutes demonstrates the 
difficulty of characterizing the reform as a wholesale attack on the 
merger concept. The measures did not create independent legal 
status or comprehensively emancipate wives, much less restructure 
marriage or the family.112 The nineteenth century amendment pro-
cess is described best as "evolutionary"; it was primarily commer-
cial and principally involved the gradual extension of separate es-
tates to married women and equalization of property available to 
creditors.113 The considerations above are not dispositive of the 
legislation's implications for immunity, because by the concluding 
phases of the amendment process, coverture was no longer a legal 
reality. Indeed, the addition of each incident of separate legal iden-
tity and concomitant removal of an incident of coverture increased 
the plausibility of arguing that the measures eroded unity, en-
10
• See Chused, supra note 21, at 1400, 1424; cf. supra note 99 (discussing judicial con· 
struction of Acts). 
110 See Chused, supra note 21, at 1412; Chused, supra note 69, at 23, 35. Tho caveats 
mentioned in supra note 98 are especially applicable to the final group of Acts. For societal 
views of women, marriage, wives, and the family at this time, see the sources cited supra 
notes 103 & 106. 
111 See infra notes 246-55, 324 & 329 and accompanying text. 
112 As late as the 1890s, marital property law could be characterized as a "jumbled patch· 
work reflecting no coherent policy or philosophy concerning the status of married women." 
Johnston, supra note 5, at 1069; accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 38, 224. Cf. Chused 
telephone interview, supra note 102 ("radical restructuring of the family was not in the 
imagination" of any legislators, who were principally conservative men). 
113 Perhaps Professor Chused most accurately captures the amendment process: 
[O]ne must hypothesize that shifts in the nation's economy, job map, family 
structure, agricultural productivity, banking practices, and trade structures 
would be mirrored by piecemeal, one step to the left, one step to the right, 
reforms in legal norms, and that changes would reflect generally held percep· 
tions about women's appropriate sphere of influence. 
Chused, supra note 21, at 1423. 
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hanced wives' legal status, or emancipated them and, thus, altered 
the notion of tort immunity. Accordingly, as early as the 1860s, 
lawyers seized upon the statutes and contended that they provided 
for personal injury litigation between husbands and wives.114 These 
suits commenced a process which has continued unabated to the 
present. 
b. Immunity Case Law. Because legislatures did not specifically 
address interspousal tort immunity, judicial opinions have been 
determinative.115 The 125 years of case law-common law develop-
ment can be divided into four discrete periods.116 Between 1863 
and 1913, judges unanimously rejected interspousal personal injury 
claims. In 1910 a sharply divided United States Supreme Court 
recognized the rule. From 1914 until 1920, jurists in seven states 
allowed such actions, and a comparable number denied them. Dur-
ing the ensuing half century, immunity slowly eroded. Finally, 
since approximately 1970, the doctrine has been converted to a mi-
nority rule.117 
(i) 1863-1913. The twelve state courts asked to permit inter-
spousal tort actions in the half century after 1863 refused to do 
,,. The first reported case is Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366 (N.Y. 1863). Cf. 
supra note 63 and accompanying text (why first case brought then). 
115 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
11
• Numerous difficulties attend any attempt to provide a coherent account of 125 years of 
opinions. Many considerations affected specific cases that were issued during such a lengthy 
period. Moreover, there are hundreds of opinions. Their chronological examination yielded 
insights and undermined numerous preconceptions. The opinions can be classified into sur-
prisingly discrete groups, even though this may be too "structuralist," "instrumentalist.'' or 
"evolutionary" for some. See, e.g., Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 
1017, 1018-24 (1981) [hereinafter Gordon n; Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and 
the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 LAw & Soc'v REv. 9 
(1975) [hereinafter Gordon II]; Minow, supra note 9. The conclusions herein are intended to 
provoke thinking about these cases and the issues they raise. Others are encouraged to as-
sess the opinions and questions, reach their own conclusions, and contribute to ongoing de-
bate. See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1560 n.241. I appreciate the limitations of relying on legal 
texts and cases, especially intentional tort cases that reflect "trouble" in the community. 
See K LLEWELLYN & E. HoEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 20-63 (1941); Minow, supra note 9, at 
825, 850 (explaining case of trouble). 
"' For some of the difficulties entailed in ascertaining why the opinions were decided 
these ways, see G. WHITE, PATI'ERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGllT 74-95 (1978); Feinman, 
The Meaning of Reliance, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1373; Feinman, The Role of Ideas in Legal 
History, 78 Mica L. REv. 722 (1980); Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. RE\·. 57 
(1984); Gordon I, supra note 116; Gordon II, supra note 116; Minow, supra note 9. Helpful 
suggestions for future work can be gleaned from N. BASCH, supra note 9; Chused, supra note 
21; Minow, supra note 9. 
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so.118 Uniform rejection is not surprising, given the legal status of 
wives, the significance of coverture, and the lack of clarity respect-
ing immunity in the Married Women's Acts.119 Moreover, this re-
sult was consistent with courts' perspectives on their responsibili-
ties in handling immunity, prevailing societal images of females, 
wedlock, wives, and the family, and other tort law developments.120 
Somewhat less predictable than the results reached are the similar 
reasoning processes employed.121 The cases rejecting interspousal 
tort actions articulate every major policy argument subsequently 
espoused to justify immunity, and they facilitate understanding of 
11
• An 1882 opinion of a New York intermediate appellate court would have permitted 
interspousal tort litigation. See Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 33, rev'd, 89 N.Y. 
644 (1882). The summary reversal of the case indicates its relative insignificance. Nation· 
wide retention of immunity during the ensuing 30 years and the failure of courts to abolish 
immunity in reliance on the decision also reflect its insignificance. But the opinion's author 
did depend on decisional techniques, statutory interpretation, and policy concepts similar to 
those relied upon by many judges who later abrogated immunity. For purposes of con· 
tinuity, the decision will be treated with the initial cases abolishing immunity, see infra 
notes 246-64 and accompanying text. There also is the 1910 dissenting opinion in Thompson 
v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910) (discussed infra notes 205-21 and accompanying text). 
The cases retaining immunity were Thompson, 218 U.S. 611; Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 
38, 103 P. 219, 221, (1909), overruled, Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 691, 376 P.2d 65, 70 
(1962); Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. 106 (1891); Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 296, 44 N.E. 
462, 465 (1896); Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa 182 (1875), overruled, Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 
616 (Iowa 1979); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 309 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. Mac· 
Donald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980); Libby v. Berry, 74 Me. 286, 289 (1883); Bandfield v. Band· 
field, 117 Mich. 80, 83, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (1898), overruled, Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 
187 N.W.2d 236 (1971); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 428, 107 N.W. 1047, 1048 (1906), 
overruled, Poepping v. Lindeman, 268 Minn. 30, 127 N.W.2d 512 (1964), and overruled, 
Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 
Barb. 366, 368-70 (N.Y. 1863); Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641 (N.Y. 1865); Schultz, 34 
N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 26; Abbe v. Abbe, 22 A.D. 483, 484, 48 N.Y.S. 25 (1897); Nickerson v. 
Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281, 283 (1886), overruled, Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 
1978); Sykes v. Speer, 112 S.W. 422, 424-25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), modified sub nom. Speer 
& Goodnight v. Sykes, 102 Tex. 451, 119 S.W. 86 (1909); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 
496, 501, 118 P. 629, 631 (1911), overruled, Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 
(1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). Cf. Deeds v. 
Strode, 6 Idaho 317, 55 P. 656 (1898) (dictum); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 391, 
77 S.W. 664, 668 (1903) (dictum), overruled, Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 759 (Tenn. 
1983). 
11
• See supra notes 66-111 and accompanying text. 
120 See infra notes 159-89 and accompanying text (considerations regarding torts, judicial 
views, and societal images). The societal images also are mentioned, see supra notes 103 & 
106, and articulated by judges in opinions recognizing immunity. See, e.g., infra notes 141· 
56 and accompanying text. 
121 The reasoning processes are remarkably similar, although not identical. 
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the doctrine's survival into the late twentieth century.122 Accord-
ingly, these cases merit comprehensive examination. 
The starting point for the courts was the common law. Most 
judges simply announced, with little explanation and even with ap-
proval of plaintiff's counsel,123 the existence of a substantive com-
mon-law rule of interspousal tort immunity, although there techni-
cally was no rule as such.12" These judges apparently were taking 
the common-law fiction of marital merger, essentially as formu-
lated by Blackstone and applied in America, and transforming it 
into a substantive tort rule.125 Some courts, however, were more 
explicit about their reasoning. They began with the unity maxim 
and explained that at common law wives: (1) had no substantive 
civil causes of action against anyone, including their husbands; (2) 
were under a procedural disability, requiring that husbands file 
tort suits on their behalf; or (3) were not entitled to damages re-
covered because any such award would belong to their husbands.126 
As each court concluded that there was a common-law rule of 
tort immunity, each proclaimed that the rule could be modified 
122 Indeed, the public policies judges espoused during this period were adopted by jurists 
deciding cases much later; were the precursors of the principal policy arguments for immu-
nity's retention; and eventually evolved into a standard litany recited by courts whenever 
they rejected requests to permit interspousal tort actions. The cases also afford insights into 
nineteenth century judicial decisionmaking and societal views of women, llllllTiage, wives, 
and the family that have implications beyond the confines of tort immunity. See, e.g., infra 
notes 177-81 and accompanying text. 
123 Counsel who pursued the first reported case conceded that "by the rules or the com-
mon law husband and wife could not sue each other in a civil action." Longendyke v. 
Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 367 (N.Y. 1863). 
"' "[T]ort actions between husband and wife were unknown at common lnw." Haglund, 
supra note 24, at 704. One reason for this was that "torts was not considered a discrete 
branch of law until the late nineteenth century." G. WHITE, TORT LAw IN Aw:luCA 1 (1979). 
Accord W. PROSSER & W.P. KEEToN, supra note 2, § 1. 
120 See, e.g., Main v. Main, 46 IlL App. 106, 107 (1891); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wnsh. 
496, 498, 118 P. 629, 629 (1911), overruled, Freehe v. Freehe, 81Wash.2d183, 500 P.2d 771 
(1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). For n discussion 
of Blackstone's articulation of the merger fiction and of his influence in America, see supra 
notes 20-23 and accompanying text. Cf. Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 522-23, 105 S.E. 
206, 210 (1920); supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (alternative origins or merger 
fiction). One judge simply seemed to presume that a substantive tort rule existed. See Bnnd-
field v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 83, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (1898), overruled, Hosko v. Hosko, 385 
Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971). 
12
• See, e.g., Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 288-91, 44 N.E. 462, 463·64 (1896); 
Longendyke, 44 Barb. at 368-69; Schultz, 65 Wash. at 498, 118 P. at 629. 
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only by statute.127 Thus the merger concept, which remained, after 
all, a fiction, was converted into a rule of common law. This pro-
nouncement had two effects. First, it invested the transformed 
unity construct with solidity and validity.128 Second, it foreclosed 
consideration of the interspousal issue as a common-law policy 
question amenable to judicial treatment independent of legislative 
action.129 Indeed, it is difficult today to appreciate the almost mys-
tical authority that the merger notion exerted over jurists during 
this period. Unity was a "metaphor of enormous power" and resili-
ence that exercised "linguistic hegemony."130 The fiction was effec-
tively the measure of all things legal between husbands and wives. 
Once judges had chosen to treat the merger maxim as a com-
mon-law rule that could be altered only by legislation, the immu-
nity issue became essentially a question of statutory interpreta-
tion-that is, of ascertaining whether the Married Women's Acts 
permitted interspousal tort claims. In construing the statutes, most 
courts followed several steps and employed varying techniques 
purportedly designed to determine the intent of legislatures in 
adopting the enactments. 
The initial step was the perfunctory examination of the relevant 
statutory language to discern whether it expressly prescribed tort 
127 See, e.g., Henneger, 145 Ind. at 293-94, 44 N.E. at 464; Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 
307 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980); Freethy v. 
Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, 641-42 (N.Y. 1865). 
12
• See infra note 130 and accompanying text (solidity and validity); supra notes 20·27; 
infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (possible reasons therefor). 
12
• Although jurists did rely on policy concepts when construing the Married Women's 
Acts, see, e.g., infra notes 143-56 and accompanying text, treating tort immunity solely as a 
common law policy question may have been incompatible with judges' views of their roles, 
see infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. These ideas conflict with the widely accepted 
view that many judges worked in the "Grand Style" and were amenable to modifying the 
common law between 1800 and 1850. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DE· 
CIDING APPEALS 35-38 (1960); M. HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 26-30; R. POUND, Tm: FORMA· 
TtVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938); infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. Cf. Abbott, 67 
Me. at 307 (allusion to law's growth by adapting itself to present societal conditions). 
130 I use hegemony in the sense that Antonio Gramsci did, see, e.g., A. GRAMSCI, SELEC· 
TIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (1971), as described in c. BOGGS, GRAMSCI's MARXISM 
39-40 (1976), and as Professor Basch does, see N. BASCH, supra note 9. Cf. E. GENOVESE, 
supra note 29, at 25 ("hegemonic function of the law"). Professor Basch persuasively shows 
the enormous power and resilience of the merger fiction which served the "legal needs of 
three shifting social structures," and "survived its feudal origins and early modern connec· 
tions," "the dislocations of colonization and revolution," and "the legislative assaults of the 
nineteenth century." N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 26-27, 38-69. 
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suits between spouses. No Act was found to so provide.131 Although 
a few courts acknowledged that particular statutes' wording might 
be sufficiently comprehensive to encompass such litigation, each 
felt obligated to ensure that this reading comported with the in-
tent and spirit of its legislature. The focus of analysis for all of the 
courts, therefore, ostensibly shifted from the language of the stat-
utes almost exclusively to the legislative intent and purposes which 
were believed to underlie adoption.132 When ascertaining legislative 
intent, the courts did not consult secondary legislative materials, 
such as committee reports or floor debates.133 Instead, they em-
ployed abstract canons of statutory construction and made choices 
premised upon their ideas of public policy. 
The overarching principle of statutory interpretation, variously 
formulated, was the "derogation" canon: courts strictly construed 
legislation in derogation of the common law.134 For example, some 
courts declared that when an enactment was phrased in general 
language and any doubt existed, it should be interpreted in accor-
dance with the common law because the legislature was presumed 
m See, e.g., Main v. Main, 46 IlL App. 106, 109 (1891); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 
80, 82, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (1898), overruled, Rosko v. Rosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 
(1971); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 498-99, 118 P. 629, 629-30 (1911), overruled, 
Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 
Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). 
132 This shift in analytical focus constituted an implicit rejection or the "pluin meaning" 
concept, application of which would have obviated the need to consider legislative intenL 
See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 621-24 (1910) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The plain 
meaning concept was familiar to nineteenth century jurists. See United States v. Fisher, 6 
U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 399 (1805); T. SEDGWICK. A TREATISE ON THE RULES WmcH Go\'ERN Tl!E 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 309-12 (1857). Cf. 
2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCT10N § 46.01 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973); 
Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Stat-
utes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939) (discussing concept). 
133 None of the opinions listed at supra note 118 mentions secondary sources. Writers 
have identified this phenomenon in broader contexts. See, e.g., J. HURST, TUE GROWTII OF 
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAw MAKERs 186-88 (1950) (tracing judicial use or legislation) (herein-
after HuRST I]; J. JOHNSON, supra note 77, at 78-79 (first third or twentieth century v.it-
nessed more pronounced use of legislative history). Courts apparently did not attempt to 
consult legislative materials even with suits instituted relatively soon after enactmenL See, 
e.g, Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641 (N.Y. 1865). But cf. supra note 77 and accompanying 
text (few states compiled legislative history and when available it probably was not illumi-
nating); infra note 167 (questioning propriety of consulting secondary sources). 
1
"' See, e.g., Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 36, 103 P. 219, 221 (1909), or:erruled, Self v. 
Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962); Bandfield, 117 Mich. at 82, 75 N.W. at 288; 
Freethy, 42 Barb. at 642-43, 645. Cf. infra note 167 (discussing derogation canon). 
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to have changed the common law only to the extent that the stat-
ute expressly stated.135 A few judges articulated the canon differ-
ently. They warned that courts must remember the law prior to 
passage of new legislation and the modification intended and as-
sume that legislators were cognizant of the longstanding common 
law and legislated with it in mind.136 Regardless of how courts for-
mulated the derogation canon, they applied it with exacting speci-
ficity, invariably yielding the same result: legislatures intended 
only those modifications of the common law explicitly enumerated 
in the terms of the statutes. For instance, a statute providing that 
"any married woman may bring and maintain an action in her own 
name, for damages, against any person . . . for any injury to her 
person or character, the same as if she were sole"137 was deemed 
insufficient. Courts applying the derogation canon determined that 
the enactments did not lift disabilities imposed upon wives at com-
mon law,138 sever merged legal identity,139 or expand wives' legal 
personalities140 any more than was expressly provided. 
The second principal way that judges discerned "legislative in-
tent" was to rely upon public policy reasons why legislators could 
not have intended to prescribe interspousal tort claims.141 The ar-
ticulation of these policies was subtle and complex. Courts seemed 
to be saying that legislatures could not have intended certain un-
desirable effects, primarily relating to marriage and the family, 
... See, e.g., Bandfield, 117 Mich. at 82, 75 N.W. at 288; Freethy, 42 Barb. at 642·45. 
136 See, e.g., Bandfield, 117 Mich. at 82, 75 N.W. at 288; Freethy, 42 Barb. at 642-45. But 
cf. Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 30 (holding Act's purpose to invade and dispel 
common law, and Act not to be construed with reference to common law at time of passage), 
rev'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882). 
m Freethy, 42 Barb. at 642 (construing New York Married Women's Act). The court 
would have required explicit inclusion of the term "husband" before allowing suit, see id. at 
644-45, even though when the state assembly wanted to exclude husbands from the purview 
of Married Women's Acts, it nearly always provided so expressly. See Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. at 32-33. 
1
•• See, e.g., Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 428, 107 N.W. 1047, 1048 (1906); Freethy, 42 
Barb. at 645. But see Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 30. 
uo See, e.g., Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 293, 44 N.E. 462, 464 (1896); Longendyke 
v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 369 (N.Y. 1863). But see Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 30. 
140 See, e.g., Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 35·36, 103 P. 219, 220-21 (1909), overruled, Self 
v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962); Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. 106, 108 (1891); 
Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 83, 75 N.W. 287 288 (1898), overruled, Hosko v. 
Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 197 N.W.2d 236 (1971). But see Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 30. 
141 Nearly every court that recognized or retained immunity employed this method and 
relied upon similar policy reasons. 
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which judges thought would necessarily result from tort suits be-
tween husbands and wives. Thus, courts inverted the technical 
meaning of legislative intent by consulting their post-enactment 
concerns regarding the statutes' potential adverse impacts, rather 
than the contemporaneous purposes of legislators who passed the 
statutes.142 
Courts espoused many policy reasons for finding that the stat-
utes did not authorize interspousal tort suits; most of these policies 
pertained much more to marriage and the family than to substan-
tive tort law.143 The overarching factor was fear that allowing per-
sonal injury claims would create, or exacerbate preexisting, marital 
disharmony. 144 Because it was clear state policy to protect wedlock 
and the family, legislatures could never have "intended to permit 
such actions. "145 
One important way in which these suits were thought to disrupt 
connubial peace was by exposing delicate matters to public scru-
tiny.146 Abolition of immunity also was believed to threaten marital 
141 Cf. T. SEDGWICK, supra note 132, at 309, 231 (rejecting judicial consideration of effects 
when legislation clear but recognizing such practice when legislation ambiguous). For a dis-
cussion of what legislators who passed the Acts might have "intended" for tort immunity, 
see supra notes 66-114 and accompanying text. 
143 Indeed, the cases as a whole leave the impression that tort immunity was more a mat· 
ter of family law than of tort law. 
, .. The marital harmony concept, which was articulated first, has been enunciated most 
consistently and still has much vitality. See infra notes 417-54 and accompanying text. Most 
of the policy reasons that judges espoused are versions of this rationale. See, e.g., infra notes 
518 & 539 and accompanying text. 
14
• See, e.g., Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 35, 103 P. 219, 220 (1909), overruled, Self v. 
Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962); Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 368-69 
(N.Y. 1863). But cf. Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 33, reu'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882) 
(interspousal tort actions could preserve or promote harmony). 
"" Because "private matters of the whole period of married existence might be exposed 
by suits," courts found it preferable "to draw the curtain and shut out the public gaze." 
Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307-08 (1877), overruled, :MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 
71 (Me. 1980). This privacy component of the marital harmony rationale relates to broader 
themes in nineteenth century judicial decisionmaking that "privatized" and "de-legalized" 
the family. See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1501-07; infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text. 
Central to these ideas is a world "split" into a legalized public sphere inhabited by men and 
a private sphere without law to which women were relegated. See K O'DONOVAN, supra note 
65, at 59-158; Powers, supra note 65, at 70-73, 79·88; Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and 
Patriarchy, ch. 15, in THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Taub & Schneider, supra 
note 94; cf. C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL IiARAssMENT OF WORKING Wor.IEN: A CASE OF SEX DIS-
CRIMINATION 83-90 (1979); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: To-
ward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 656-58 (1983). But cf. Teitelbaum, Family His· 
tory and Family Law, 1985 Wts. L. REv. 1135, 1165 (danger of split sphere appro:ich as 
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tranquility by allowing spouses to invoke the tort litigation process 
for the resolution of minor conjugal differences, such as petty do-
mestic quarrels.147 Moreover, judges reasoned that retention of im-
munity could even promote marital harmony because it required 
spouses to resolve their difficulties, essentially by forgiving and 
forgetting.148 
Numerous courts also evinced concern about the problems en-
tailed in distinguishing behavior that would be considered tortious 
between strangers from similar conduct between spouses which 
would not be actionable.149 A number of judges worried about bur-
dens imposed upon the judicial system by excessive and frivolous 
or trivial claims, and a few jurists expressly mentioned the possi-
bility of multiple suits upon divorce.150 
Courts also rejected interspousal tort claims because as a matter 
of policy they believed that legislators could not have "intended" 
such claims. The judges premised this conclusion on the legisla-
tures' provision of adequate remedies for spouses for tortious be-
havior, primarily criminal and divorce actions.161 Some courts, ap-
parently alluding to the threat of duplicate claims upon marital 
dissolution, specifically observed that divorce afforded the advan-
tage of resolving all interspousal disputes in a single proceeding.102 
analytical tool). 
"' Courts evinced concern about interspousal litigation over "every real and fancied 
wrong." Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 82-83, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (1898), overruled, 
Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, N.W.2d 236 (1971). Accord Longendyke, 44 Barb. nt 369. 
This idea is a forerunner of the "floodgates" policy argument. See infra notes 149-50 & 521-
41 and accompanying text. 
148 See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDon· 
ald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980). Accord Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, 645 (N.Y. 1865). For 
helpful discussion of the "forgiving and forgetting" rationale and related notions of altru-
ism, sharing, and sacrifice within the family, see Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private 
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1725-37 (1976); Olsen, supra note 65, at 1505, 
1520-24; Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 623-24 (1983). 
149 See, e.g., Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 33, 34 (Davis, P.J., dissenting), reu'd, 89 
N.Y. 644 (1882). 
'"
0 See, e.g., Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. 106, 108-09 (1891); Abbott, 67 Me. at 307-08; 
Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 501, 118 P. 629, 630-31 (1911), overruled, Freehe v. 
Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972), and overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 
729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). This idea illustrates the overlapping nature of the policy argu· 
ments because it implicates the marital harmony, "floodgates," and "alternative remedies" 
arguments. See supra note 147 and infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. 
'"' See Main, 46 Ill. App. at 108; see infra notes 542-63 and accompanying text. 
m See, e.g., Main, 46 Ill. App. at 108; Abbott, 61 Me. at 307-08; Schultz, 65 Wash. at 501, 
118 P. at 630-31. 
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Judges articulated several additional public policies. They de-
clared that wives should not be allowed to sue their husbands for 
personal injuries because "marriage acts as a perpetually operating 
discharge of all wrongs between man and wife.m113 Courts also ex-
pressed concern that such litigation would provide a new means for 
unfairly raiding estates111' and could jeopardize testamentary dis-
positions that otherwise might have been made.m Moreover, 
judges espoused a juridical equality idea, observing that husbands 
never had been permitted to file personal injury claims against 
wives.156 
In short, courts treated the interspousal issue principally as a 
question of statutory interpretation by discerning legislative intent 
through application of certain abstract canons and public policies. 
Judges could have made different choices, however. Instead of rely-
ing upon the derogation canon, they could have used its comple-
ment: remedial measures are to be construed liberally. Similarly, 
courts might have found that permitting interspousal tort litiga-
tion could deter the intentional infliction of injury, thereby pro-
moting marital harmony.1117 Moreover, judges might have eschewed 
reliance on the canons and public policy and consulted legislative 
103 Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877), overruled, M.acDonnld v. MacDonald, 412 
A.2d 71 (Me. 1980), cited in Peters v. Peters, 156 Cnl. 32, 36, 103 P. 219, 221 (1909), ouer-
ruled, Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962). But cf. Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 26, 33 (holding husband's intentional tort violated marit.al contract and responsibil-
ities), rev'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882). Perhaps courts recognizing immunity were suggesting that 
marriage is a contract, albeit not subject to the rules generally governing such agreements. 
See text accompanying supra note 16. 
1$4 See, e.g., Abbott, 67 Me. at 308; Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 369 (N.Y. 
1863). The concerns appear to be a precursor of the fraud and collusion policy contention, 
discussed infra notes 457-503 and accompanying text. See Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 
317 (Tex. 1987). 
105 Longendyke, 44 Barb. at 369. 
106 See, e.g., Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 428, 107 N.W. 1047, 1048 (1906), overruled, 
Poepping v. Lindeman, 268 Minn. 30, 127 N.W.2d 512 (1964), and ouerruled, Beaudette v. 
Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, 644 (N.Y. 
1865); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 500, 118 P. 629, 630 (1911), overruled, Freehe 
v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 
729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). For .a helpful discussion of the juridicnl equality idea, see Olsen, 
supra note 65, at 1505, 1512, 1516-20. Of the cases listed at supra note 118, Peters v. Peters, 
156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909), is the only one brought by .a husband intentionnlly injured by 
his wife. 
107 See Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 33 (contemporaneous judicinl expression), 
rev'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882); infra note 445 and accompanying text (modem expression). 
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history. uss 
There are a number of explanations for the courts' treatment of 
immunity. The most significant derive from broader currents in ju-
dicial decisionmaking after 1850, particularly jurists' views of ap-
propriate roles for courts to play, especially vis-a-vis legislatures. 
Judges' perspectives on their functions changed dramatically in 
the middle of the nineteenth century. The first half of the century 
was a time of great legal innovation. Jurists deciding cases in the 
"Grand Stylemise were willing to use the common law as an instru-
ment of social policy and came to see themselves as lawmakers 
with primary responsibility for shaping private law doctrine.100 
In contrast, the second half of the century was a period of con-
solidation, when "precedents were regarded as settled, rules as for-
mulated, and principles as defined,"161 characterized by formalistic 
opinion writing. Courts typically were reluctant to act unless com-
pelled by precedent or empowered by statute.162 Professing to ob-
serve a strict separation of powers, and categorizing governmental 
authority according to function, each branch having hegemony in 
its respective sphere, judges announced that they were merely to 
••• Judges may not have relied on legislative history, however, because it was usually un· 
available or unilluminating or because such reliance was considered improper. See supra 
notes 77 & 133 and accompanying text; infra note 167. Cf. infra notes 159-66 and accompa· 
nying text (explanations why judges relied on canons and public policy). 
Of course, judges also might have read the Acts' language more broadly. But even courts 
treating Acts passed nearer the end of the amendment process, when coverture had been 
substantially eroded, read them narrowly so as to Gnd that wives could only sue third par· 
ties. See, e.g., Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909). 
••• K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 129, at 36-38. Accord M. HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 26-30; 
HURST I, supra note 133, at 186-88; J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN TllE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956) [hereinafter HURST II]. Full treatment of these 
ideas is beyond the scope of this Article and must await much more research, but their 
contours can be sketched, and plausible accounts afforded, by relying principally on the 
sources above. 
••
0 See M. HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 26-30; HURST II, supra note 159; K. LLEWELLYN, 
supra note 129, at 36-37. Cf. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and 
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 
(1950) (statutes construed freely to implement purposes from 1820 to 1850). Accord Hu11sT 
I, supra note 133, at 186-89. 
••• J. REID, CHIEF JUSTICE: THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF CHARLES DoE 299 (1967). Accord M. 
HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 253-66. Cf. HURST II, supra note 159; K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 
129, at 35-41; R SUMMERS, lNSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982) (discuss· 
ing formalism). 
••• See J. REID, supra note 161, at 299; G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 113· 
14 (1976). 
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find, declare or interpret, but not to make, law. "Policy," it was 
said, "is for the legislature, not for the courts, and so is change 
even in pure common law."163 Judges exhibited a preference ap-
proaching reverence for the common law, much of which their 
predecessors had created during the preceding half century. Corre-
spondingly, courts evinced less regard for legislative law. They 
viewed statutes as alien intruders upon the well-ordered common-
law system.164 Judges also considered legislatures as competitors 
for governmental authority; as populist, political, and potentially 
redistributional; or as lacking the requisite competence to draft ad-
equate measures.165 
Thus, courts displayed significantly increased willingness to 
scrutinize, read restrictively, and even invalidate enactments like 
the Married Women's Acts.166 Judges regularly announced that 
policy was for legislatures, not courts. They ascertained legislative 
intent almost entirely by employing techniques and consulting 
materials unrelated to the Acts or the legislative process.167 They 
accorded cursory consideration to statutory phraseology, unless 
blindingly clear. Jurists also applied abstract rules of construction, 
particularly the derogation canon, while they ascertained legisla-
163 K LLEWELLYN, supra note 129, at 38. Accord HURST I, supra note 133, at 186-89. 
104 See K LLEWELLYN, supra note 129, at 39; HURST I, supra note 133, at 186-89; J. 
HURST, DEALING WrrH STATUTES 41-42 (1982) [hereinafter HuRST Ill]; Stone, The Common 
Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 12-15 (1936). Cf. R COSGROVE, OUR W\0 THE 
COMMON LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL COMMUNITY, 1870-1930, at 1-2 (1988) (Anglo-
American community of scholars dedicated to celebration or common law dated from 1870 
and reached zenith in years before World Warn. 
1
•• See M. HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 253-66; HURST I, supra note 133, at 186-89; K 
LLEWELLYN, supra note 129, at 38-40; HURST III, supra note 164, at 42. 
168 
"[I]n the late nineteenth century, judges were not inclined to look favorably on legisla-
tion which, like the Married Women's Property Acts, changed doctrine which judges had 
made the law of the land." HURST I, supra note 133, at 186. Accord K Lu:wELLYN, supra 
note 129, at 38; cf. Llewellyn, supra note 160, at 400 (statutes limited or eviscerated by 
wooden and literal reading and insistence on precise language). 
167 Indeed, as late as 1900, the United States Supreme Court, which had greater access to 
such material than state judges, declared that congressionnl debates were "not appropriate 
sources of information from which to discover the meaning or the language or a statute 
passed by that body." United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 
(1897). Cf. HURST I, supra note 133, at 187; J. JOHNSON, supra note 77, at 78-80 (Supreme 
Court relied consistently on such materials only in twentieth century); Thomir.>0n v. 
Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618, 621 (1910) (majority and dissenting opinions in tort immunity 
case eschew reliance on materials). See generally T. SEDGWICK, supra note 132, at 241-47 
(contemporaneous treatise stating that legislative intent was to be gleaned only from statu-
tory words). 
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tive intent by considering possible consequences of specific 
interpretations.168 
An additional theme in nineteenth century judicial decisionmak-
ing was the courts' reluctance to intervene in the private family.100 
Judges hesitated to interfere with familial interactions, principally 
because domestic life was viewed as sacred, delicate, altruistic, and 
certainly not for public scrutiny.170 This reticence was manifested 
in jurists' refusal to criminalize interspousal activity which would 
have been illegal between strangers or to treat as legally cognizable 
disputes among family members involving domestic relations.171 
Most telling, however, was the courts' reluctance to legalize rela-
tions between husbands and wives in property and contract, al-
though the Married Women's Acts provided much more explicitly 
for such interspousal interaction.172 
Two propositions follow if legislators were seen as "lawmakers" 
and judges as "law interpreters." First, the common law could only 
be changed by statute, because judicial alteration would be law-
making. Second, courts read statutes modifying the common law 
narrowly and with demanding specificity. Accordingly, predicating 
interspousal tort litigation on liberal construction of broad enact-
ments would require courts to add words to legislation and, thus, 
168 See HURST Ill, supra note 164, at 42; HURST I, supra note 133, at 186 (application of 
derogation canon). The canon's application is revealing. As with most tenets of statutory 
construction, an equally persuasive counter-rule could have been invoked to yield tho oppo· 
site conclusion as to legislative intent. One is that remedial legislation is to be interpreted 
liberally. For the modern exposition of this, see Llewellyn, supra note 160. See also T. 
SEDGWICK, supra note 132, at 231, 309 (consideration of effects proper when legislation am· 
biguous but not when clear). Several writers have contended that the judicial treatment of 
statutes reviewed often was obstructive and narrowed the legislation's intended effects. See 
HURST I, supra note 133, at 186-88; K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 129, at 38·39. 
1
•• Courts were also said to have "privatized" or "delegalized" the family. For a compro· 
hensive discussion of these phenomena, see Olsen, supra note 65, at 1504-07. See also C. 
MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 83-90; Taub & Schneider, supra note 94; MacKinnon, supra 
note 146; Polan, supra note 146; Powers, supra note 65, at 70-88. Cf. R. UNGER, LAW IN 
MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 144 (1976) (familial relationships 
governed by "law of the jungle" reflected in state noninterference with "exploitation of 
power advantages within the family"). 
17° For a comprehensive analysis, see Olsen, supra note 65, at 1504-07. 
111 For a tort immunity case articulating these views of the family, see Abbott v. Abbott, 
67 Me. 304, 306-09 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980). 
112 The Acts, discussed supra notes 66-114 and accompanying text, expressly legalized 
relations in contract and property between husbands and wives during the nineteenth con· 
tury but only legalized tort actions in the twentieth century. See supra note 75. Cf. N. 
BASCH, supra note 9, at 200-23 (judicial reluctance to legalize husband-wife relations). 
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to make law.173 
An additional explanation for the courts' treatment of immunity 
is the idea of "judicial de-radicalization,m7" meaning that courts 
consciously undermined clear efforts of legislatures to prescribe in-
terspousal tort suits.176 The de-radicalization concept cannot be 
sustained, however, given the imprecise language and purposes of 
the Married Women's Acts, as well as the difficulty of securing reli-
able evidence pertaining to .the passage and judicial treatment of 
the Acts.176 
Other important reasons for the courts' resolution of the inter-
spousal immunity issue pertain to prevailing societal images of f e-
males, wedlock, wives, and the family. These images-of a world 
split into a superior, public, legalized sphere occupied by males 
and an inferior, private realm without law to which women were 
relegated; of females as weak, inferior beings who needed men's 
protection; of marriage and the family as private, altruistic and sa-
cred-often were articulated expressly in the cases. 177 Most signifi-
173 If judges construing statutes generally considered it improper to consult legislati\'e his· 
tory but appropriate to discern legislative intent by applying canons and public policy, it 
should not be surprising that these principles were employed when courts analyzed the Mar-
ried Women's Acts. Moreover, if jurists were reluctant to recognize interspousal interactions 
in property and contract, clearly provided for in statutes, they would ha\'e been e\'en less 
willing to permit tort claims. Although courts currently treat tort immunity almost exclu· 
sively as a common-law policy issue, such treatment might ha\'e appeared e\'en more inap-
propriate to late nineteenth century judges. But cf. text accompanying supra notes 159-60 
(judges from 1800 to 1850 viewed themselves as "policymakers"). 
174 See Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern 
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 270-80 (1978) (explanation of idea). 
Cf. P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 123; Johnston, supra note 5, at 1069 (context of judicial 
treatment of Acts). 
175 See, e.g., Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 28, 30, 33, reu'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882). 
Cf. Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 524, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920); N. BASCH, supra note 9, 
at 202-03, 206-07 (later allegations of judicial obstructionism). 
176 See P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 123; Chused, supra note 21, at 1400 n.2ll; Johnston, 
supra note 5, at 1069. For a discussion of the Acts' language and purposes and evidence 
regarding their enactment, see supra notes 66-114 and accompanying text. There is wide-
spread agreement, however, that courts narrowly read the Acts. See supra note 99. 
m See cases cited supra notes 145-56. See also Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 5S2. 
589 (1858) (wife's identity merged into husband's); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 
130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring} (discussing propriety of wife remaining in pri\'ate 
sphere; impropriety of wife having occupation distinct from husband in public sphere); 
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1888) (holding marriage more than mere contract; 
not subject to normal contractual rules, thereby enabling husband to a\'oid obligations to 
abandoned wife); Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485 (1904) (wife as husband's property); 
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) ("woman has always been dependent upon 
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cant, however, probably was the merger fiction, especially insofar 
as it conveniently captured those images and thereby essentially 
embodied the underlying social relations that governed the nine-
teenth century patriarchal family.178 Indeed, when jurists observed 
existing society, it may well have been inconceivable to them that 
legislatures could have intended to intrude upon a husband's con-
trol over his wife's body, the most delicate area of the sacrosanct 
institution of marriage.179 
The judiciary was an all male elite, few of whom were sympa-
thetic to alterations of the status quo, especially the potential sub-
version of traditional gender roles that interspousal tort litigation 
might have represented.180 Nevertheless, most judges probably 
man"). Cf. Polan, supra note 146; Powers, supra note 65, at 72-73; Taub & Schneider, supra 
note 94 (discussions of Supreme Court cases). Cf. Minow, supra note 9, at 840-51; Olsen, 
From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, Illi-
nois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518, 1523-34 (1986) (recent analysis of Bradwell caution· 
ing against overemphasizing importance). For discussion of societal views of women, mar-
riage, wives, and the family at the beginning of this period, see supra notes 65, 89-92, 103, 
106 & 109 and accompanying text. These views of marriage and the family as private and of 
the separate spheres probably reached their apogee in the Victorian era. By approximately 
1890, however, the images were beginning to change. After 1890 more single and married 
women attended college and entered the workforce; social and economic changes drew to-
gether the private, family sphere and the legal, public sphere; and most entities within the 
emerging middle class experienced a new self-consciousness. See generally E. FLEXNEll, 
supra note 96, at 182-247; S. EISENSTEIN, GIVE Us BREAD BuT GIVE Us RosES: WORKING 
WOMEN'S CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890 TO THE FIRST WORLD WAii (1983); A 
KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 5-6 (1965); R. SEN· 
NE'IT, FAMILIES AGAINST THE CITY: MIDDLE CLASS HOMES OF INDUSTRIAL CHICAGO, 1872-1890 
(1970); R WIEBE, supra note 106, at 111-32. Cf. E. PLECK, supra note 40, at 69-120 (three 
reform efforts against domestic violence defining it as crime requiring stern punishment 
reached apex in last third of nineteenth century); Minow, supra note 9, at 874-83 (women 
factory and volunteer workers created ethic of caring and new roles but not individual rights 
within family). 
178 See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 27, 38-41, 68-89, 200-03, 224-32 (merger fiction); Olsen, 
supra note 65, at 1504-07; Unger, supra note 148, at 623-24 (nineteenth century family). For 
discussion of the correlation between legal doctrine and underlying social relations, see C. 
MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 83-90; Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 829 (1983). 
178 The specter of wives invoking the tort litigation process and hauling their husbands 
before public tribunals to divulge the intimacies of their lives, thereby striking at the es· 
sence of marriage, all to the detriment of individual families and the society, must have 
been unimaginable to most judges. Even if judges could have overcome their incredulity, 
they probably would have found the effects of interspousal tort litigation more deleterious 
than beneficial. 
180 See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 208, 225 (pervasive maleness of legal system at that 
time). Cf. Polan, supra note 146, at 301 (same today). 
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were not attempting consciously to suppress women but believed 
in a subtler, more paternalistic way that denying wives suits 
against their husbands was best for the individual women and 
society.181 
Developments in tort law are less important to resolution of the 
early immunity cases than are the factors discussed above because 
torts had only begun to emerge as a discrete field of jurisprudence 
and because the immunity opinions rarely mentioned tort princi-
ples.182 Nonetheless, insofar as a field which can be denominated 
torts is discernable, much in the area comported with judicial 
treatment of immunity. 
Torts "was essentially a common law subject, one whose rules 
and doctrines had been articulated and developed by judges and 
academicians [so that] legal problems in Torts were 'solved' pri-
marily by the application of common-law principles . . . rather 
than through legislation. m 93 The prevailing tenor of tort jurispru-
dence, which could be characterized fairly as one of constricted lia-
bility, was evidenced by the rise and consolidation of the negli-
gence concept. During this period, jurists formulated modern 
negligence and expanded the scope of its coverage. Strict liability 
and intent faded in significance, while nuisance essentially disap-
peared.184 Correspondingly, courts shifted the burden of proof from 
181 For example, see the paternalistic public policies enunciated for recognizing immunity 
in the cases cited supra notes 145-56. Some have suggested that courts' treatment of immu-
nity was an exercise in male chauvinism, whereby judges manipulated available legal mecha-
nisms to perpetuate the subjugation of wives. See, e.g., Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 
523-24, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920); see also L. KANOWITZ, supra note 5, at 40; Warren, Hus-
band's Right to Wife's Services, 38 HARv. L. REv. 421, 423 (1925). But this view is "reduc-
tive if not somewhat ahistorical" and ignores other realities, such as "why male lesfulators 
wanted to change the law in the first place." See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 225-26. 
18
' See G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 3-62 (discussing coalescence of tort law). There is 
widespread agreement about the general ideas in this account, but controversy and revision 
have attended recent analyses of numerous specifics discussed. A reliable account can be 
afforded by relying principally upon l\.1. HORWITZ, supra note 43; G. WHITE, supra note 124, 
at 3-62; and Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Re-
interpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981). 
183 G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 60. This account of tort law dovetails with the judges' 
view of their roles vis-a-vis legislatures. See supra notes 159-67 and accompanying texL 
"[l)n the late nineteenth century, judges were not inclined to look favorably on lesfulation 
which, like the Married Women's Property Act, changed doctrine which judges had made 
the law of the land." HuRST I, supra note 133, at 186. 
,.. See G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 61. For history of the negligence idea, see ~1. HOR· 
wrrz, supra note 43, at 85-99; W. PROSSER & W.P. 'KEEroN, supra note 2, § 28, at 161; G. 
398 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:359 
the defendant to show that he or she exercised extraordinary care 
to the plaintiff to prove that defendant failed to exercise ordinary 
care. m Judges also recognized, or emphasized, the "unholy trinity" 
of defenses: contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the 
fellow-servant doctrine.188 Moreover, judicial treatment of the re-
maining immunities paralleled that of interspousal immunity. In 
this period, parent-child immunity was created, and no jurisdiction 
allowed such intrafamily litigation;187 charitable immunity was rec-
ognized for the first time and by the overwhelming majority of 
courts asked to permit claims against charities;188 and the United 
States and all state governments rarely consented to be sued.189 
WHITE, supra note 124, at 3-19. For discussions of the tenor of tort law, characterizing it as 
one of constricted liability, see M HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 98-99; W. PROSSER & W.P. 
KEETON, supra note 2, § 80, at 571-72; § 65, at 451-62; § 68, at 480-98; G. WHITE, supra note 
124, at 61-62. But cf. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 264 n.37, 417-27; Schwartz, supra note 
182, at 1720 (nineteenth century torts system less favorable to industry and more favorable 
to victims than had been thought). 
19
• See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 298 (1850); but cf. M. HORWITZ, supra 
note 43, at 89-91 (Brown given exaggerated significance). 
186 Chief Justice Shaw has been credited with advancing American recognition of contrib-
utory negligence in Brown, 60 Mass. at 292 n.181, see Schwartz, supra note 182, at 1757-67, 
and the fellow-servant and assumption of risk doctrines in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester 
Ry., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 57 (1842). See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 263-64; M. HOR· 
WITZ, supra note 43, at 209-10; W. PROSSER & W:P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 80, at 571-72 
(fellow-servant doctrine). See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 263; M. HORWITZ, supra note 
43, at 210 (assumption of risk). Cf. L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH ANO C111EF 
JUSTICE SHAW (1957) (Shaw's biography). For discussion of the history of the "unholy trin-
ity" see L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 263-64; W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 
80, at 571-72; § 65, at 451-62; § 68, at 480-98. Cf. M. HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 95-96; 
Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946) (history 
of contributory negligence); Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Indus-
trial Accidents, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 50, 51-58 (1967) (history of fellow-servant rule); G. 
WHITE, supra note 124, at 41-45 (history of assumption of risk). These developments are 
important examples of tort liability's constricted tone, see supra note 184, and of how courts 
created an interrelated doctrinal scheme, see G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 61. Finally, it 
should be noted that before 1900 the "primary function of tort liability had been seen as 
one of punishing or deterring blameworthy civil conduct," not compensating injured per-
sons. G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 62. 
187 See Hollister, supra note 11, at 494; cf. F. HARPER, supra note 27, § 8-11, at 573; W. 
PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 122, at 904-07 (discussing history of parent-child 
immunity). 
188 See F. HARPER, supra note 27, § 29.16, at 756-63; W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra 
note 2, § 133, at 1069-70. 
••• See F. HARPER, supra note 27, § 29.1-29.4, at 596-618; W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, 
supra note 2, § 131, at 1032-56. 
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(ii) 1910: Thompson v. Thompson.100 Every court requested to 
allow interspousal personal injury actions between 1863 and 1913 
refused. By the end of this period, however, certain considerations 
relevant to tort immunity had changed. For example, most legisla-
tures substantially amended their Married Women's Acts, signifi-
cantly eroding coverture. Nevertheless, it was a transitional period: 
even as voters in California and Washington approved female suf-
frage, the supreme courts of each jurisdiction simultaneously re-
jected interspousal tort litigation.191 It should not have been sur-
prising, therefore, that in 1910, when a four-Justice majority of the 
United States Supreme Court recognized immunity in the District 
of Columbia, Justices Harlan, Holmes, and Hughes would join in a 
strong dissent.192 The opinions in Thompson represented the "mo-
ment" of legal change for the longstanding immunity concept.193 
The majority determination constituted immunity's zenith; the 
idea previously had been acknowledged or reaffirmed in twelve 
states. The dissenting decision was the first substantive break with 
immunity, marking the commencement of its erosion, a process 
that continued throughout the twentieth century. m 
Justice Day's majority opinion reiterated most of the rationales 
for rejecting interspousal tort claims articulated in prior case law. 
After announcing the common-law existence of a substantive rule 
of tort immunity,1915 the jurist analyzed the District of Columbia 
Married Women's Act which arguably prescribed interspousal tort 
suits as clearly as any contemporaneous measure. He stated that 
"interpretation of the law [is] the only function of the courts"; 
policymaking was for Congress; and the Court should construe the 
100 218 U.S. 611 (1910). 
191 See E. Fl.EXNER, supra note 96, at 263-66 (California and Washington suffrage ap-
proval); Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 37-38, 103 P. 219, 221 (1909), ouerruled, Selfv. Self, 5S 
Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wosh. 496, 501, 118 P. 629, 631 
(1911), overruled, Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972), and ouerruled, 
Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984) (both states rejecting tort 
litigation). 
192 Thompson, 218 U.S. at 619-24. 
193 I use the idea here to mean the point of dramatic change in a doctrinnl legal concept. 
For other definitions, see A WATSON, SOURCES OF LAw, LEGAL CHANGE AND AMBIGum' 93-131 
(1984); Feinman, supra note 178. 
194 Of course, there is in Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 33, reu'd, 89 N.Y. 644 
(1882), discussed supra note 118, in which an intermediate appellnte court would have per-
mitted interspousal suits, but it was summarily reversed. 
190 Thompson, 218 U.S. at 614-15. 
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enactment "with a view to effectuate the legislative purpose. "190 
Justice Day observed that "such radical and far-reaching changes" 
in the common law's "policy of centuries" as the abolition of im-
munity "should only be wrought by language so clear and plain as 
to be unmistakable evidence of the legislative intention. m97 He 
then briefly considered the statutory terminology which empow-
ered married women to sue anyone separately "for torts committed 
against them, as fully and freely as if they were unmarried.m9s The 
Court found that the statute was meant "to allow the wife, in her 
own name, to maintain actions of tort, which, at common law, 
must be brought in the joint names of herself and her husband. "199 
Justice Day next purported to interpret the measure and ex-
amine the legislative intent underlying the enactment but failed to 
consult any relevant legislative materials. 200 Instead, he "strictly 
construed" the Act, invoking several propositions closely related to 
the derogation canon.201 Justice Day also appealed to public policy. 
He enumerated several "possible evils" of interspousal tort litiga-
tion that he thought Congress could not have "in-
tended"-connubial disharmony, exposure of conjugal differences 
to public scrutiny, and frivolous and trivial litigation-while ex-
plicitly acknowledging the impropriety of considering such poten-
tial effects. 202 
The jurist found that provision of "adequate grounds for relief 
under the statutes of divorce and alimony" also evidenced congres-
sional intent not to prescribe these suits.203 Justice Day concluded 
by asserting that Congress could not have intended "to revolution-
ize the law governing the relation of husband and wife as between 
196 Id. at 618 (first two propositions); id. at 615 (third proposition). 
197 Id. at 618. 
198 Id. at 615-16. 
199 Id. at 617. 
200 Justice Day mentioned no secondary sources, such as committee reports, although tho 
Act had passed in 1901. See id. at 615-19. 
201 A helpful example is the proposition in the text accompanying supra note 197. 
202 
"The possible evils of such legislation might well make the lawmaking power hesitate 
to enact it." Id. at 618 (Harlan J., dissenting). See also id. at 617-18 (enumeration of evils). 
Justice Day acknowledged the impropriety of considering these evils by stating that "inter· 
pretation of the Jaw is the only function of the courts," and that "[w]hether the exorcise of 
such jurisdiction would be promotive of the public welfare and domestic harmony" is a 
question properly "addressed to the legislative, not the judicial branch of the Government." 
Id. at 618. 
20
• Id. at 617, 619. 
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themselves."204 In short, the majority opinion epitomized the rea-
soning processes of courts that had previously addressed 
immunity. 
Justice Harlan, in dissent, used similar and equally cryptic 
methods to reach the contrary result. He agreed that a judge's 
"duty is only to declare what the law is," proclaiming that respon-
sibility for the "mere policy, expediency, or justice of legislation" 
must remain "with the legislative department, so long as it keeps 
within constitutional limits."2011 Justice Harlan, however, accused 
the majority of making law and of discerning congressional intent 
by improperly considering possible impacts of the enactment. The 
jurist remarked that, if the statute's phraseology led to undesirable 
public policy results, it was outside the Court's province "to ward 
off the dangers feared or the evils threatened by a judicial con-
struction that [would] defeat the plainly-expressed will of the leg-
islative department."206 He declared "mere construction" unneces-
sary when the language was clear, thus vitiating the need to 
examine congressional intent or secondary legislative materials.207 
Justice Harlan scrutinized the Act's text and listed the indicia of 
legal status afforded married women, especially their capacity to 
sue in tort. He observed that "Congress, by these statutory provi-
sions [destroys] the unity of the marriage association as it had pre-
viously existed [, making] a radical change in the relations of man 
and wife as those relations were at common law in this District," 
and concluded that Congress had prescribed interspousal tort 
litigation. 208 
Why was Thompson decided in this manner? The explanations 
discussed above for previous recognition and reaffirmation of tort 
immunity appear applicable to the majority determination, as Jus-
tice Day's reasoning process attests.209 The most important factors 
204 Id. at 619. 
20
• Id. at 621 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
206 Id. at 621; see generally id. at 621-24 (accusations). 
207 Id. at 621; cf. supra note 132 ("plain meaning" concept might allow court to consider 
only words of Act); text accompanying supra note 200 (Thompson majority consulted no 
secondary sources). 
•
0
• See id. at 621-23; id. at 622 (quotation); id. at 623 (conclusion). Thus, the authors or 
the majority and dissenting opinions employed similar, equally cryptic approaches to reach 
opposite results. The majority's conclusions as to what Congress intended are only margin-
ally less defensible than the dissent's. 
20
• See supra notes 159-89 and accompanying text (explanation of uniform tort immunity 
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pertain to broad trends in nineteenth century judicial decision-
making, especially jurists' perspectives on their functions when 
treating legislation.210 Many judges continued to hold those views 
in 1910, as may have the four jurists who comprised the majority. 
Each has been characterized as a traditionalist; each analyzed 
closely and read narrowly social reform measures.211 
The dissenting opinion is more difficult to explain, however, be-
cause it abruptly departed from prior judicial treatment of immu-
nity. The most significant explanations implicate judicial decision-
making, especially courts' roles in handling social welfare 
legislation. The three Justices generally deferred to public policy 
choices of legislatures and acquiesced in their reform efforts, refus-
ing to read restrictively social welfare measures. They also con-
strued generously enactments, even searching for and implement-
ing purposes not expressed clearly, so as to effectuate affirmatively 
the statutes' reformist goals. 
For example, Justice Harlan was a staunch proponent of separa-
tion of powers, and the "uncompromising faith that the legislature, 
not the judiciary, should administer political affairs infused all 
treatment). Compare the similar reasoning processes of courts recognizing immunity, supra 
notes 124-58 and accompanying text, and of Justice Day, supra notes 195-204 and accompn· 
nying text. 
•
1
• See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text (judges' views of their role in interpret· 
ing legislation). For many judges the common law remained a "brooding omnipresence." Sec 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Cf. supra 
note 164 (scholars dedicated to common law's celebration reached zenith in years before 
World War I). 
•n L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789· 
1969 (1969) (five volumes), provides helpful biographical analyses of each justice. See id. at 
1773-89 (Day); id. at 1847-63 (Lurton); id. at 1719-36 (McKenna); id. at 1633-57 (White); 
see also R. HIGHSAW, EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE: DEFENDER OF THE CONSERVATIVE FAITH 
(1981) (biography); M. MCDEVITT, JOSEPH McKENNA: AssocIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1946) (biography); J. SEMOSCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RE· 
SPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920 (1978) (additional analysis of justices). Tho nine· 
teenth century theme of judicial nonintervention in the private family, see supra notes 169· 
72 and accompanying text, and the earlier visions of women, marriage, wives, and the fam· 
ily, supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text, seem somewhat less important to the 
Thompson majority. But patriarchical pronouncements are present in Thompson and in 
other contemporaneous opinions the four justices joined. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 
U.S. 412 (1908) (holding constitutional Oregon statute limiting hours women could work); 
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904) (holding that assault to wife was injury to husband's 
property) (superseded by statute as stated in In re Quezada, 718 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied sub nom. Kelt v. Quezada, 467 U.S. 1217 (1984)). 
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other areas of his legal thinking."212 Correspondingly, Justice 
Holmes "advocated 'purposive' or 'goal-oriented' interpretation" of 
statutes.213 Significantly, when legislation did not provide for a 
particular contingency, Justice Holmes looked beyond the mea-
sure's express language to ascertain and implement purposes not 
mentioned explicitly, declaring the failure to do so a dereliction of 
judicial duty: 
A statute may indicate . . . a change in the policy of the 
law, although it expresses that change only in the specific 
cases most likely to occur to the mind. The Legislature 
has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall 
be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, 
that will should be recognized and obeyed. The major 
premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute ... may 
212 G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 130-31. He also believed that national and state govern-
ments possessed broad powers, often viewing expansively the regulatory authority delegated 
to administrative agencies. Justice Harlan thought ns well that the federal government 
should protect the rights of disadvantaged minorities, particularly blacks. These ideas were 
captured best in stinging dissents, which accused the majority of amending constitutions 
and statutes through judicial "legislation" or "construction." See, e.g., Civil Rights Cnses, 
109 U.S. 3, 26-62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that "courts best discharge their duty by execut-
ing the will of the lawmaking power, constitutionally expressed, leaving the results of legis-
lation to be dealt with by the people through their representatives"). Accord G. WHIT&, 
supra note 162, at 130-31, 138-45. Indeed, the accusations were similar to those in the 
Thompson dissent. In short, his opinion seems premised principnlly on solicitude for integ-
rity of the branches of government. See 2 L. F'RmDMAN & F. lsRAEL, supra note 211, at 1285. 
I rely substantially here on G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 128-35; 2 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, 
supra note 211, at 1281-95; and J. SEMONCHE, supra note 211, at 3-276. 
213 Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv. 417 (1899), cited in R. 
Su111MERS, supra note 161, at 154. Justice Holmes had been a member of the Supreme Court 
since 1902 after sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Court for twenty years. Although 
more has been written about Holmes than any other Justice, his jurisprudence defies easy 
description. See White, Looking at Holmes in the Mirror, 4 LAw & HIST. REv. 439 (19SS) 
(recent compilation and analysis). Nonetheless, the jurist consistently opposed invalidation 
of social welfare enactments, "finding strength in his Marshnllinn conception of a Constitu-
tion, his skepticism, and the liberation from parochialism wrought by a grandly synoptic 
view of legal history." 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. lsRAEL, supra note 211, at 1759. Justice Holmes 
respected the wishes of the people as expressed through their elected representatives and 
was unwilling to read narrowly reform measures, regardless of his feelings ns to the ad\i..<>n· 
bility of the specific legislative activity and in the belief that law must reflect existing com-
munity values. See id. See also G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 150-77, 425-26; White, The 
Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHL L. REv. 51 (1971). Cf. H. POHLMAN. JUSTICE 
OLIVER WENDELL Hou.ms AND UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1984) (ongoing debate over 
Holmes). 
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not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate dis-
charge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are 
driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we 
shall go on as before. 214 
Justice Hughes shared the perspectives of Justices Harlan and 
Holmes on numerous considerations relevant to Thompson.21n 
Hughes was receptive to legislative reform endeavors, refusing to 
read restrictively social welfare measures;218 he viewed broadly gov-
ernmental authority, often construing expansively agency regula-
tory power;217 and he supported civil liberties.218 
Thus, one plausible explanation for the dissenters' treatment of 
interspousal tort immunity is deference to the legislature. Justice 
Harlan believed that "courts best discharge their duty by execut-
ing the will of the lawmaking power, constitutionally expressed, 
leaving the results of legislation to be dealt with by the people 
through their representatives. "219 It seems logical in Thompson for 
the Justice (1) to have implemented that will by reading recep-
tively the substantially amended Act and by finding its terminol-
ogy sufficient to permit interspousal tort litigation, and (2) to have 
castigated the majority for frustrating Congress' clearly enunciated 
"" Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908). For helpful discussion of 
Holmes' use of this technique, see Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their 
Terms in Common-Law Cases, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 558 (1982); cf. Landis, Statutes 
and the Sources of Law, 2 HARV. J. LEGIS. 7, 15-17 (1965) (technique's application to Mar-
ried Women's Acts); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908) 
(contemporaneous advocacy of technique's use). Justice Holmes has also been characterized 
as relatively indifferent to the rights of minorities. Thus, his vote in Thompson appears to 
be based primarily on general willingness to acquiesce in, and even effectuate, the will of the 
populace as articulated in legislation. 
210 Like Harlan, Hughes was a former governor, joining the Court at the end of two terms 
as New York's chief executive. His gubernatorial record was distinctly "progressive." For 
thorough accounts of Hughes, see D. DANELSKI & J. Tut.CHIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NO'l'Es 
OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (1973); L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 211, at 1893-1915; 
M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (1951); and G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 200-29. 
••• See Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1967). 
211 See 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 211, at 1899; M. PUSEY, supra note 215, nt 
215-16; J. SEMONCHE, supra note 211, at 321. 
••• See 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 211, at 1906; Pusey, Mr. Chief Justice 
Hughes, in MR. JUSTICE 166-69 (A. Dunham & P. Kurland eds. 1956); Freund, supra note 
216, at 41-42. 
••• Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552, 558-59 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Accord 
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 621 (1910) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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will and considering the measure's potential impacts.220 
More limited explanations pertaining to trends in early twenti-
eth century judicial decisionmaking also can be proffered. Some 
courts evidenced less reluctance to intervene in, legalize, and de-
privatize the family. Jurists recognized more areas of potential 
criminal and civil liability, legalizing, for instance, much inter-
spousal interaction in property and contract. 221 
The dissenters' views about women may explain their decision. 
Justices Harlan and Hughes generally were sympathetic to disad-
vantaged minorities, although it is unclear whether this concern in-
cluded women.222 Justice Holmes was familiar with the history of 
wives' legal status,223 but his judicial opinions evinced ambivalence 
toward women's rights. For example, in 1923 Justice Holmes si-
multaneously upheld statutory protection for female workers and 
opined that it would take "more than the Nineteenth Amendment 
to convince me that there are no differences between men and 
women. "224 
Although the three jurists probably appreciated the underlying 
realities of wife battering, they may have believed it improper to 
intervene in marriages on behalf of one spouse, absent legislative 
prescription, or to accord wives all the individual rights of males 
220 Similarly, if Justice Holmes thought that judges were obligated to effectuate the peo-
ple's wishes as expressed in legislation, even when particular situations were not provided 
for specifically, the jurist might have dissented, because he viewed the statutory conferral of 
particular indicia of legal personhood as an expression of congressional intent to alter rela-
tions between husbands and wives or to effect a change in wedded females' legal status and, 
thus, sufficient to allow interspousal tort suits. Moreover, the language of the act at issue in 
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1910), came as close to permitting inter-
spousal tort suits as any contemporaneous act. Justices Harlan and Holmes had evinced 
willingness to acquiesce in legislative reform efforts in many contexts. A famous example 
was Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65, 74 (1905) (Harlan, Holmes, JJ., dissenting). 
221 Two courts that retained interspousal tort immunity recognized interspousal suits over 
. property. See Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 36, 103 P. 219, 221 (1909), overruled, Self v. Self, 
58 Cal. 2d 683, 691, 376 P.2d 65, 70 (1962); Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 294, 44 N.E. 
462, 464 (1896). 
222 See supra notes 212 & 215 (Harlan's and Hughes' concern for minorities). 
= See Holmes, Agency, 4 HARv. L. REv. 345, 352-53 (1891) (writing on history of v.ives' 
legal status illustrates familiarity). 
224 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 569-70 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Holmes' refusal to invalidate women's "protective legislation" in Adkins, and in Muller 
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), seems premised more on deference to legislative reform than 
concern for women's rights. 
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and single women.2211 Instead, they may have seen females as vul-
nerable beings who might need the protection of special legisla-
tion. 226 These viewpoints may be reflected in their acquiescence in 
patriarchal Supreme Court pronouncements but are captured best 
in Muller v. Oregon,227 agreed to by Justices Harlan and Holmes in 
1908, and adopted in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish228 by Justice 
Hughes three decades later: 
[W]oman's physical structure and the performance of 
maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the 
struggle for subsistence ... [so] that her physical well 
being becomes an object of public interest and care in or-
der to preserve the strength and vigor of the race . . . . 
[T]here is that in her disposition and habits of life which 
will operate against a full assertion of [contractual] 
rights. She will still be where some legislation to protect 
her seems necessary to secure a real equality of right. 
Hence she was "properly placed in a class by herself and 
legislation designed for her protection may be sustained 
even when like legislation is not necessary for men and 
could not be sustained. "229 
Other general currents in judicial decisionmaking at this time 
are less applicable to the dissent. Around 1880 legislatures had as-
sumed responsibility for general policymaking, so that after the 
turn of the century courts read measures more positively and 
••• Nonetheless, the jurists might have been amenable to helping the injured wife by pro· 
viding civil recourse. For discussion of judicial intervention in marriages, see supra notes 
169-72 and accompanying text; infra notes 282-85 and accompanying text; cf. infra note 412 
and accompanying text (discussion of wives as rights-holders); Minow, supra note 9 (criticiz-
ing traditional family law view of wives as rights holders). 
••• See Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal 
Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 653-65 
(1981) (discussing special treatment legislation). 
227 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The Supreme Court made other patriarchal pronouncements in 
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485 (1904) (holding that assault to wife was injury to hus· 
band's property) (superseded by statute as stated in In re Quezada, 718 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied sub nom. Kelt v. Quezada, 467 U.S. 1217 (1984)), in which Harlan joined, 
and MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915) (domestic and international policy give 
dominance to husband), in which Holmes joined. 
••• 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
••• Id. at 394-95. Of course, the Justices may not have considered the pronouncements 
patriarchal and what they agreed to in an opinion may not actually reflect their views. 
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pragmatically, by, for instance, relying less on abstract canons of 
statutory construction.230 Moreover, after 1900 some judges and ac-
ademicians increasingly criticized mechanical or formalistic judicial 
decisionmaking perceived as antidemocratic or as hindering legisla-
tive reform efforts.231 Accordingly, the critics offered numerous 
prescriptions. For example, courts were admonished to defer to 
legislative policymaking.232 But these developments probably had 
minimal impact on the Supreme Court dissenters; in fact, the Jus-
tices may well have influenced or even anticipated the develop-
ments. Although Justice Harlan has been characterized as the 
quintessential transitional jurist between the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, little probably could have influenced him to modify 
his long held views regarding statutory construction and the 
branches of government.233 Moreover, Justice Harlan's opinion in 
Thompson was as formalistic as the majority determination.234 
Similarly, Justice Holmes, in "magisterial detachment," had firmly 
held convictions respecting the judiciary's obligation to implement 
the sovereign's will as expressed through legislation.2311 
Additional, less significant, reasons for the dissent pertain to 
contemporary societal visions of women, wedlock, wives and the 
family. These images had changed by 1910: marriage was seen as 
less irrevocable and wives as more independent of their spouses.236 
230 See HURST I, supra note 133, at 186-88; HURST m, supra note 164, at 41-42. 
231 Roscoe Pound, in articles, such as Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. REv. 6-05 
(1908), was an important proponent of these views. For helpful discussion of these develop-
ments, see G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 116-19; White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to 
Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. 
REv. 999, 1000-12 (1972). 
= See G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 145-46; G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 116-19; White, 
supra note 231, at 1000-12 (discussing prescriptions and judicial deference); cf. H. BLACR. 
HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCl'ION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAws xii, at 710 (2d ed. 1911) 
(contemporaneous reference source including prescriptions); Pound, supra note 214 (con-
temporaneous advocacy of applying statutes in way Thompson dissent may ha\•e). 
= "With the end of Harlan's tenure, American appellate judging entered the twentieth 
century." G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 146. Indeed, Harlan was one of the first judges to use 
"modem" statutory interpretation techniques. 
""' Compare the dissenting and majority opinions in Thompson, 218 U.S. 611. Cf. K 
LLEWELLYN, supra note 129, at 40-41 (temporal, geographical variability in opinion \\Titing); 
supra note 166 (formalism discussion). 
= Indeed, Holmes apparently affected these developments with contributions such as his 
dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905), and advocacy of "goal oriented" 
statutory interpretation, see supra notes 213-14. 
236 See S. EISENSTEIN, supra note 177, at 13, 19 (eight times as many women worked in 
408 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:359 
The modified visions may have been held by the three dissenters, 
as evidenced in Justice Harlan's proclamation that Congress had 
radically altered the common-law relation of husband and wife. In-
deed, when the dissenters considered contemporary social condi-
tions, it might have seemed plausible to them that the legislative 
branch intended to end coverture. 237 
The factors discussed above seem to have more importance for 
the Thompson dissent than tort jurisprudence. Indeed, the dis-
senting opinion does not explicitly mention tort law.238 Develop-
ments in the field, which had coalesced by 1910, yield a mixed pic-
ture. Substantive tort doctrine differed minimally from that of the 
nineteenth century,239 and most of the change originated in the 
legislature and not in the judiciary. For example, the New York 
Assembly initially created a cause of action for violation of the 
right of privacy in 1903 but only after the state's highest court had 
refused to do so the preceding year.240 New York also adopted the 
nation's first state-level workers' compensation scheme in 1910,241 
in part to ameliorate the harsh effects of the judicially created "un-
holy trinity" of defenses.242 Accordingly, the dissent appears less 
explicable in terms of tort law. 
In summary, Thompson was a watershed for interspousal tort 
immunity. The majority opinion marks the rule's apogee,243 while 
1910 as 1890, but marriage was still seen as duty); w. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE 
ERA x (1967) (1880-1920 time of decisive change in public attitudes on divorce and 1900-
1915 crucial because thereafter nothing could control the rising divorce rate); R. SENNETT, 
supra note 177, at 208-13 (decline in father's home authority); R. WIEBE, supra note 106, at 
ch. 5 (all within new middle class, including women, experienced growth of self. 
consciousness). 
237 See supra notes 219-20 & 225-29 and accompanying text (deference to legislature more 
important than women's rights). 
•
3
• See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 621 (1910) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
"" See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text (describing tenor of constricted 
liability). 
"
0 Act of April 6, 1903, ch. 132, § 2, 1903 N.Y. Laws; Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box 
Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 545, 64 N.E. 442, 443 (1902). 
•
41 Act of July 18, 1911, ch. 674, 1910 N.Y. Laws. This legislation was enacted at then 
Governor Hughes' instigation. However, this initiative was only marginally more responsive 
to workers' needs than those of employers. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 587-88. Moreover, 
the court of appeals declared the New York statute unconstitutional. See Ives v. South Buf-
falo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 317, 94 N.E. 431, 448 (1911). 
242 L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 587-88. 
243 Prior to Thompson, 12 jurisdictions had recognized tort immunity, but no jurisdiction 
had permitted interspousal tort litigation. The Thompson majority probably afforded im-
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the dissenting opinion presaged the abrupt, substantial departure 
from prior precedent. 244 
(iii) 1914-1920. From 1914 until 1920, courts in seven jurisdic-
tions recognized interspousal tort claims, while courts in a compa-
rable number of states refused to do so.24 is Courts that permitted 
the claims reached that result in one of three ways. 
First, every court that allowed interspousal litigation relied sub-
stantially upon the Married Women's Acts, which had been 
amended significantly but did not explicitly prescribe tort claims 
between spouses. The jurists viewed the measures in numerous 
ways, and most subscribed to multiple perspectives. Several judges 
depended primarily upon the text of the Acts which was consid-
ered adequate to permit the lawsuits.246 Courts also analogized 
from statutory causes of action afforded wives against their hus-
bands in contract or property or against third parties in those ar-
eas and torts.247 Moreover, judges found that the Married Women's 
Acts (1) restored the legal status that married women had enjoyed 
prior to wedlock;2' 6 (2) ended spouses' merged identity;249 (3) re-
munity vitality it might not otherwise have had. See infra note 245 (many courts finding 
immunity later rely upon Thompson). 
"" Justice Harlan's opinion may have anticipated the departure, but the courts that ini-
tially abolished immunity relied minimally on the Thompson dissent. 
... Cases recognizing interspousal tort suits were Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 44, 77 
So. 335, 338 (1917); Fit2patrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 177, 186 S.W. 832, 836 (1916); 
Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 49, 89 A. 889, 892 (1914); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 5, 95 
A. 657, 657 (1915); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 524, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920); Fiedler v. 
Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 129-30, 140 P. 1022, 1025 (1914) (styled as Fiedeer v. Fiedeer in 140 P. 
1022); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 47, 102 S.E. 787, 788 (1920). 
Cases rejecting interspousal tort suits were Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634, 639, 92 
S.E. 25, 27 (1917); Dishon v. Dishon, 187 Ky. 497, 501, 219 S.W. 794, 796, (1920), overruled, 
Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 484, 484 (Ky. 1903); Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 391, 177 
N.W. 624, 625 (1920), overruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373, 173 N.W.2d 416, 
420 (1969); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 208, 177 S.W. 382, 384 (1915), overruled, Town-
send v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Mo. 1986); Butterfield v. Butterfield, 195 Mo. App. 
37, 38, 187 S.W. 295, 295 (1916); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 64, 179 S.W. 628, 
629 (1915); Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 175, 96 S.E. 315, 321 (1918), overruled, Surratt v. 
Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971). 
"'" See, e.g., Gilman, 78 N.H. at 47, 95 A. at 657; Prosser, 114 S.C. at 47, 102 S.E. at 788 • 
... See, e.g., Brown, 88 Conn. at 46-47, 89 A. at 891; Crowell, 180 N.C. at 521, 105 S.E. at 
209. 
"'" See, e.g., Johnson, 201 Ala. at 43, 77 So. at 337; Brown, 88 Conn. at 47, 89 A. at 891; 
Schult2 v. Schult2, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 27, rev'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882). 
"'" See, e.g., Fit2patrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S.W. 832 (1916); Brown, 88 Conn. at 
46, 89 A. at 891; Crowell, 180 N.C. at 522, 105 S.E. at 209-10. 
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moved wives' common-law disabilities;250 (4) invested married fe-
males with indicia of independent legal status;251 (5) made married 
women equal to their husbands;252 or (6) were meant to be reme-
dial, and, therefore, to be interpreted liberally.253 These determina-
tions alone, or in various combinations, supported conclusions that 
wives could sue their husbands for personal injuries. 
A second way that judges justified allowing interspousal tort ac-
tions was by rejecting earlier judicial treatment of immunity. 
These courts rhetorically criticized prior analyses of the Married 
Women's Acts. Several jurists even ascribed the retention of the 
doctrine to statutory readings so restrictive that they "inter-
pret[ ed] away" corrective legislation clearly meant to free wives 
from common-law disabilities.254 Moreover, judges expressly re-
futed the policy contentions traditionally articulated for immunity. 
They found that tort claims would not be pursued in marriages 
when any conjugal harmony remained. 255 Instead, courts pro-
claimed that such suits could serve connubial peace and public pol-
icy equally well as permitting married women "to go into the crim-
inal courts and send [their husbands] to the penitentiary or into a 
divorce court and publish their entire married [lives] to the 
world."256 The courts also stated that the "alternative remedies" of 
criminal prosecution and marital dissolution provided little actual 
••• See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, 124 Ark. at 167, 186 S.W. at 835; Gilman, 78 N.H. at 4, 95 A. at 
657; cf. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 30, 33 (Act's purpose to invade and dispel the common 
law). 
2
•
1 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, 124 Ark. at 167, 188 S.W. at 833; Brown, 88 Conn. at 44-45, 89 
A. at 890. 
••• See, e.g., Brown, 88 Conn. at 44-45, 89 A. at 890; Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 A. 
657 (1915); cf. Fitzpatrick, 124 Ark. at 167, 186 S.W. at 836 (Act could accord wife more 
rights than husband). 
••• See, e.g., Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 128, 140 P. 1022, 1024 (1914); Prosser v. 
Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 47, 102 S.E. 787, 788 (1920). A few courts looked beyond the Acts' 
express terms, ascertained that the measures effected a change in wives' legal status, and 
reasoned therefrom that disabilities not eliminated explicitly or indicia of legal personality 
not prescribed specifically by the Acts also should be removed or granted. See, e.g., Brown, 
88 Conn. at 45, 89 A. at 890-91; Fitzpatrick, 124 Ark. at 167, 186 S.W. at 835-36. 
204 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, 124 Ark. at 167, 186 S.W. at 834; Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 
516, 524, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920); Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 126, 140 P. at 1023. 
••• See, e.g., Brown, 88 Conn. at 48, 89 A. at 891-92; Crowell, 180 N.C. at 525, 105 S.E. at 
211 (Allen, J., concurring). 
••• Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 130, 140 P. at 1025. Accord Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 44, 77 
So. 335, 338 (1917); cf. Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 33 (permitting tort actions 
would promote harmony), rev'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882). 
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redress to injured wives257 and that the threat of frivolous or trivial 
interspousal litigation was insignificant.258 
A third way that courts supported their determinations was with 
affirmative public policy arguments. The courts asserted that pro-
vision for tort suits could afford married women compensatory re-
lief,259 prevent breaches of the peace,260 or punish or deter inten-
tionally inflicted interspousal harm.261 Several judges observed that 
an important purpose of courts, often enshrined in state constitu-
tions and statutes, was to be open to all, regardless of marital sta-
tus, to remedy wrongs.262 A few jurists recognized wives' individual 
rights.263 The Married Women's Acts were the principal focus of 
these judges, however, and none treated the immunity issue purely 
as a common-law policy question.264 
A number of interrelated reasons underlie this dramatic depar-
ture from prior precedent. Considerations pertaining to judicial 
decisionmaking, especially to courts' perspectives on their respon-
sibilities, appear predominant. Although numerous judges in the 
two decades after 1900 perceived their roles as late nineteenth cen-
tury jurists did, an increasing number viewed their functions dif-
ferently. Legislatures clearly had gained primary responsibility for 
policymaking, and "statute law had increased in reach and den-
sity," becoming the major element of legal growth. Legislation, 
particularly the Married Women's Acts, exhibited "sustained lines 
of policy" as substantial as case precedent.26G From the turn of the 
"'' See, e.g., Johnson, 201 Ala. at 44, 77 So. at 338; Crowell, 180 N.C. at 522, 105 S.E. at 
209; Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 130, 140 P. at 1025. 
258 See Brown, 88 Conn. at 48, 89 A. at 891-92. In response to the fraud rationale for 
prohibiting interspousal suits, discussed supra note 155 and accompanying text. one court 
concluded that the "divorce courts open the same avenues in order to recover undeserved 
alimony." Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 130, 140 P. at 1025. 
••• See, e.g., Johnson, 201 Ala. at 44, 77 So. at 338; Crowell, 180 N.C. at 523, 105 S.E. at 
210; Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 129-30, 140 P. at 1025. 
••• See Brown, 88 Conn. at 49, 89 A. at 892; Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. CL at 28-29, 33. 
••• See Crowell, 180 N.C. at 524, 105 S.E. at 210; Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. CL at 33; Fiedler, 
42 Okla. at 129-30, 140 P. at 1025. 
••• See Brown, 88 Conn. at 49, 89 A. at 892; Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 127, 140 P. at 1024. 
••• Crowell, 180 N.C. at 516, 105 S.E. at 210. Accord Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 129, 140 P. at 
1024-25; cf. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 33 (permitting interspousal tort litigation would 
enlarge wives' rights). 
204 See infra notes 351 & 363-64 and accompanying text (discussions of treatment ns a 
common-law policy question). 
265 HURST III, supra note 164, at 42. Accord HURST I, supra note 133, at 187-88. 
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century until 1920, Congress and state legislatures passed many re-
form measures premised on the belief that government had an af-
firmative obligation to rectify newly appreciated social and eco-
nomic inequities.266 Correspondingly, courts' policymaking 
responsibilities diminished. The influence exerted by the common 
law, reflected specifically in doctrinal development and in the 
merger fiction, waned. Thus, judges more readily accepted statu-
tory law, such as the Married Women's Acts, as part of the general 
corpus of the law and considered it less of an intrusion upon the 
symmetrical common-law system. In short, courts' "creative oppor-
tunity had become the subordinate, but essential, task of imagina-
tive, firm implementation of legislative policy."267 
Moreover, certain judges and scholars explicitly urged courts to 
adopt new perspectives on their roles, especially vis-a-vis legisla-
tures. These advocates thought that the law should be responsive 
to changing human conditions, premised on philosophy and the 
new social sciences, and fairly applied to afford social justice in 
particular cases.268 They generally favored contemporary reform 
measures and lauded improvements in the legislative process.200 
These proponents also criticized aspects of existing judicial 
thinking and the substantive determinations that it yielded. They 
rejected static principles and mechanical legal reasoning, especially 
as manifested in formalistic judicial construction of legislative re-
form measures.270 The jurists and academicians challenged the pro-
position that courts merely declared or interpreted law, by expos-
ing them as lawmakers and their decisionmaking as a "highly 
politicized and idiosyncratic process."271 Jurists who retained the 
••• See HURST III, supra note 164, at 42; Pound, supra note 214, at 384 (legislative im· 
provements); G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 69-70, 105; L. GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN 
LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 59-81 (1988) (Progressive era trans· 
formation of child protection in families); s. Woon, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE PRO· 
GRESSIVE ERA: CHILD LABOR AND THE LAW 1-46 (1968) (passage of reform measures). 
••
1 HURST I, supra note 133, at 187. Accord G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 116·19; G. 
WHITE, supra note 162, at 154-56. 
••• See Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 
591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912) (pts. 1 & 3); see also G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 
69-71; G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 154-56; White, supra note 231, at 999-1012 (secondary 
treatment). 
••• See G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 71, 118. See also Bingham, What is the Law? 11 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 109 (1912) (pts. 1 & 2); Pound, supra note 214, at 384. 
•
10 See, e.g., Pound, supra note 214, at 384-88; Pound, supra note 231. 
271 G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 154. 
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common law in the face of remedial legislation or who restrictively 
interpreted such measures were accused of impeding progress by 
improperly substituting their own value choices for those of the 
people.272 These observers described the ideal judge as an "archi-
tect of social policy," who appreciated the social context of deci-
sionmaking.273 Such a jurist understood the necessity for positive 
governmental activity to alleviate societal unfairness and for courts 
to engage in those efforts only by effectuating the policymaking 
authority of the legislature or remedying the judiciary's prior unre-
sponsiveness. 274 When treating statutes, courts were admonished to 
read them broadly; to be attuned to such practicalities of legisla-
tive drafting as the difficulty of providing expressly for all contin-
gencies; to implement rigorously the legislature's will where articu-
lated explicitly; and to effectuate it even when less clearly 
enunciated.275 Indeed, in 1910, Roscoe Pound boldly proposed that 
judges handle legislation in the following manner: 
[Courts] might receive it fully into the body of the law as 
affording not only a rule to be applied but a principle 
from which to reason, and hold it, as a later and more 
direct expression of the same general will, of superior au-
thority to judge-made rules on the same subject; and so 
reason from it by analogy in preference to them.276 
In short, jurists were enjoined to exercise self-restraint and to de-
fer to the legislature.277 
These considerations underlie contemporary judicial treatment 
of statutes, as manifested in courts' increased willingness to read 
expansively the Married Women's Acts in numerous contexts, even 
effectuating the legislative will expressed therein, although not 
stated clearly.278 Judges became less antagonistic and literal and 
= See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905); Pound, supra note 214. Accord 
G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 155. 
27
• G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 118. Accord Bingham, supra note 269, at 119-21. 
274 See Pound, supra note 268 (positive government action); G. White, supra note 124, at 
71, 118 (all ideas in text). 
27
• For the clearest contemporaneous statement of these ideas, see Pound, supra note 214, 
at 385-86. Accord HuRST III, supra note 164, at 41-45; G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 155-56. 
276 Pound, supra note 214, at 385. 
277 See G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 155; Pound, supra note 214, at 385-86 • 
..,. See Landis, supra note 214, at 16-17; HURST III, supra note 164, at 41-45; HURST I, 
supra note 133, at 186-88. 
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more flexible and pragmatic.279 They accorded greater weight to 
the legislative process, particularly as a policymaking endeavor, 
while evincing appreciation for the realities of drafting. They rec-
ognized that statutes generally resulted from an ongoing process. 280 
Courts also read generously the text of Married Women's statutes, 
finding imprecise phraseology sufficient to cover specific, uncon-
templated contingencies like interspousal tort litigation. When 
judges concluded that the text alone was insufficient, they at-
tempted to ascertain legislative intent. Courts typically employed 
methods and considered information related to the Acts or the leg-
islative process, such as legislative history.281 Correspondingly, 
courts abandoned reliance on the canons of statutory construction. 
Indeed, the only frequently invoked canon-that measures in dero-
gation of the common law were to be interpreted liberally to imple-
ment their remedial purposes-often was based upon a statute.282 
Jurists also gleaned applicable expressions of public policy from 
legislative activity in a particular area or related fields; from the 
passage of a succession of enactments; or from statutes by treating 
them like common-law precedents.283 
Several other factors may explain these changes in judicial deci-
sionmaking. First, numerous jurists were less reluctant to intervene 
in the family, particularly when the legislature had somehow ad-
dressed the issue before the court. 284 This phenomenon was re-
flected in the legalization of widened spheres of interspousal inter-
action and in rising divorce rates. The opinions also may be 
attributable to changing perspectives on judges' roles broader than 
those discussed above. 285 For example, some jurists believed that 
law should be used affirmatively to aid disadvantaged members of 
society and that fair resolution of specific cases required an appre-
ciation of the moral dimensions and the social realities underlying 
279 See HURST III, supra note 164, at 42-45; HURST I, supra note 133, at 187. 
280 See HURST III, supra note 164, at 40-46. 
281 See id. at 42; HURST I, supra note 133, at 188, J. JOHNSON, supra note 77, at 75·82. 
282 See HURST I, supra note 133, at 188 (abstract canons abandoned); Fiedler v. Fiedler, 
42 Okla. 124, 128, 140 P. 1022, 1024 (1914) (tort immunity's abolition premised on statute 
requiring liberal interpretation of remedial Act). 
283 See HURST III, supra note 164, at 44-45; supra note 213 and accompanying text (con· 
temporaneous example of Holmes' precedential treatment of statute). 
284 See supra notes 247-53 and accompanying text for Acts in cases that legalized inter· 
spousal tort activity. 
288 See supra notes 265-83 and accompanying text. 
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them. Therefore, some courts might have permitted interspousal 
tort claims because they wanted to intervene on behalf of the 
weaker party, help the injured female by affording a civil remedy, 
or punish and deter the social evil of wife battering, regardless of 
whether the judges thought that the legislators actually had con-
templated these precise consequences.288 Thus, although a few ju-
rists may have considered it appropriate for courts to intervene in 
the family when necessary, even those who did not might have ap-
preciated that there would be little detrimental interference in a 
marriage already disrupted by intentionally inflicted harm. 287 
Other significant reasons why courts permitted interspousal tort 
actions pertain to contemporary societal visions of women, mar-
riage, wives, and the family. The images had substantially changed 
since immunity first was recognized and even since Thompson was 
decided.288 During the late nineteenth century a new middle class 
emerged. Between 1895 and 1915, many groups within the class ex-
perienced "formative growth toward self-consciousness."289 Conse-
288 See, for example, the cases recognizing interspousal tort suits, discussed supra notes 
259 & 261 and accompanying text. Cf. G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 69·71 (judges were 
admonished to help weaker members of society, appreciate social realities, nnd do justice in 
specific cases). 
281 The courts that abolished immunity in Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 523, 105 S.E. 
206, 210 (1920), and Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 126, 140 P. 1022, 1024 (1914), evinced 
some willingness to permit state intervention in the family. See the other cases recognizing 
interspousal tort suit, discussed supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text (second proposi-
tion in text). This account offers plausible reasons for courts' abolition of tort immunity. If 
jurists in states where such actions were allowed had read expansively the l\iarried Women's 
statutes and legalized interspousal relations in numerous other contexts, it made sense to 
handle immunity similarly. Indeed, the writers of several opinions asked why a wife who was 
able to sue her husband for a broken promise could not also sue him for a broken arm. 
Moreover, if certain judges believed that they were obligated to effectuate the legislative "'ill 
or to resolve equitably disputes, the jurists may have discharged these duties by abrogating 
immunity. See Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 
516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920). 
288 Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). See supra notes 190-204 nnd accompa-
nying text. 
289 R WIEBE, supra note 106, at 112. Accord W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 15-42; W. C11AFE. 
THE AMERICAN WOMAN: HER CHANGING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ROLES, 1920-1970, 
at 3-22 (1972); W. O'NEILL, EvERYONE WAS BRAVE: THE RISE AND FALL OF FEMINISM JN 
AMERICA (1969). For other helpful data, see generally sources on suffrage, e.g. E. Fu:.XNER. 
supra note 96, and sources on the "Progressive Era," such as R HOFSTADTER. THE AGE OF 
REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R 131-212 (1960); H. MAY, THE END OF Ai.l&IUCAN INNOCENCE: 
A STUDY OF THE FmsT YEARS OF OuR OwN TIME. 1912-1917 (1959); M. Wurra. Soc1AL 
THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REvoLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1976). It is also difficult to genera-
lize about such complex matters. Cf. supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussion of 
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quently, women in significantly increased numbers had careers or 
were employed, attended college, and advocated social welfare is-
sues, often as members of women's clubs or moral reform 
organizations. 200 
These phenomena continued and accelerated during much of the 
teens, a period that can aptly be characterized as one of considera-
ble ferment and optimism, especially regarding the prospects of 
improving society. "Progressivism" reached its zenith. That move-
ment contributed to passage of much reform legislation, notably 
meant to protect females and children as family members and in 
the workplace.291 Moreover, World War I gave public prominence 
to women who left their homes and participated in the war ef-
fort.292 Women were involved actively in numerous political move-
ments, most importantly suffrage, and their endeavors culminated 
in adoption of the nineteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 293 
At this time, both the absolute number of divorces and divorce 
rates rose sharply.294 Most significant was the decisive shift in pub-
lic opinion toward markedly greater acceptance of divorce, because 
it exemplified important changes in American cultural values.20G 
Thus, by approximately 1915, wives probably were seen as hav-
ing some separate legal identity, if not as completely independent 
individuals. Marriage and the family were perceived less as patriar-
earlier images). 
290 See C. CLINTON, supra note 65, at 166-67; A. KRADITOR, supra note 177, nt 5-6; W. 
CHAFE, supra note 65, at 27-29, 54-56. Cf. Minow, supra note 9, at 881 (women's voluntary 
work led to law reform mentioned infra note 291 and accompanying text); S. EISENSTEIN, 
supra note 177, at 13 (large increase in working women from 1890 to 1910). 
291 See, e.g., S. WooD, supra note 266, at 47-80 (child labor reform); Muller v. Oregon, 208 
U.S. 412, 420-23 (1908) (challenge to workplace protective legislation for women); infra note 
298 (workers' compensation legislation); L. GORDON, supra note 266. 
2
•
2 Professor Chafe found that "during World War I, thousands of women had moved into 
jobs formerly held by men, causing many observers to assert that a revolution in the eco-
nomic role of women had occurred." W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 22. He also found, how-
ever, that "only 5 per cent of the women war workers joined the labor force for the first time 
in the war years." Id. at 52. Accord B. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 56-57. Cf. A. KESSLER· 
HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 217-49 
(1982) (data on women workers); W. O'NEILL, supra note 289, at 169-224 ("women's move· 
ment and the war"). 
203 See generally E. F'LEXNER, supra note 96, at 256-337; cf. W. O'NEILL, supra note 289, 
at 146-224 ("feminism in the progressive era"). 
294 W. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 19-21 (1967). 
29
• Id. at ix-x, 254-73. 
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chal enclaves insulated from public scrutiny.296 These images were 
explicitly articulated in some immunity cases, and they may have 
been shared by judges.297 When judges looked around at contempo-
rary society, it could have seemed to them that legislators, who al-
ready had provided married women various indicia of legal status, 
intended to afford battered wives some relief.298 Some judges may 
have thought it eminently sensible that a woman-forced to di-
vorce the man who had infected her with venereal disease or im-
paired her own earning capacity, desecrating the sacred institution 
of marriage and treating her in the least "altruistic" way imagin-
able-should be able to seek compensation from and hold account-
able that man in court. The judges may have intended to deter 
others similarly disposed, all to the benefit of the victim and 
society.299 
The factors considered above were more significant to courts 
than tort law, although tort principles had become more important 
296 Id. at 268-69 (Progressives believed new, more egalitarian family was evolving); cf. Ol-
sen, supra note 65, at 1509-13, 1516-20, 1530-38 (improved women's legal srotus). See gener-
ally Minow, supra note 9, at 827-32 (describing and criticizing traditional view that \\ives 
bedune rights holders). 
•
97 See, for example, the cases discussed supra notes 255-57 & 263 (regarding family har-
mony and women as rights holders). 
••• See Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U.L. Rsv. 723, 
746 (1935) (discussion of Married Women's Acts); Olsen, supra note 65, at 1509-13, 1516-20, 
1530-38 (improved women's legal status). 
••• The facts are drawn from Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 516, 105 S.E. 206, 206 
(1920). Such facts, and the policies invoked, are similar to those in most cases abolishing 
immunity. See supra notes 252-63 and accompanying text. Caution is warranted, however, 
in concluding that the judiciary viewed women as persons in their own right entitled to all 
the rights men possessed. Some courts that abolished immunity did mention such rights, see 
supra note 263. Additionally, the Supreme Court observed that "great-not to say revolu-
tionary-changes" in the "contractual, political and civil status of women, culminating in 
the Nineteenth Amendment," had brought gender differences almost to the "vanishing 
point." Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923) (holding Minimum Wage Act of 
1918 an unnecessary unconstitutional interference with liberty of contract). The composi-
tion of the state judiciary is said to have changed, being comprised or fewer judges wedded 
to the common law or "educated in the legal supremacy of the husband." K LLEWELLYN, 
supra note 129, at 40-41. But a commanding image of woman as rights-holder did not 
emerge. Moreover, the Supreme Court cases yield a mixed picture. Compare the language 
above from Adkins with Holmes' dissent in that case, 261 U.S. at 567-71, supra text accom-
panying note 214, and the patriarchal pronouncements in l\iacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 
311 (1915), mentioned supra note 227, and in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 
394-95 (1937). Cf. Crozier, supra note 298, at 746-49 (Acts weakened common law, creating 
hiatus before public policy's rise during which judiciary recognized women's rights but gen-
der discrimination ultimately prevailed). 
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than in earlier periods. The authors of the opinions mentioned in a 
cursory manner or alluded to the major purposes of tort jurispru-
dence. Most found more important the nineteenth century con-
cepts of punishment and deterrence than the twentieth century 
notion of compensation. 300 A helpful example of this was the incre-
mental character of liability's expansion. Contemporary develop-
ments in the substantive field were checkered. The negligence con-
cept retained preeminence, weakening only minimally. Although 
numerous courts permitted an intentional tort cause of action for 
mental distress against common carriers, many other judges re-
jected such claims. 301 While the privity of contract requirement 
was initially eliminated for products liability actions in both negli-
gence and warranty at this time, the two courts doing so were 
among the first to adopt tort immunity and each retained it 
throughout the teens.302 Moreover, the courts effectively main-
tained the remaining tort immunities nationwide; indeed, immu-
nity between parents and children attained much broader accept-
ance. 303 Thus, while tort jurisprudence did not figure prominently 
in the cases, jurists' articulation of tort law precepts gave that sub-
stantive area more significance than before and anticipated future 
developments. 304 
300 See the cases discussed supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text. 
301 For helpful discussion of the cases, see W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 12. 
302 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1050 (1916) 
(abolishing privity requirement as to negligence); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 
622, 135 P. 633, 633 (1913) (abolishing privity requirement as to warranty); cf. Roller v. 
Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 242, 79 P. 788, 788 (1905) (third state to recognize parent-child immu-
nity), overruled, Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). For early cases adopt-
ing interspousal tort immunity, see Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 366 (N.Y. 
1863); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 P. 629 (1911), overruled, Freehe v. Freehe, 
81 Wash. 2d 183, 192, 500 P.2d 771, 777 (1972), and overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 
2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). During the teens, immunity was not challenged in either state. 
Many states also passed worker's compensation statutes, though most of the measures 
were limited. New York adopted the first statute in 1910, and by 1921 nearly every state 
had done so. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 80. Cf. Larson, The Nature 
and Origins of Workers Compensation, 37 CORNELL L. Q. 206, 232-33 (1952) (legislation 
limited). 
303 See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, §§ 131, 133 (governmental, charitable 
immunities); Hollister, supra note 11 (parent-child immunity). 
30
' Another explanation for the decisions abrogating immunity can be drawn from similar, 
contemporary judicial treatment of gender-based discrimination. In that field, the Married 
Women's Acts had undermined the common law's strength, creating a legal hiatus before 
the rise of public policy, during which some courts recognized that females possessed certain 
constitutional rights or additional entitlements. The legal hiatus was said to have been the 
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Although seven courts recognized interspousal tort suits between 
1914 and 1920, the same number rejected such claims.3011 Several of 
the courts considered themselves bound by earlier precedent.300 
But even courts in states that never had addressed immunity de-
nied interspousal litigation by employing logic nearly identical to 
that used much earlier.307 
Thus, the judges announced a common-law rule of immunity 
which could be changed only by legislation and that their responsi-
bility was to declare and not to make law.308 When the jurists con-
sidered the substantially amended Married Women's Acts, they 
first determined from a cursory reading that the statutes in terms 
did not abolish immunity.309 The courts then ostensibly construed 
the enactments, principally by discerning legislative intent. Instead 
of examining pertinent legislative information, the judges relied on 
variations of the abstract derogation canon310 and recited the now-
standard litany of public policy reasons-conjugal discord, frivo-
lous or trivial actions, provision of alternative relief, juridical 
equality-to explain why legislators could not have "intended" in-
terspousal tort suits.311 Courts embellished the longstanding policy 
rationales and invested them with more strident rhetoric. Admoni-
tions, replete with Biblical annotations, regarding the sanctity of 
the home resonated from the pages of opinions. Courts warned of 
apogee in women's constitutional status, but gender discrimination weathered the "change 
from ancient to modern nomenclature, and under its new sponsor, public policy, fully 
regained its old strength" by 1935. See Crozier, supra note 298, at 746-49. 
305 The cases are listed supra note 245. 
306 See, e.g., Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 391, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (1920); Butterfield v. 
Butterfield, 195 Mo. App. 37, 38, 187 S.W. 295, 295 (1916); Lillienkrunp v. Rippetoo, 133 
Tenn. 57, 59, 179 S.W. 628, 628 (1915). 
307 See, e.g., Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634, 639, 92 S.E. 25, 37 (1917); Rogers v. 
Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 205-08, 177 S.W. 382, 383-84 (1915); Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 
160-75, 96 S.E. 315, 316-21 (1918). 
308 Heyman, 19 Ga. App. at 636, 92 S.E. at 26; Rogers, 265 Mo. at 202, 177 S.W. at 383-84. 
3
"" See, e.g., Heyman, 19 Ga. App. at 636, 92 S.E. at 26; Rogers, 265 Mo. at 202, 177 S.W. 
at 383-84. Courts also demanded exacting specificity, finding, for example, that the Acts 
only governed property, or were procedural, and did not create new substantive causes of 
action. See, e.g., Drake, 145 Minn. at 388, 177 N.W. at 624; Keister, 123 Va. at 157, 96 S.E. 
at 316-19. 
310 See, e.g., Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.W. 628 (1915); Keister, 123 Va. 
at 157, 96 S.E. at 317. A variation was the assumption that legislatures acted \\ith the com-
mon law in mind. 
•
11 See, e.g., Rogers, 265 Mo. at 200, 177 S.W. at 384; Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 
105 S.E. 206 (1920); Lillienkamp, 133 Tenn. at 57, 179 S.W. at 628. 
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disturbing the marital relation on which the health, purity and 
morals of civilization depended; the dangers of public exposure of 
insignificant familial disputes; the need for forgiveness between 
husbands and wives; and the importance of self-sacrifice, not only 
for the two people involved, but also for the greater good of the 
society.312 Accordingly, these courts concluded that interspousal 
tort claims had not been prescribed. 
The changes in perspectives on judicial decisionmaking and in 
societal images of women, marriage, wives, and the family which 
had occurred by the teens were not universal. They varied in 
scope, as well as geographically and temporally, affecting most 
courts differently and some not at all. 
Many judges saw their responsibilities much like nineteenth cen-
tury jurists. They remained strongly influenced by the common 
law, viewing statutes as intrusions upon it and, thus, narrowly con-
strued them. Judges who were more receptive to legislation, never-
theless, may have considered it improper to look beyond the ex-
press text or to accord statutes precedential value. In fact, Pound 
conceded that his prescription for judicial treatment of statutes 
would "doubtless appeal to the common law lawyer as absurd."818 
Moreover, many judges would have found alien the proposition 
that courtS should intervene in the family, even to rectify social ills 
like wife battering. Continued widespread reliance on the unity fic-
tion and application of the derogation canon illustrate these ideas. 
The changes in societal images of women clearly were not uni-
versal. Visions as pervasive and powerful as those that prevailed 
before the teens certainly could not be displaced completely, and 
many people continued to hold these perspectives. For example, 
012 See, e.g., Drake, 145 Minn. at 391, 177 N.W. at 625; Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 
525-29, 105 S.E. 206, 211-13 (1920) (Walker & Hoke, JJ., dissenting); Lillienkamp, 133 
Tenn. at 64, 179 S.W. at 629; Keister, 123 Va. at 176-77, 96 S.E. at 321-22 (Burks, J., con-
curring); cf. Crowell, 180 N.C. at 522-24, 105 S.E. at 209-10; Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 
140 P. 1022, 1023-25 (1914) (rhetoric and Biblical allusions in cases abrogating immunity). 
Such admonitions ring hollow, however, because nearly all the suits were pursued by, or on 
behalf of, a woman battered, or killed, by her husband . 
.,. Pound, supra note 214, at 385. Indeed, statutes had not yet been received fully into 
the law. An interesting chronology can be traced from Pound, supra note 214, and Holmes, 
supra note 213; to Landis, supra note 214, and Stone, supra note 164, in the 1930s: to 
Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463, 473 (1962), and 
Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 18-21 (1966), in the 1960s; to G. 
CALIBRES!, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982), and Williams, supra note 226, 
in the 1980s. 
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even at the height of the women's suffrage movement, most fe-
males were not involved actively, and many remained opposed to 
giving women the right to vote. 314 
The opinions retaining immunity, nonetheless, convey the sense 
that the teens were a transitional time marked by real changes. For 
instance, the mechanical reasoning and the stylized format of opin-
ions probably signal a realization that legislatures had captured 
primary policymaking authority.31G More significantly, the vigor 
with which the earlier societal images were championed and trans-
formed into arguments of public policy for recognizing immunity 
indicates judicial cognizance of several factors. Courts evidently 
believed that the older visions had continuing vitality worth de-
fending against the threatening new images. They also seemed to 
appreciate that there had been changes in societal views of mar-
riage and the family as manifested in greater public concern for 
their individual members316 and that the Married Women's stat-
utes actually had eroded the common law's strength and the 
merger :fiction. These factors necessitated increased reliance upon 
policy considerations.317 
In summary, from 1914 to 1920, courts in seven jurisdictions per-
mitted interspousal tort litigation. These years cannot be charac-
terized as a period of wholesale abandonment, however, because 
other jurists recognizing immunity afforded the rule continuing 
strength. Moreover, any change in such a longstanding and widely 
recognized doctrine which happened so abruptly was unlikely to 
continue at a comparable pace. Accordingly, it is not surprising 
that during the ensuing half century immunity eroded more 
••• See C. DEGLER, supra note 65, at 328-61; cf. A. KRADITOR, supra note 177, at ch. 2 
(compromises necessary to ensure suffrage secured); C. DEGLER, supra note 65, at 306 (nine-
teenth century women's movement left untouched great mass of women, many of whom 
scorned it as wrongheaded). 
••• Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 157, 96 S.E. 315, 315 (1918) is a classic of the formalis-
tic genre. Indeed, the almost ossified exposition on rights and remedies might indicate a 
desire to freeze flagging judicial supremacy, or to recapture now-faded glory, or even to 
return to earlier, halcyon days. 
••• See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 312 and accompanying text. Indeed, the strident 
rhetoric with which courts embellished the images and the strained manner in which courts 
deployed the images indicate how very threatening the newer images must have appeared. 
317 See supra note 293 and accompanying text. These considerations may give credence to 
the "deradicalization" idea, discussed supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text. Most in-
teresting is the air of quiet desperation, or even decadence, that pervades certain tort immu-
nity opinions. 
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gradually. 318 
(iv) 1921-1970. Between 1921 and 1970, tort immunity slowly 
eroded nationwide. Some states completely abolished the doctrine, 
allowing both intentional tort and negligence interspousal suits. 
Most jurisdictions, however, abrogated the rule in a piecemeal 
manner, recognizing actions in certain contexts, such as after di-
vorce or one spouse's death. Over time, the percentage of opinions 
involving negligence immunity increased significantly. Most inter-
esting, however, was the dearth of novel ideas in the cases, al-
though those previously operating were articulated more explicitly 
or applied differently.319 Thus, throughout the period courts cited 
accumulating precedent, relied substantially upon reasoning 
processes used earlier, and employed previously stated policy argu-
ments to justify immunity's retention or abrogation. In the first 
quarter-century, the Married Women's Acts figured prominently in 
most determinations. During the second, however, the emphasis 
shifted to policy considerations principally related to torts. In 
short, by 1970, most states had permitted tort claims in some con-
text, and the interspousal issue had become essentially a common-
law policy question of substantive tort jurisprudence. 320 
•
1
• Two interspousal tort immunity cases decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court in 
1920 afford a valuable transition. In Dishon v. Dishon, 187 Ky. 497, 497, 219 S.W. 794, 794 
(1920), overruled, Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1953), the court's cryptic re· 
fusal to recognize a tort action aptly summarized prior similar treatment. Two months Inter 
in Robinson v. Robinson, 188 Ky. 49, 49, 220 S.W. 1074, 1074 (1920), the court permitted 
the administrator of the estate of a woman killed by her husband to sue the husband, thus 
presaging future developments. Before the Robinson case, the seven abolition cases, listed 
supra note 245, that involved intentional torts, had had the effect of fully abrogating immu· 
nity because courts in those states later held that negligence immunity also wns abolished. 
See, e.g., Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 583, 131 A. 432, 432 (1925); Roberts v. Rob· 
erts, 185 N.C. 566, 566, 118 S.E. 9, 9 (1923). The Kentucky court was the first to partially 
abrogate immunity. It commenced a process which is ongoing, whereby judges or legislators 
who are unwilling to eliminate immunity fully, abolish it in specific contexts when nbrogn· 
tion is warranted. For instance, the Robinson court recognized that when the reasons for 
immunity have ceased to exist, as when murder ends the marriage, so should immunity. 
Partial abrogation has been a favored technique, and the piecemeal nature of abolition in 
Virginia is a classic, see Comment, The Legislative Abrogation of lnterspousal Immunity in 
Virginia, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 939 (1981). Similarly, Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634, 
634, 92 S.E. 25, 25 (1917), is a precursor because it is the first case seeking recognition of a 
negligence cause of action. 
319 The ideas were refined, applied in new contexts, or accorded varying significance at 
certain times, depending on their relative relevance. 
320 Judicial treatment of immunity by courts abolishing or retaining it was similar during 
the first two decades, changed somewhat between 1940 and 1950, and was nearly identical 
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From 1920 to 1940, considerably more jurisdictions recognized 
immunity than rejected it. In each decade, the same number of 
courts asked to allow interspousal tort claims for the first time re-
jected them as during the teens.321 Most judges who recognized in-
terspousal actions in the 1920s and 1930s served on courts that al-
ready had allowed intentional tort suits.322 During the 1930s, 
however, courts that had retained immunity partially eliminated it, 
especially in the employer-employee context.323 
Many jurists used reasoning similar to that employed before 
1920. The Married Women's statutes remained integral, while 
judges relied substantially on precedent and the policy arguments 
developed earlier.324 Courts rejecting litigation repeated the stock 
ideas supporting immunity, including the unity :fiction, the exis-
tence of a common-law rule of tort immunity, the derogation ca-
from 1950 until 1970. These similarities allow combined analysis or the initial and Inst score 
or years and individualized assessment of the middle decade, while the gradual pace of 
change and the paucity of novel concepts in the decisions facilitate examination of such a 
lengthy period. Space limitations preclude listing the cases. For specific periods, see Annota-
tion, Modern Status of Interspousal Tort Immunity in Personal Injury and Wrongful 
Death Actions, 92 AL.Ran 901 (1979) (and its predecessors). 
321 See, e.g., Palmer v. Edwards, 155 So. 483 (La. App. 1934); Furstenberg v. Furstenberg, 
152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927); Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932), ouer-
ruled, Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342 (Mont. 1986); Sargeant v. Fedor, 3 N.J. Misc. 
832, 130 A. 207 (1925); Leonardi v. Leonardi, 21 Ohio App. 110, 153 N.E. 93 (1925) (the 
1920s); Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935) (the 19303), ouerruled, Cof-
findaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 244 S.E.2d 338 (1978). 
= See, e.g., Penton v. Penton, 223 Ala. 282, 135 So. 481 (1931); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 
Conn. 583, 131 A. 432 (1925) (superseded by statute as stated in Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 200 
Conn. 290, 512 A.2d 130 (1986)); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); 
Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932). Cf. Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 
740 (1935); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Wait v. Pierce, 
191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926); N.Y. GEN. 0BLIG. § 3-313 (McKinney 1963) (states totally 
abolishing for the first time). 
323 See, e.g., Webster v. Snyder, 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932) (injured plaintiff's sub-
sequent marriage to servant or agent who negligently caused injuries held not to abate 
plaintiff's right of action against employer); McLaurin v. McLnurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 
180, 146 So. 877 (1933) (where husband/servant's tortious act injuring his \',ife is net. of his 
master, master is liable to wife, even though wife could not sue husband). Cf. Haglund, 
supra note 24, at 897-906 (analysis of employer-employee cases). This is a combined exam-
ple of partial abrogation, the "Erosion Principle," and the significance or compensation and 
insurance. 
324 See supra notes 246-312 and accompanying text. Few judges incisively analyzed tort. 
immunity or developed new ways of treating it, but there were exceptions. See, e.g., Austin 
v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 73-74, 100 So. 591, 593 (1924) (Etheridge, J., dissenting); Courtney 
v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 395, 87 P.2d 660, 660 (1938). 
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non, and traditional policy contentions such as marital harmony 
and frivolous claims.325 Most important, however, were two "mod-
ern-day" policy notions which could have evolved from previously 
articulated concepts. First, the idea that a wife would raid her hus-
band's estate may have foreshadowed the idea that unscrupulous 
spouses might collude to defraud motor vehicle insurers. 326 Second, 
the earlier treatment of the Married Women's measures presaged 
the notion of judicial deference to legislative public policy 
choices.327 Moreover, the opinions rendered between 1920 and 1940 
were less rigid, strained, and strident than cases decided from 1914 
to 1920.328 The most interesting aspects of decisions abrogating im-
munity were the increased judicial willingness to read the relevant 
Acts broadly and to abrogate immunity partially, particularly when 
the policy reasons for retention would not be contravened. 329 
During the 1940s, approximately twice as many courts retained 
the doctrine as repudiated it. 33° Courts continued to depend upon 
precedent and policy arguments, as the Married Women's legisla-
tion remained significant. Close scrutiny of the opinions indicates, 
however, that jurists handled immunity somewhat differently, indi-
cating that the decade of the 1940s may have been a transitional 
••• See, e.g., Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 523, 263 N.W. 546, 546 (1935), over· 
ruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373 n.10, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10 (1969); Aus· 
tin, 136 Miss. at 61, 100 So. at 591; Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 425, 15 P.2d 922, 922 
(1932). 
••• Perlman v. Brooklyn City Ry. Co., 117 Misc. 353, 354, 191 N.Y.S. 891, 891 (1921), 
aff'd, 202 App. Div. 822, 194 N.Y.S. 971 (1922), was the first case to mention the collusion 
idea, but many subsequent cases do. See, e.g., Maine v. J. Maine & Sons, Co., 198 Iowa 
1278, 1279, 201 N.W. 20, 21 (1924), overruled, Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 720, 74 
N.W.2d 212, 219 (1956); Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 41, 198 N.E. 320, 321 (1935). 
327 See, e.g., Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 899, 62 S.W. 2d 1084, 1085-86 (1933), over· 
ruled, Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1986); Emerson v. Western Seed & 
Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 184-85, 216 N.W. 297, 298-99 (1927), overruled, Imig v. March, 
203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979); Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291, 292-93, 117 A. 357, 358 
(1922), overruled, Digby v. Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 388 A.2d 1 (1978). 
••• Compare the cases cited in supra notes 325-27 with those cited in supra note 307. 
••• See, e.g., Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 
62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926). For 
examples of partial abrogation, see Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 
191 (1935); Albrecht v. Potthoff, 192 Minn. 557, 257 N.W. 377 (1934); Kaczorowski v. Kalko-
sinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 A. 663 (1936), overruled, Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 433 A.2d 859 
(1981). For citations to the cases decided between 1920 and 1940, see Annotation, supra 
note 320. 
••• The number considering the question as a matter of first impression was quite small, 
so that judges in almost every jurisdiction had some precedent to consider. 
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period. The altered treatment was subtle, a matter of degree, and 
more pronounced in the decisions retaining immunity.331 
These courts de-emphasized the unity fiction, the derogation ca-
non, and the longstanding and less persuasive policy notions relat-
ing to alternative relief, "floodgates," and juridical equality. The 
judges stressed and continued to refine the fraud and collusion and 
judicial deference concepts. Although the marital harmony ration-
ale retained prominence, the tenor of its articulation moderated. 
Courts repudiating immunity relied less on the Married 
Women's Acts and more on the status of wives as individual rights-
holders. In short, the 1940s witnessed alterations in the substance, 
emphasis, and tone of interspousal tort immunity opinions. Espe-
cially noteworthy is a shift in focus from the common law and stat-
utes to the most convincing public policy considerations.332 
Between 1950 and 1970, the pace of abrogation quickened, even 
though many more jurisdictions retained than abolished immunity. 
During the 1950s numerous courts partially eliminated the rule, 
but few completely abolished it. During the 1960s, only a small 
number of courts partially abrogated the doctrine and several to-
tally eliminated it. · 
Judicial reasoning processes evolved but resembled those em-
ployed before. Precedent assumed greater significance with a 
growth in case law, and some jurists relied primarily on it.333 Al-
though courts mentioned the Married Women's statutes, their im-
portance dwindled. Courts treated immunity almost entirely as a 
common-law policy question.334 The mode of argumentation also 
changed, as jurists analyzed immunity more comprehensively, care-
fully, and candidly.335 The tenor of most cases remained mild, but 
331 McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943), is the most "Jnnus·like" 
opinion. 
332 For citations to the cases decided during this decade, see the sources cited in Annota-
tion, supra note 320. 
333 Some opinions, especially those retaining immunity, were cryptic nnd included few 
reasons for the conclusion. See, e.g., Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 217, 239 P.2d 933, 933 
(1952), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Romero v. 
Romero, 58 N.M. 201, 201, 269 P.2d 748, 748 (1954), overruled, Maestas v. Overton, 87 N.M. 
213, 214, 531 P.2d 947, 948 (1975). 
33
• But new policy ideas were not enunciated. 
= They thoroughly ventilated the issues at stake and acknowledged the strengths nnd 
vulnerabilities of the policy arguments for and against abolition and retention. For example, 
the simultaneous ascendance of the fraud and judicial deference contentions on the one 
hand and the compensation rationale on the other may have reflected countervailing posi-
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occasional strong language can be found in dissenting opinions. 336 
More specifically, nearly all courts rejecting tort suits abandoned 
the alternative remedies, frivolous litigation, and juridical equality 
ideas and relied principally on the marital harmony, collusion, and 
judicial deference notions. During the 1950s, jurists fully abrogat-
ing the doctrine primarily depended upon responses to these argu-
ments. Courts partially eliminating immunity expressly observed 
that when the reasons for the rule, such as existence of a marital 
relationship, had ceased, so should the doctrine's application. By 
the next decade, however, some judges enunciated more explicitly 
affirmative policy arguments, like compensation for injuries. 337 
Courts handled the interspousal question as described above be-
tween 1920 and 1970 for numerous reasons, some of which are sim-
ilar to explanations offered during earlier periods. Factors respect-
ing judicial decisionmaking, tort jurisprudence, and societal images 
of females, wedlock, wives, and the family have more comparable 
importance than previously. 
Considerations regarding judicial decisionmaking, particularly 
jurists' views of their roles, evolved during the fifty-year period, 
appearing to change somewhat in the 1940s. Statutes remained a 
primary source of legal growth338 and, correspondingly, the 
strength of the common law, its rules and fictions continued to 
dwindle. Yet, opinions included more appeals to public policy, and 
courts increasingly treated substantive legal issues as policy ques-
tions appropriate for judicial resolution independent of 
legislatures. 339 
Two identifiable schools of legal thought refined ideas about ju-
dicial decisionmaking. The first jurisprudential movement, "Real-
ism," predominated between 1920 and 1945. The second school, 
tions developed on a critical policy question. 
338 See, e.g., Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 74-76 (Mo. 1960) (Eager, J., dissent-
ing); Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 550-66, 180 A.2d 772, 774-82 (1962) (Musmanno, J,, dis-
senting), overruled, Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 433 A2d 859 (1962). 
337 For citations to the cases decided between 1950 and 1970, see the sources cited in 
Annotation, supra note 320. 
338 See HURST I, supra note 133, at 188-89. 
33
• A classic statement of these ideas in the tort context is R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do 
JUSTICE (1969). See also W. PROSSER & W:P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 3. Thus, while legisla-
tures probably retained policymaking primacy, see text accompanying supra note 332, 
courts may have regained lost policymaking authority in torts, because legislatures lacked 
sufficient time to "seriously consider proposals for law reform," see R. KEETON, supra, at 16. 
1989] INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY 427 
denominated "Reasoned Elaboration" or "Process Jurisprudence," 
was preeminent from 1945 until 1970.340 
The Realists subscribed to concerns expressed earlier about dis-
advantaged persons and justice in specific cases. They advocated 
reliance on the use of nonlegal materials and criticism of mechani-
cal concepts, legal reasoning, and opinion writing. The Realists also 
warned against placing undue reliance on traditional legal author-
ity, including the common law, doctrine, and fictions, while favor-
ing policy-oriented and functional decisionmaking and approaches 
that balanced interests, especially those of litigants.341 
Realism posed a number of philosophical dilemmas, particularly 
irrationality and moral relativism. The Reasoned Elaborationists 
responded to such dilemmas by refining certain Realist theories 
and offering their own. 342 These judges and scholars emphasized 
rationality and consensus thinking. They were concerned about in-
stitutional relationships between the legislative and executive 
branches of government and the courts, for which they envisioned 
a circumscribed role. Thus, the judiciary was to exercise restraint, 
limit its lawmaking activity, and defer to the more democratic 
branches whenever practicable.343 The Reasoned Elaborationists 
admonished courts to observe "neutral principles," respecting pre-
cedent. Courts were clearly, candidly, and comprehensively to ar-
ticulate and balance the issues, interests, and values implicated, 
while resolving questions pursuant to societal consensus and re-
fraining from judgment when these goals could not be attained.344 
"'
0 I rely most here on the work of those in the jurisprudential movements, such as Karl 
Llewellyn and Herbert Wechsler, and on White, supra note 268. See also White, The Evolu-
tion of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REY. 
279 (1973) (secondary treatment). 
"'' See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN :MIND (1930); Llewellyn, A Realistic Juris· 
prudence-The Next Step, 30 Cotur.t L. REv. 431 (1930). Cf. White, supra note 268, at 1013-
26; White, supra note 340, at 280-82 (secondary treatment). 
"'" See, e.g., L. Fuu.ER, Tm: LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); cf. White, supra note 340, at 
282-86 (secondary treatment); White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. 
L. REv. 649, 655-56 (1984) (discussing how incremental criticism in this context precipitated 
legal change). 
"'" See, e.g., Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lin· 
coln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1957); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 
Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1959); cf. G. W11rra, 
supra note 162, at 323 (secondary treatment). 
"'' See, e.g., Hart, supra note 343; Wechsler, Tou:ard Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959); cf. G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 323 (secondary 
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Once judges reached decisions, they were to write opinions in a lu-
cid, forthright, and internally consistent manner and to justify 
conclusions with thorough, persuasive rationales. 3411 
The ideas espoused by these jurisprudential schools may explain 
the courts' treatment of immunity. Judges' increasing willingness 
to abolish immunity partially manifested numerous Realist tenets. 
Jurists may have been attempting to provide equity between the 
parties, rejecting the irrelevant unity fiction, or recognizing the un-
derlying social realities of wife battering.346 Similarly, the judicial 
deference policy contention embodied aspects of Reasoned 
Elaborationist teachings.347 Indeed, tort immunity, implicating del-
icate issues of marriage and the family about which there could be 
little societal consensus, might well have been the kind of question 
considered more appropriate for legislative resolution. 348 Moreover, 
significant changes in immunity's treatment after 1940, such as de-
creasing dependence on the common law, merger, and the Married 
Women's Acts, greater reliance on more salient public policy argu-
ments, and use of more candid, thorough modes of argumentation 
reflected integral precepts of each jurisprudential school and of ju-
dicial decisionmaking in numerous substantive fields. 349 
Tort jurisprudence, particularly after 1945, appears to have been 
more important to immunity decisions than before 1920. It seems 
equally important as considerations regarding judicial decision-
making. 350 Moreover, many aspects of courts' treatment of the in-
terspousal question comported with a number of theoretical and 
case law developments in tort law. 
The theorizing had numerous strands. Several major strains that 
developed between 1920 and 1950 can be identified. One group of 
treatment) . 
... See, e.g., Bickel & Wellington, supra note 343; Sacks, Foreword to the Supreme Court, 
1953 Term, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1954); cf. G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 345 (secondnry 
treatment). 
346 See supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
347 See, e.g., supra note 343 and accompanying text. 
••• See supra notes 343-44 and accompanying text. 
349 For example, the Reasoned Elaborationists evinced most concern about the United 
States Supreme Court's treatment of constitutional issues. See supra notes 341-45 nnd nc-
companying text (precepts of both schools). 
••• See supra notes 338-49 and accompanying text. Tort jurisprudence is relnted to con-
temporary judicial decisionmaking, for example, because tort law was one focus of the Renl-
ists. I rely most here on work of those, like Leon Green, who advocated tort lnw ideas dis-
cussed below, and for secondary treatment on G. WHITE, supra note 124. 
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judges and academicians treated torts as a "private law" subject 
with discrete boundaries, the primary purpose of which was ad-
monitory. They emphasized the field's doctrinal nature and negli-
gence as its organizing principle. 3111 A second collection of judges 
and writers, the Realists, differed with much of this.3112 They con-
sidered torts to be an area of "public law," stressing its compensa-
tory goal and de-emphasizing the field's doctrinal aspects and the 
central importance of negligence. 3113 
"Tort law was not the same after the impact of Realism."3114 By 
the 1940s, however, tort law had become an "unwieldy, diverse, 
fluid subject," and Realism's philosophical difficulties had been ex-
posed. 355 Thus, there ensued a search for consensus dominated by 
two approaches that grew out of the earlier thinking. The first, a 
"traditional" perspective, subscribed to the body of substantive 
tort doctrine and considered the field's principal purpose to be 
civil punishment of blameworthy behavior.3116 The other approach, 
characterized by a "policy" orientation, viewed torts primarily as a 
scheme for compensating injured people through insurance.3117 A 
surface reconciliation of these perspectives was said to have been 
achieved mainly through the efforts of Dean Prosser, who pre-
served doctrinal approaches to torts while applying Realist meth-
odologies.358 This theorizing contributed to subtle changes between 
1945 and 1970, so that by 1970 torts was evolving into a public law 
u• Professor White, supra note 124, at 78-83, describes Francis Bohlen as a central figure 
in this group. Cf. id. at ch.3 (full discussion of group's views and citations to writings). 
u• Professor White, supra note 124, at 75·78, describes Leon Green as a leader of this 
group. Cf. id. at ch. 3 (full discussion of group's views and citations to writings). 
u• See id. at 106-10, 149-50. Moreover, Professor White has identified a third group that 
included Charles Gregory and Fleming James, who also argued that negligence should have 
less significance. Id. at 146. The Realists also stressed the policy ramifications of tort law, 
urged courts to consider the relationship between parties before them while balancing the 
litigants' interests and policy factors, and recommended that strict liability be treated as a 
distinct category, rather than as a series of exceptions. Id. at 106-10, 149-50. 
= Id. at 112. 
u• See G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 139-40 (unwieldy); id. at 139-41; text accompan}ing 
supra note 342 (exposure of Realism's philosophical difficulties, such as relativism). 
u• See id. at 140-53. Professor White identifies certain "Harvard-trained scholars," like 
the Keeton brothers, as leaders, see id. at 153. Cf. id. at 140-53 (full discussion of group's 
views and citations to writings). 
307 See G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 146-53. Professor White identifies Charles Gregory, 
Fleming James, and Leon Green as leaders of this group, see id. at 153. Cf. id. at 146-53 
(discussion of group's views, the significance of insurance and citations to writings). 
$08 For a thorough discussion of Dean Prosser's efforts, see id. at 153-79. 
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subject, principally aimed at adjusting societal risks through more 
equitable and efficient compensation of injuries. 369 
Although little of this thinking was acknowledged expressly in 
tort opinions until the 1940s, it may have influenced judicial deci-
sionmaking during the entire half century. Numerous elements of 
the case law-including expansion of liability's ambit as well as de-
velopments respecting specific doctrine and perceptions of torts' 
purposes-were consistent with courts' handling of interspousal 
immunity. The patterns of gradual evolution throughout this pe-
riod, as well as incremental change at the beginning and accelerat-
ing change near the end, extended across much of tort law.36° For 
instance, the independent intentional tort cause of action for 
mental distress was adopted sporadically before mid-century, but 
more widely thereafter.361 In products liability, courts slowly abro-
gated the privity requirement for negligence and warranty actions 
nationwide. Courts only recognized strict liability in tort during 
the 1960s, after which time it quickly swept the nation.362 Numer-
ous other tort doctrines slowly eroded over the fifty years, as 
judges developed "ameliorating practices and a group of exceptions-
for avoiding" the application of rules believed to "regularly pro-
duce unjust results or lag behind social and economic develop-
ments. "363 Indeed, the alteration of doctrines that occurred be-
3
•• See id. at 176-79. Professor White finds Prosser most influential, see id. at 176-77, but 
others, like James and Harper with their treatise, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956), and Charles 
Gregory were influential. Of course, all tort theorizing at this time did not fit neatly into tho 
categories above, and tort scholars evinced little interest in tort immunity during tho half 
century. There were Haglund, supra note 24, and Sanford, supra note 3, but the seminal 
work on tort law in the family realm was by a family law specialist, McCurdy, supra note 3. 
36° For helpful analysis of numerous doctrinal areas that evinced these patterns, sec R. 
KEETON, supra note 339. 
361 See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 3; Givelber, The Right to Minimum 
Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42 (1982). 
362 For discussion of the slow development before the 1960s, see W. PROSSER & W.P. KEE· 
TON, supra note 2, §§ 96-97; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 
(1960). For judicial adoption of strict liability during that decade, see Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 57, 377 P.2d 897, 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 697 (1962). Cf. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A)(l965) (Restatement adoption); w. PROSSER & 
W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 98 (history of products liability). 
363 See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 594 (7th ed. 
1982). Tort immunity, like these tort doctrines, was a prime candidate for the "erosion prin· 
ciple," which also explains judicial willingness to partially abrogate tort immunity. Other 
examples of the slow pace of change are Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.) 
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tween 1958 and 1968, led numerically by most of the tort 
immunities, was so dramatic that it has been characterized as a 
"decade of distinctly accelerated overruling."364 
In addition to these patterns, courts after 1945 increasingly re-
solved numerous tort law issues by balancing certain important 
policy arguments, especially judicial deference and compensa-
tion.365 This treatment reflected shifts in the perception of torts 
from a private to a public law field, compensatory in nature, and 
that warranted policy-oriented, rather than doctrinal, analysis.366 
Finally, many developments in torts specifically relating to im-
munity can be traced to expanding automobile use and to develop-
ing notions of how to handle injuries attributable to negligent driv-
ing. For example, motor vehicle operation may underlie the spate 
of recognition of tort immunity, passage of guest statutes by half 
the states, and emergence of the fraud policy contention between 
1920 and 1940, as well as the continuing significance of that argu-
ment and the judicial deference and compensation contentions 
thereafter. 367 
Factors relating to societal images that predominated from 1920 
to 1970 comport in a number of ways with courts' treatment of the 
interspousal question. Because societal visions as ubiquitous and 
strongly held as those that existed before 1910 could not have been 
replaced totally and because the images that arose in the teens had 
such different and threatening ramifications, the newer images 
(first case recognizing wife's suit for consortium), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950); State 
Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952) (lead case recog· 
nizing independent mental distress cause of action); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d lOS, 
443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (first case abolishing traditional categories governing 
premises liability) . 
... See R KEE'I'oN, supra note 339, at 3; cf. id. at 45 (immunities led development). None· 
theless, before 1960, all the tort immunities eroded slowly. See W. PROSSER & W:P. KEETON, 
supra note 2, §§ 122, 131, 133 (parent-child, governmental, and charitable immunity); Hol· 
lister, supra note 11 (parent-child immunity). 
06
• The rise of the judicial deference and compensation ideas extended across much of 
tort law. See W. PROSSER & W :P. KEE'I'oN, supra note 2, §§ 3-4; cf. Keeton, supra note 313 
(history of deference's rise); G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 146-53 (history of compen.«ation's 
rise). 
366 See infra notes 389-91 & 394-95 and accompanying text. 
367 See w. PROSSER & W:P. KEE'I'oN, supra note 2, § 34 (discussion or guest statutes). Cf. 
id., §§ 34, 122; Hollister, supra note 11 (preeminence of judicial deference and compensation 
ideas and juxtaposition of latter with fraud counter-argument evident in cases chnllenging 
guest statutes and parent-child immunity). See generally L. Fim:DMAN, supra note 37, at 
588-89 (after 1920 tort law increasingly became "law of the automobile"). 
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could not have been expected to prevail. Indeed, what vitality the 
visions had eroded swiftly and dramatically. Consequently, those 
that predominated throughout most of this half-century were of 
the traditional nuclear family in which the husband was the princi-
pal wage earner and the wife functioned primarily as homemaker. 
The particulars of these images varied over time, yet the visions 
apparently were so strong that they masked and denied the statis-
tical realities, such as escalating divorce rates. 368 
Public opinion substantially shifted between the world wars. 
World War I, with its aura of "holocaust and meaningless death 
and its mood of social instability" precipitated changes: prewar op-
timism and earnestness became cynicism; "social responsibility 
gave way to alienation, virtuousness appeared as hypocrisy."369 Al-
though the Progressive movement did not end during the 1920s, it 
wore a "changed face."370 States still enacted social welfare mea-
sures, but many Americans opposed additional change. 371 More-
over, some advances made in the Progressive era, especially for fe-
males, were lost or eroded, while the ephemeral quality of others 
was revealed. After the Armistice, numerous wives quit the work 
place and returned to their households, undermining whatever ac-
complishments women had achieved. 372 Despite the political gain 
that suffrage represented, much of the reform's promise failed to 
materialize, because the females who voted made choices remarka-
bly similar to men. 373 
The reexamination of traditional mores triggered by the war and 
Progressivism may have been detrimental. Many "came to ques-
tion the inviolability of their own moral principles,'' the number of 
divorces continued to soar, and the increased freedom captured in 
the "flapper" idea translated into little real political or economic 
368 See w. CHAFE, supra note 289; N. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1962); W. O'NEILL, supra note 294, at 20-21 (divorce rates). 
369 White, supra note 268, at 1014. Accord M. COWLEY, EXILE'S RETURN (1934); W. 
O'NEILL, supra note 294, at 269-70. 
370 White, supra note 268, at 1013. Accord w. LEUCHTENBERG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY: 
1914-1932 (1958); H. MAY, supra note 289. 
371 See White, supra note 268, at 1013 (states enacted social welfare measures); W. 
O'NEILL, supra note 9, at 90; S. Woon, supra note 266, at 255-56 (opposition to certain 
reforms or more change). 
372 See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 52-54. Accord B. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 57. 
373 See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 26-33; E. Fl.EXNER, supra note 96, at 331; W. 
O'NEILL, supra note 9, at 92. 
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liberty.374 With the stock market crash and the Great Depression, 
the public mood became much more "hard-boiled";37rs women were 
excluded from certain occupations, and those who held jobs were 
castigated for depriving males of work. 376 Given these societal dis-
locations, it should not have been surprising that from the 1920s 
until the 1940s prominent public figures and organs of popular cul-
ture persistently reinforced the notion that a woman's proper place 
was in the home.377 In short, by 1940 women's political, economic, 
and social status had improved minimally, while the vision of fe-
male as homemaker was strengthened. 378 
The Second World War, however, required creation of new 
images for women, even as it altered underlying social realities. To 
recruit females for the war effort, women workers were portrayed 
publicly as fully competent to perform tasks formerly reserved ex-
clusively for males.379 Millions of married and single women en-
tered the job market, and they were paid higher wages and labored 
under better conditions than before the war.360 Most salient, how-
ever, substantial numbers of females remained permanent mem-
bers of the work force after the war. These realities undermined 
the hegemony of the prevailing visions of women as homemakers 
and of husbands as primary breadwinners and heads of their 
households. 381 
Nevertheless, the images continued to have considerable vitality 
throughout the 1950s because of post-war societal uncertainties. 
Dislocations caused by World War IT, tensions created by the Cold 
War, and McCarthyism contributed to a search for consensus in 
American life, pressures to conform, and the desire to reestablish 
37
• White, supra note 268, at 1013-14. For additional discussion, see W. CHAFE, supra note 
289, at 51, 94-96; H. MAY, supra note 289. 
375 D. WECTER, THE AGE OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 251 (1948). Accord W. O'Nruu., supra 
note 294, at 269-70. 
378 See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 64, 107-09. Accord B. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 57. 
377 See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 64, 107; W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 31-34. 
378 See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at ch. 4; W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 29-34. 
37
• See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at ch. 6; W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 92-94. 
380 See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at ch. 6; W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 92-95. Cf. Gins-
burg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REY. 1, 9 (1975) (equal pay requirement in 
force during war, quietly retired later). See generally Finley, Transcending Equality The-
ory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 CotUM. L. REY. 1118, 1176 
(1986) (veterans' job protection statute). 
38
' See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at ch. 8, 144-46; W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 94-96. 
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the patterns of a "simpler era."382 Many females experienced con-
flicts about their appropriate roles and were advised by public 
leaders, the media, and health professionals to seek fulfillment in 
the successful performance of their natural responsibilities as wives 
and mothers. 383 The authority of the predominant images of the 
nuclear family was not challenged seriously until the 1960s. That 
decade witnessed the rejuvenation of the organized women's move-
ment, which had been comparatively quiet, especially in the politi-
cal arena, since adoption of the nineteenth amendment. 384 
These prevailing visions were enunciated expressly in the immu-
nity opinions and were shared by judges. Indeed, many would have 
been reluctant to take any action that might jeopardize the fam-
ily's well being. Thus, these jurists would have been unwilling to 
permit tort suit by a female, separated, but not divorced, from her 
battering spouse. They would have allowed the children of a wo-
man murdered by her husband to sue, however. Moreover, the 
strength exerted by the predominant images at different times dur-
ing the half-century paralleled the slow pace of the doctrine's ero-
sion and the preeminence of the marital harmony policy argument 
throughout the period. It also was consistent with the flurry of 
cases recognizing immunity from 1920 to 1940 and the accelerated 
382 W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 208-09; G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 140, 144-45. 
383 See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 205-09 (writers urged women to return to tho homo, 
while educators advocated that child rearing and homemaking be raised to the dignity of n 
profession and made the primary purpose of women's colleges); W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 
94-95 (magazines featured pictures of large families, praised women who became profession-
als at homemaking, and glorified family togetherness). 
38
' B. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 56-58; W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 227. The period of 
comparative quiet in the women's movement mirrors the hiatus in the demise of inter-
spousal tort immunity. Whether there is any link between the two phenomena will require 
more research. For helpful discussion of the "lag theory," especially how the fomily lags 
behind the market, see Olsen, supra note 65, at 1513-20. 
During the 50 years, there probably was considerable uncertainty about how to reconcile 
the societal visions that obtained in the nineteenth century with those of the teens. Thus, 
the views prevailing from 1920 until 1970 may have been an accommodation of the images 
of the two earlier periods, so that wives could have been seen anywhere on n spectrum thnt 
ranged from chattels to full rights holders. See, e.g., the dissenting and majority opinions in 
Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 80, 72, 100 So. 591, 595, 593 (1924): "When the Constitution 
and Legislature emancipated women from the disability of coverture, they necessarily made 
her a legal person [with] the right under the law to a redress for a personal injury •••. 
Secrecy will cure many troubles of the home, while publicity will only add fuel to tho 
flames." Accord McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 204, 135 P.2d 940, 940 (1943). 
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rate of change in the 1960s. 385 
Thus, between 1920 and 1970, immunity eroded gradually na-
tionwide and within particular jurisdictions. By 1970, the inter-
spousal issue was treated almost exclusively as a policy question. 
Most states had allowed tort litigation in some context and the 
pace of abolition was accelerating. Predictably, then, after 1970 the 
doctrine increasingly came under attack and was transformed 
quickly from a majority to a minority rule. 
(v) 1970-1989. During the last two decades, interspousal immu-
nity has been severely weakened.386 Many courts have either com-
pletely or partially abolished the doctrine, and legislatures in sev-
eral jurisdictions have provided for intentional tort actions 
between spouses. Most cases involved negligence, the newest mani-
festation of which was unreasonable household behavior.387 In 
short, approximately one-sixth of the states retain immunity in 
some form, and a substantial majority have fully abolished it. 388 
Judges no longer relied on the Married Women's statutes but 
restated, comprehensively and candidly, refined policy arguments. 
For instance, jurists more carefully separated and juxtaposed con-
tentions applicable to intentional, as opposed to negligent, torts. 389 
Judges who permitted claims emphasized tort law's compensatory 
goal and explicitly acknowledged wives' individual rights. Jurists 
retaining immunity stressed the marital tranquility, fraud, and ju-
dicial deference concepts. Considerations respecting judicial deci-
sionmaking, torts, and societal images-most of which evolved 
from prior developments-appeared more interrelated and quite 
significant to resolution of the interspousal question.390 The thor-
ough and rapid abandonment of the longstanding doctrine will be 
examined initially. 
385 Although a decade-by-decade analysis might yield more refined conclusions, I only dis-
covered numerous, obvious ideas that were apparent from assessing the longer period or 
that operated in earlier periods, such as the Acts' amended nature. 
386 For helpful lists of the cases, see Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1211-12 (MiEs. 
1988); Heino v. Harper, 306 Or. 347, 349-50, 759 P.2d 253, 254-55 (1988) . 
..., See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 381 :Mass. 231, 231, 409 N.E.2d 717, 717 (1980); MerenotT v. 
Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 535, 388 A.2d 951, 951 (1978). 
388 See supra note 2. 
389 See, e.g., S.A. V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 {Mo. 1986); Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 
3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985). 
••• The quintessential example of the ideas in the text are the developments described 
infra note 395 and accompanying text. 
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Trends in judicial decisionmaking, especially jurists' perspectives 
on their roles and relationships to other societal institutions, 
changed substantially.391 The United States Supreme Court, nu-
merous lower federal courts, and some state courts increasingly 
considered it an important judicial responsibility to resolve signifi-
cant social issues. These new duties included resolution of issues 
formerly deemed less appropriate for treatment by courts than by 
other government branches or societal entities like the family or 
religious organizations.392 Courts were especially receptive when 
rights of disadvantaged minorities and women were implicated and 
when the legislative and executive branches and other societal in-
stitutions had been relatively unresponsive.393 Correspondingly, 
certain state judges apparently believed that they were obligated 
to address important familial disputes, even those previously 
thought better left to legislatures or extra-legal entities, particu-
larly when individual family members' rights were involved.394 
Moreover, courts addressing tort questions assumed greater re-
sponsibility for substantive change in the field. They resolved is-
sues formerly considered more appropriate for treatment by legis-
latures or other societal institutions; opened new and expanded old 
areas of liability; increasingly overruled precedents; and empha-
391 But these trends did evolve from prior developments, see supra notes 338-67 and ac-
companying text. I rely most here on G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 295-316, 320-24; White, 
supra note 268, at 1027-28; White, supra note 340, at 290-302 for secondary treatment and 
case law for primary treatment. 
•
92 See G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 320-26, 339-41, 357-59; White, supra note 340, at 
290-91, 295-96. Cf. A Cox, THEW ARREN CouRT (1968); Wright, Professor Bickel, The Schol· 
arly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971) (contemporaneous 
advocacy of views); G. WHITE, EARL WARREN, A PUBLIC LIFE (1982) (analysis of jurispru· 
dence of important advocate of views). 
393 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (women's rights); Balter v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186 (1962) (voting rights); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (blacks' rights); Cf. 
G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 320-26, 39-41, 57-59; G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL 
THOUGHT 60-61 (1978) (secondary treatment). 
394 Judges intervened in, legalized, and made public the family in fields such as domestic 
relations law. See R MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN (1985); Minow, supra note 9, 
at 832-33. This also was true of parent-child immunity, see Hollister, supra note 11. Cf. 
Olsen, supra note 65, at 1530-39 (full discussion of developments); Note, Domestic Violence: 
Legislative and Judicial Remedies, 2 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 167 (1979); infra note 413 and 
accompanying text (statutory protections for wives); infra note 403 (all tort immunities' 
erosion evinces courts' willingness to intervene in institutions earlier considered sacrosanct); 
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 
61 N.Y.U.L. REV. 589, 644 (1986) (judicial protection for battered women). 
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sized the judiciary's special obligation to "modernize" the common 
law.395 
Rapidly expanding and broadly liberalized liability emerged as 
the dominant themes in tort jurisprudence. Aimed primarily at 
achieving the field's compensatory purpose and premised substan-
tially on the availability of insurance, these themes comported 
with the dramatic overthrow of tort immunity.396 More areas were 
governed by strict liability principles. Strict liability in tort for in-
juries caused by defective products swept the country,397 and many 
jurisdictions adopted no-fault automobile compensation 
schemes.398 Some authorities have even suggested that courts' abo-
lition of the familial immunities constituted a judicially imposed 
no-fault system.399 Moreover, many jurisdictions relaxed doctrinal 
categorizations that had served to limit imposition of tort liability. 
Numerous states implemented comparative negligence;'00 and they 
modified guest statutes;'01 status categories governing premises lia-
••• All of these ideas are discussed in the next paragraph. Cf. Townsend v. Townsend, 703 
S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. 1986); Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342, 344-45 (Mont. 1986) 
(recent tort immunity cases emphasizing obligation to modernize common law). 
•
06 The developments described here evolved from prior ones, see supra notes 359-67 and 
accompanying text; infra note 406. I rely most on the cases. For helpful secondary treat-
ment, see w. PROSSER & P. KEEToN, supra note 4; 1\1 SHAPO, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF 
INJURY (1984); G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 168-243; Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis 
and Modern Tort Law, 9 YALE L.J. 1521, 1525 (1987). For helpful discussion of ideas under-
lying the dominant theme in the text by those who influenced the developments that en-
sued, see R KEEToN & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A 
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965); James, Accident Liability Recon-
sidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948). Cf. W. PROSSER & W.P. 
KEEToN, supra note 2, §§ 82-85 (discussion of compensation systems). 
••
1 For a helpful discussion of ideas underlying this development by one who influenced 
it, see Prosser, supra note 362. Cf. W. PROSSER & W.P. KE&ToN, supra note 2, §§ 95-104A; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (full analysis of strict tort liability). 
••• For a helpful discussion of ideas underlying this development by those who influenced 
it, see R KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 396; Cf. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEEToN, supra 
note 2, § 84; A. WIDISS, No-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE lN ACTION (1977) (later 
developments). 
••• See infra note 472 and accompanying text. 
•
00 See Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 
858 (1975) (lead case); Wade, Comparative Negligence, 40 LA. L. Rsv. 299 (1980) (chroni-
cling development). For helpful discussion of ideas underlying this development, which was 
primarily statutory, and of the concept, see P. KE&ToN, supra note 4, § 67; V. ScmvARTZ. 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 1986). 
••• See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 855, 506 P.2d 212, 212, 106 Cal Rptr. 383, 383, 
(1973) (lead case); W.P. KEEToN, supra note 4, § 34, at 215-17 (chronicling development and 
discussing guest statutes). 
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bility,402 and parent-child, sovereign, and charitable immunities.408 
Novel causes of action such as wrongful birth were recognized."0" 
Legislators, who evinced greater willingness to pass substantive 
tort measures,405 and judges, who were more ready to act in areas 
of legislative inactivity,408 shared responsibility for the expanding 
ambit of liability. 
Societal visions of women, marriage, wives, and the family also 
have been quite important, changing significantly during the past 
two decades. This time has been one of considerable social fer-
ment, characterized by disintegrating consensus.407 More women 
than ever before work, many in jobs formerly held almost exclu-
sively by men.408 Divorce rates have continued to rise, and nearly 
402 See Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968) (lead case); J. PAGE, 
PREMISES LIABILITY (1984); w. PROSSER & w .P. KEETON, supra note 2, §§ 58·62 (chronicling 
development and discussing premises liability). 
403 See Hollister, supra note 11 (parent-child); W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, 
§ 122, at 904-07; 131; 133 (parent-child, sovereign and charitable immunities). California 
continued to lead these developments. See supra note 364 (earlier leadership). New Jersey, 
however, may now have assumed the mantle. 
404 See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 55, at 370·73 (chronicling develop· 
ment and discussing concept). Cf. W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 363, at 
463-68 (discussing recognition of other new causes of action); Finley, Rescuing a Submerged 
Text: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE JL. & FEMINISM (forthcoming 
1989). 
400 For example, no-fault compensation, see supra note 398, was instituted almost exclu· 
sively by legislatures, and comparative negligence, see supra note 400, was primarily a legis-
lative innovation. 
406 The increasing "activism" and decreasing deference in the latter half of the 1960a, 
mentioned supra notes 359-67 and accompanying text, have since become more pronounced. 
See W. PROSSER & W .P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 3; Henderson, Expanding the Negligence 
Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976). Indeed, the latest manifes-
tation of the interplay between the judicial and legislative branches, albeit one generally 
aimed at limiting liability, is passage of "tort reform legislation," such as that imposing 
"caps" on damages in certain situations. See Priest, supra note 396, at 1587-88; Vetri, The 
Integration of Tort Law Reforms and Liability Insurance Ratemaking in the New Age, 66 
OR. L. REV. 277 (1987); Symposium: Issues in Tort Reform, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 317 (1987); Tort 
Reform Symposium Issue, 64 DEN. U.L. REV. 613 (1988). 
407 J. MITCHELL, WOMAN'S ESTATE 11-42 (1971); w. O'NEILL, COMING APART (1971); P. 
SLATER, THE PURSUIT OF LONELINESS (1970). 
4
•• W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 119-20; Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the 
Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913, 922 (1983); Ginsburg, supra note 380, at 8-9. Cf. Freed-
man, supra at 921 (feminist goal to gain access for women to opportunities previously re-
served for men and equal rewards once access achieved). But cf. W. CHAFE, supra note 289, 
at 247; Note, To Have and To Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1273 n.114 (1986) (discrimination in compensation). 
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all states permit no-fault divorce.409 Women have participated en-
ergetically in the major political movements-protesting American 
involvement in Vietnam, opposing racism, pursuing environmental 
and consumer protection, and seeking greater rights for them-
selves.410 The women's movement, relatively inactive since gaining 
suffrage, has been revitalized and vigorous, pressing for widespread 
reform.411 Further, a number of new economic, political, and civil 
rights, and legal causes of action, have been recognized and numer-
ous existing ones expanded.412 For these reasons, images of women, 
as well as the family, husbands, and wives, have changed. 
Many people have begun to view the family and marriage as 
comprised of individuals whose personal fulfillment is as important 
as the continued existence of either unit. Married women have 
come to be seen as individuals entitled to the same rights and op-
portunities possessed by others and for whom the government 
ought to intervene in the family when necessary. For example, 
some states have granted statutory protections to battered wives 
and victims of spousal rape.413 Courts articulated these modem 
views of women and wives in judicial opinions. Indeed, in contem-
porary society, it probably seemed appropriate as a matter of pub-
... See L. WEITZMAN, Tm: DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA, at xvii, 215 (1985) (divorce rotes); id. 
at 41-49 (no-fault divorce). 
m See M CARDEN, Tm: NEW FE11nNIST MoVE!llENT (1974); A. DOUGLAS, Tm: FEMINIZATION 
OF AlllERlcAN CULTURE (1977); J. HoLE & E. LEVINE. REBIRTH OF FE?.ltNISM (1971); J. MrrcH-
ELL, supra note 407. Cf. Freedman, supra note 408, at 916-17 (catalog or rights women 
achieved). 
m See J. HoLE & E. LEVINE, supra note 410; J. MITCHELL, supra note 407, at.11-96. Cf. M. 
CARDEN, supra note 410, at 9-15 (discussion of major ideas of movement); Freedman, supra 
note 408, at 915; Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TR.'<. L. 
REV. 387, 389 n.7 (1984); Taub & Schneider, supra note 94, at 130 (describing women's 
movement's development of rights legal theory and warning or dangers inherent. in 
approach). 
412 See, e.g., supra notes 393 & 410. Of course many of these rights were recognized at. the 
behest of individual women or the women's movement. See supra note 411. 
03 See infra notes 590-95 and accompanying text (women as individual rights holders); 
Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1657 
(1981); Olsen, supra note 65, at 1530-39 (intervention in family); id. at 1518; E. PLEcK, 
supra note 40, at 182-200 (battered women's protections); Note, supra note 394 (battered 
wives' protections); Note, supra note 408 (protections governing spousal rape). Cf. Olsen, 
supra note 65, at 1530-39 (other protections). Indeed, recent statutes prescribing inter-
spousal intentional tort suits were included in legislative packages aimed at. v.ife battering 
and spouse abuse. See, e.g., Iu.. REv. STAT., ch. 40 para. 1001 (1982), cited in Moran v. 
Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245, 1246 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-109 (1984). 
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lie policy (1) to intervene in marriages on behalf of abused women, 
recognizing their individual rights, and (2) to permit wives whose 
husbands negligently hurt them to seek compensation, affording 
personal injury causes of action.414 
Of course, a number of judges did not view their roles, torts, or 
society as described above. These jurists did not see themselves as 
"activist policymakers" but instead believed that other govern-
mental branches or societal institutions could treat more properly 
harmful interspousal conduct.4111 Even those who acknowledged the 
compensatory purpose of tort law might have found it overridden 
in the marital context by the potential for collusion between 
spouses or because this goal should be effectuated by legisla-
tures.416 Similarly, judges who recognized women's rights in many 
situations could have thought that such rights were superseded by 
society's interest in the integrity of the nuclear family.417 One, or a 
•
14 The newer images seem different from those prevailing during the preceding half cen· 
tury and more similar to visions extant in the teens. But the prevalence and longevity of tho 
newer images are unclear, as illustrated generally by events in the 1980s, when many women 
have not improved their conditions or acquired more power, and specifically by recent opin· 
ions opposed to abolition. 
A miscellany of less compelling reasons exists. For example, the current activity may 
evince only judicial willingness to clean up an area of the law long considered untidy, as 
evidenced by states that finally eliminated immunity after decades of piecemeal abolition. 
See, e.g., the phenomenon in Maryland as traced in Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 250·52, 
462 A.2d 506, 510·11 (1983). But this idea, and others, fail to account adequately for the 
dramatic doctrinal change. 
410 Recent examples are Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1213 (Miss. 1988) (Griffin, J., 
dissenting); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 654-56 (Mo. 1986) (Welliver, J., dissenting in 
part). 
418 Recent examples are Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 621·22 (Iowa 1979) (LeGrand, 
J., dissenting) (collusion potential); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 759-60 (Tenn. 1983) 
(Humphreys, J., dissenting) (legislative effectuation); Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1213· 
16 (Miss. 1988) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (legislative effectuation); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 
1065, 1070 (Wyo. 1987) (Brown, C.J., dissenting) (encouragement of fraud and collusion and 
facilitation of "overly friendly lawsuits between husband and wife"). 
417 Recent examples are Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 22-24 (Fla. 1982); Bonkowsky v. 
Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 155, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (Locher, J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982), overruled, Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 
388 (1985). With allusions to the need to protect the beleaguered family as the foundation of 
civilization, what appears at stake for these, and other, judges and many members of society 
resonates in the opinions. Notwithstanding the rhetoric or the conviction with which judges 
hold the views espoused, they seem to overestimate abolition's significance and to be looking 
backward through rose-colored glasses at an image of the family which may have never ex· 
isted and does not today, given national statistics on wife battering and divorce rates. See 
Marcus, supra note 413, at 1662 n.19 (2,000,000 wives battered annually by husbands); L. 
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combination, of these considerations plausibly explains the contin-
uing prominence of the marital harmony, fraud, and judicial defer-
ence policy arguments, as well as the continuing, though dwindling, 
vitality of immunity.418 
Thus, interspousal tort immunity has a long, rich, and interest-
ing history. Although courts initially asked to permit personal in-
jury suits between husbands and wives focused almost entirely on 
the Married Women's enactments, those statutes rarely are men-
tioned today. Instead, immunity has become essentially a debate 
over the public policy reasons for continued application and aboli-
tion. Moreover, although courts and writers have enunciated nu-
merous policy arguments over time, those contentions are now 
static. The public policies favoring retention and abrogation will be 
examined in the next Part of this Article. 
II. PUBLIC POLICY REASONS FOR RETENTION AND ABOLITION OF 
IMMUNITY 
A. Reasons for Retention of Immunity and Responses to Those 
Reasons 
Courts and commentators articulate five recurring public policy 
arguments in favor of interspousal tort immunity. First, many 
state that immunity preserves marital harmony and that inter-
spousal tort litigation disrupts such tranquility. The oldest and 
most frequently invoked rationale, this notion remains quite per-
suasive. The second important reason for the doctrine's current vi-
tality is the fear that husbands and wives would engage in fraud 
and collusion. The third idea, that courts should defer to legisla-
tures in resolving the immunity question, also has considerable 
strength today. A fourth rationale is the threat of excessive and 
frivolous claims, and the fifth justification is that injured spouses 
should pursue alternative remedies. These last two arguments fre-
quently appeared in the early cases, but rarely are mentioned 
anymore. 
1. Marital Harmony. The policy which was enunciated first, has 
been articulated most consistently, and continues to have much vi-
WEITZMAN, supra note 409, at xvii, 215 (similar divorce rates). 
418 Tort immunity recently has been retained in some form by numerous states. See 
supra note 2. 
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tality is that immunity protects connubial peace while permitting 
suit would create, or exacerbate preexisting, disharmony. The for-
mulations of the concept vary. A classic version appears in an early 
Pennsylvania opinion: "The flames which litigation would kindle 
on the domestic hearth would consume in an instant the conjugal 
bond, and bring on a new era indeed-an era of universal discord, 
of unchastity, of bastardy, of dissoluteness, of violence, cruelty, 
and murders."419 Later decisions proclaimed that interspousal ac-
tions would contradict the clear state policy of preserving inviolate 
marriage and the family.420 The most recent variation of this 
theme is that such claims would impose one additional burden on 
those already beleaguered institutions.421 
Unfortunately, very few courts have justified satisfactorily their 
reliance upon the domestic harmony rationale. Judges writing early 
opinions simply assumed that there is a peculiar societal interest in 
protecting marital peace that transcends the needs of the two peo-
ple involved.422 Recently, several judges have observed that connu-
bial and familial stability should be maintained because marriage 
and the family are fundamental structural components of Ameri-
can society.423 Little additional justification for the argument is of-
fered, however. 424 
Moreover, few courts explain precisely how immunity preserves 
conjugal tranquility or how permitting suit leads to, or aggravates 
prior, dissension. Several authors of early opinions apparently be-
lieved that immunity protects connubial harmony by shielding 
"" Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858). I provide the obligatory reference to Ritter, but 
it was not a tort case. 
••• See, e.g., Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 162 (Del. 1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 
931 (1980); Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 525-26, 263 N.W. 546, 547-48 (1935), 
overruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373 n.10, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10 (1969); 
Counts v. Counts, 221 Va. 151, 155-56, 266 S.E.2d 895, 897-98 (1980). 
421 See, e.g., Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Iowa 1979) (Le Grand, J., dissenting); 
Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 155, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1000, (Locher, J., con· 
curring), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 759·60 (Tonn. 
1983) (Humphreys, J., dissenting). 
••• See, e.g., Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tonn. 
57, 64, 179 S.W. 628, 629 (1915). Accord Note, Litigation Between Husband and Wife, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 1650, 1651 (1966); supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
••• See, e.g., Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 1982); Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 
Idaho 14, 24, 539 P.2d 566, 576 (1975) (Shepard, C.J., dissenting). 
••• Of course, if judges assumed marital harmony to be "good," they probably deemed 
justification unnecessary. See supra note 422 and accompanying text. 
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from public scrutiny sensitive information that a tort suit might 
reveal425 or by requiring spouses to resolve their differences, essen-
tially by forgiving and forgetting.426 Most courts seem to have been 
concerned primarily, however, about the burden imposed upon 
marital relationships by the adversary roles that spouses as liti-
gants would be required to adopt.427 Because judges provide little 
guidance, it is appropriate to examine more comprehensively how 
these actions might threaten tranquility. 
Intentional tort cases could jeopardize peace by creating tension 
that increases throughout the tort litigation process."28 There are 
several reasons for this: the behavior in question, while morally 
reprehensible, degrading, and embarrassing, also may be consid-
ered personal and private; a conjugal relationship so insecure that 
one individual would deliberately injure the other will be quite 
tenuous;429 and insurance will not cover the defendant's litigation 
expenditures or any damages awarded. 
There may be friction at each stage of an intentional tort suit. 
The injured spouse must employ counsel and pay all expenses, per-
haps from scarce familial resources.430 Even under a contingent fee 
arrangement the plaintiff will be responsible for any costs in-
curred.431 Merely filing suit could end the marriage or drastically 
reduce the possibility of reconciliation. The complaint may be the 
initial public acknowledgement of the challenged conduct and may 
include bitterly contested accusations that are exaggerated and hu-
425 See, e.g., Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 72, 100 So. 591, 592-93 (1924); Lillienknmp v. 
Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 64, 179 S.W. 628, 629 (1915). Accord Note, supra note 420, at 1652; 
supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
••• See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDon-
ald, 412 A.2d 71, 71 (Me. 1980); Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 391, 177 N.W. 624, 625 
(1920), overruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 :Minn. 366, 373 n.10, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10 
(1969); supra note 148. 
•
27 See, e.g., Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 1982); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 
244, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1965), overruled, Morgan v. Biro :Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 
N.E.2d 286 (1984), and overruled, Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 
(1985). 
•
20 It is important to distinguish between negligent and intentional torts because different 
policy and practical considerations apply to retention and abolition of the immunity for 
each. 
••• See infra notes 447-48 and accompanying text. 
.. 
0 See Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 24 (Fla. 1982). The plaintiff also may lose wages and 
incur medical costs prior to the resolution of the dispute. 
01 Cf. id. at 24 (intentional tort suit inconsistent with public policy proscribing contin-
gent fees in domestic relations matters because can adversely affect reconciliation). 
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miliating and which reopen old wounds.432 The defendant must 
hire a lawyer, who will be paid by the litigant, not an insurer, and 
may file an equally divisive answer. 
During discovery the parties will become more adversarial, es-
sentially proving the "paper" allegations in the pleadings. They 
may retell, and perhaps relive, the story of how one person will-
fully, and even maliciously, harmed the other; confront one an-
other with acerbic charges and countercharges involving intimate 
details of domestic life; and violently disagree over the facts possi-
bly inflated in the pursuit of success.433 Moreover, these cases are 
unlikely to settle. They peculiarly become matters of principle, and 
the parties are not influenced by pressures that insurers can 
exert.434 
At trial, the potential for creating connubial discord will be 
greater. The individuals must testify in the highly-charged atmo-
sphere of a public courtroom. The nature of the behavior-wife 
battering, sexual abuse, or murder-means that there will be em-
barrassing media coverage. Moreover, any relief awarded will be 
divisive because the defendant must pay the damages and may re-
sent the remedy's imposition for other reasons.435 
Connubial peace may be disturbed even in negligence actions in 
which the moral tinge of purposeful behavior is absent and insur-
ance coverage ostensibly insulates the marriage from certain ten-
sions. Vehicle collision litigation is illustrative. Filing suit may be 
unsettling. Use of different counsel and their admonitions against 
discussing the case can be disconcerting. Recurring recriminations 
relating to the defendant's driving abilities may be more disrup-
tive. Such allegations, made initially in the complaint, continue 
throughout discovery, and culminate at trial. Even when spouses 
are mutually supportive, the reconsideration of how one's careless-
ne~s injured the other can be corrosive.436 Finally, the temptation 
432 Of course, the police and relatives or friends of the spouses may be aware of the 
conduct. 
433 See Note, supra note 422, at 1652; Miller v. Miller, 78 Iowa 177, 183, 42 N.W. 641, 642 
(1889); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 245, 208 N.E.2d 533, 536 (1965) (specific ideas), 
overruled, Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984), and over· 
ruled, Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985). 
434 See infra note 442 and accompanying text. 
43
• See Note, supra note 422, at 1652-53 (discussing "other" reasons). 
436 See Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 475 So. 2d 1211, 1212 (Fla. 
1985). A few courts have articulated the "family exchequer" concept, a corollary of the mari-
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to defraud insurers may be substantial; acting on that possibility 
could undermine future familial trust."37 
There are many responses to these ideas. The contentions that 
immunity preserves marital harmony while interspousal litigation 
threatens it can be challenged. The possibility of discord depends 
substantially on numerous variables that may be present in specific 
situations. The marital harmony argument is premised on the pa-
ternalistic assumption that husbands and wives cannot safeguard 
their own relationships. But because most people wish to protect 
their marriages,438 they should be more competent than courts to 
ascertain the effect of litigation on domestic life."39 A number of 
judges also have observed that when harmony exists, either an ac-
tion will not be filed, or, if instituted, will not be maintained once 
peace is endangered;"'0 
When the relationship is less secure, so that litigation could be 
more threatening, different considerations may prevail. If spouses 
negligently hurt each other, the unintentional character of the con-
duct and the widespread existence of insurance may minimize po-
tential disruption. The behavior generally lacks the moral repre-
hensibility, disregard for another's dignity, and insensitivity 
inherent in willful activity; thus the case probably would not be 
publicized.441 Moreover, insurance diminishes the possibility of dis-
cord because insurance will pay for defense of the suit and any 
damages awarded, and settlement is more likely, particularly when 
tal harmony idea, that tort suits will deplete scarce family resources. See Ashdovm, In· 
trafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the Family Exclusion Clause, 60 lowA L. 
REv. 239, 247-48 (1974) (helpful analysis). 
•
31 See Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372, 173 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1969); Rubalcava v. 
Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 349, 384 P.2d 389, 392 (1963). 
•
39 See Note, supra note 422, at 1652. 
••• See Miller v. Fallon County, 721P.2d342, 345 (Mont. 1986); Merenoff'v. Merenoff', 76 
N.J. 535, 551-52, 557, 388 A.2d 951, 959-60, 962 (1978); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 
187, 500 P.2d 771, 774 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 
(1984). 
••• See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 48-49, 89 A. 889, 891-92 (1914); Immer v. 
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 488, 267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970); Digby v. Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 304, 388 A.2d 
1, 3 (1978); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 187, 500 P.2d 771, 774 (1972) overruled, 
Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984) . 
.., "Garden-variety" negligence cases are not very newsworthy. Even if the dispute were 
publicized, the information is unlikely to threaten marital harmony because that data would 
not be embarrassing and might even evoke public sympathy. See, e.g., Guffy v. Guffy, 230 
Kan. 89, 89, 631 P.2d 646, 646 (1981), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Knn. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 
1183, 1190 (1987). 
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liability is clear.442 Some courts have expressed difficulty under-
standing how precluding interspousal suits for negligently inflicted 
injury could foster harmony.443 Other courts have declared that 
preventing claims might be more divisive than allowing them:'"" 
Indeed, litigation frequently could preserve, and actually may pro-
mote, tranquility. For instance, successful tort actions can elimi-
nate economic burdens like lost wages and medical expenses im-
posed upon families by negligently caused interspousal harm for 
which payment otherwise could not be recovered;m 
The marital harmony rationale for interspousal tort immunity 
for intentional injury is more problematic. Abolition's proponents 
have contended, with little elaboration, that when spouses deliber-
ately hurt one another, civil litigation will not endanger harmony 
because none remains to be preserved.446 In fact, most actions will 
only be pursued after separation, divorce, or death, and there 
probably are a few additional instances in which such claims might 
not disturb domestic accord.447 Nevertheless, in some situations, 
suit could upset the delicate balance theretofore maintained:'"0 
442 See Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 249, 510 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1986); Digby v. Digby, 
120 R.I. 299, 304, 388 A.2d l, 3 (1978); Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 194, 183 S.E.2d 
200, 202 (1971). Insurance also increases the potential for interspousal fraud and collusion. 
See infra notes 457-503 and accompanying text. 
443 See, e.g., Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Iowa 1979); Miller v. Fallon County, 
721 P.2d 342, 345 (Mont. 1986); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex. 1987); Coffindaffer 
v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 565, 244 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1978). 
444 See, e.g., Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. 1986); Immer v. Risko, 56 
N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970); Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 314, 433 A.2d 859, 866 
(1981). 
440 See Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 249, 510 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1986); lmmer v. Risko, 
56 N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970); Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 98, 480 
N.E.2d 388, 393 (1985); accord Note, supra note 422, at 1652-53. Cf. Cutright, Income and 
Family Events: Marital Stability, 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 291 (1971) (data). 
446 See, e.g., Moran v. Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245, 1247 (7th Cir. 1984); Ebert v. Ebert, 232 Kan. 
502, 504, 656 P.2d 766, 768 (1983); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357, 390 A.2d 77, 88 (1978); 
Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1210 (Miss. 1988) (Griffin, J., dissenting); Townsend v. 
Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. 1986). Some courts do state that intentional behavior 
or the pursuit of tort litigation indicates marital disharmony. 
447 For example, the behavior may be so blatant that the perpetrator must acknowledge 
it, and intentional tort suit then might (1) "bring into the open" a smoldering controversy 
and resolve it, or (2) eliminate a major source of marital discord. See Note, supra note 422, 
at 1652-53. Cf. Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 567, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343.44 
(1978); Note, supra note 422, at 1653; Comment, Toward Abolition of lnterspousal Tort 
Immunity, 36 MONT. L. REV. 251, 256 (1975) (suggesting that possibility of interspousal tort 
suit might preserve marital peace by deterring tortious conduct). 
448 Recent data indicate that 2,000,000 wives are battered annually by husbands. See 
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Thus, it is impossible to verify the accuracy of Professor Mc-
Curdy's declaration in 1930 that "there is nothing to show that in 
the states which permit such actions the peace and harmony of the 
home are disrupted to any greater extent . . . than in the states 
which deny the action," or of subsequent, similar pronounce-
ments.449 It appears, nonetheless, that interspousal tort claims vlill 
have little detrimental impact on marital tranquility in numerous 
circumstances and may protect or even foster peace in some but 
will seriously jeopardize harmony in only a few. 
Even assuming interspousal suits do threaten marital harmony, 
the validity of the conjugal peace idea itself can be questioned. 
The litigants' tranquility is not relevant in tort actions involving 
unrelated individuals, yet their equanimity may be disturbed as 
much as that of husband and wives in interspousal tort suits.4no 
Moreover, the value of attempting to maintain harmony may be 
debatable in certain situations. For example, the interests of all the 
family members and society might be served better by ending, 
rather than perpetuating, marriages in which physical abuse oc-
curs.451 Some writers have attacked the continuing viability of 
marriage as an institution,452 while others have "argued over the 
nature and extent of a general social interest in marriage stability" 
and challenged "the fundamental premise that organization into 
stable families is best for society."4n3 Regardless of whether these 
views are widely shared in America, the citizens of a country in 
Marcus, supra note 413, at 1662 n.19. Cf. c. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES 
ON LIFE AND LAw 14 (1987) (battery of women systematic in one-quarter to one-third of 
American homes). 
••• McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1053. See Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 249, 510 A.2d 
1187, 1190 {1986); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 105, 300 A.2d 637, 641 {1973); W. PROSSER 
& W.P. KEEToN, supra note 2, § 122 {subsequent similar pronouncements). Cf. Heino v. 
Harper, 306 Or. 347, 377, 759 P.2d 253, 270 {1988) {no studies, resources, or authorities 
definitively answer question). 
••
0 The "matter seems to be inappropriate for judicial consideration." Note, supra note 
422, at 1651. 
'"' See Marcus, supra note 413, at 1670 {effects on children from families where mother 
battered by father). Moreover, the marriages most likely to be disrupted by intentional tort 
suit may least warrant protection. Cf. Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 24, 539 
P.2d 566, 576 {1975) {Shepard, C.J., dissenting) {questionable value in perpetuating mar· 
riages "which exist in name only"). 
'"
2 See M BARRE'IT, WOMEN'S OPPRESSION TODAY {1980); E. ZARE'I'sKY, CAPITALISM. THE 
FAMILY, AND PERSONAL LIFE (1976). 
, .. See the sources cited in Note, supra note 422, at 1651-52. 
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which divorce essentially is available on demand, more than forty 
percent of all marriages are dissolved, and single persons are the 
heads of an increasing percentage of households, view wedlock and 
the family very di:ff erently than when the connubial peace concept 
initially was enunciated.4114 It is also ironic that courts, which rely 
upon the domestic harmony rationale as the principal policy rea-
son for retaining immunity, relegate married individuals to alter-
native divorce and criminal remedies, the attempted invocation of 
which effectively terminates the conjugal relationship.41111 Finally, 
tort cases are said to be less disruptive than other interspousal ac-
tions, such as property claims, permitted today nationwide. 4116 
Thus, while the marital harmony concept seems most persuasive 
of all the contentions traditionally articulated for immunity, the 
argument is deficient in important respects. It is appropriate, 
therefore, to examine another significant reason for the rule's con-
tinuing strength: the concern that abolition would lead to fraud 
and collusion between spousal litigants. 
••• See E. GoLANTY & B. HARRIS, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE 366, 453-54 (1982) (statistical 
data). Cf. Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 109, 631 P.2d 646, 658 (1981) (Prager, J., dissenting), 
overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Bonkowsky v. 
Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 162-63, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1004, (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 565, 244 S.E.2d 
338, 342 (1978) (facetious suggestion that if marital harmony is purpose of immunity wife 
should have no legal actions against husband). The data indicate that forces at work in 
society are (1) at once broader, and more fundamental, than interspousal immunity, such as 
those underlying no-fault divorce; (2) ones that have been influenced minimally by aboli-
tion; and (3) ones that immunity's retention is essentially powerless to affect. Thus, while it 
is arguable that the data make immunity's retention more compelling, and that spouses 
whose marriages deserve protection, but may be jeopardized by tort suit, should be pro-
tected, these ideas should not outweigh the important interests of numerous injured 
spouses. Nevertheless, alternatives to tort suit should be explored for spouses whose mar-
riages may be threatened. See Note, supra note 422, at 1655 (discussing some options). 
Wives battered by their husbands also might pursue compensation in dissolution proceed-
ings. See infra note 546 and accompanying text. This would protect tenuous marriages from 
problems created by tort suit, afford battered wives some relief, and eliminate multiple pro-
ceedings. Cf. Counts v. Counts, 221 Va. 151, 155-56, 266 S.E.2d 895, 897-98 (1980) (option 
might encourage divorce). 
••• See infra notes 542-63 and accompanying text. 
••• See Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 20-21, 284 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1972); Townsend v. 
Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. 1986); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 488-89, 267 A.2d 
481, 484 (1970); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex. 1987). Courts also observe that 
tort suits are less disruptive than divorce or criminal actions. See, e.g., Shook v. Crabb, 281 
N.W.2d 616, 619 (Iowa 1979). This seems disingenuous because these are the "alternative 
remedies" to which spouses are relegated by jurisdictions retaining immunity, for which rel-
egation they are criticized by courts abolishing immunity. 
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2. Fraud and Collusion. Some courts retain immunity because 
they fear that allowing husbands and wives to sue each other will 
result in fraud and collusion, especially when insurance companies 
are the real parties in interest;m This rationale is the most recent 
of the five arguments enunciated.4158 Although many cases retaining 
immunity between 1920 and 1940 involved negligent driving, few 
mention fraud. Those that do merely include cryptic allusions to 
the possibility that spouses will raid insurers.4159 Subsequent judi-
cial treatment, however, has been more comprehensive and e:A.-plicit 
and is integral to the discussion below. 
There are several reasons why the threat of unscrupulous behav-
ior, inherent in all negligence suits when the defendant has insur-
ance coverage, is said to be substantial in interspousal tort ac-
tions. "60 The litigants, husband and wife, ordinarily have an 
intimate personal and confidential relationship."61 Liability insur-
ance also substitutes the prospect of profit for the risk of financial 
loss. That potential loss can be great, especially when the victim 
suffers serious injury and neither other coverage nor familial re-
sources is available."62 This means that each party and the rest of 
the family will benefit from a judgment for the plaintiff and will be 
affected adversely by a verdict for defendant."63 Moreover, a 
401 Indeed, Ashdown, supra note 436, is premised on this thesis. 
•
08 It did have an early predecessor, however. See supra note 154 and accompanying texL 
Cf. Ashdown, supra note 436, at 249 (more background). 
•••Perlman v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 117 :Misc. 353, 354, 191 N.Y.S. 891, 891 (1921), 
apparently was the first case to mention fraud. Cf. Maine v. J. Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa 
1278, 1279, 201 N.W. 20, 21 (1924), overruled, Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 720, 74 
N.W.2d 212, 219 (1956); Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 146, 214 N.W. 305, 306 (1927) 
(similar cryptic allusions), overruled, Hasko v. Hasko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971). 
'
60 See Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372, 173 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1969); Immer v. 
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 490, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970) . 
.., See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 701, 376 P.2d 70, 76, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 108 (1962) 
(Schauer, J., dissenting); Ra.isen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla.. 1979), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 886 (1980); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 348, 384 P.2d 389, 391 (1963); 
Ta.der v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1070 (Wyo. 1987) (Brown, C.J., dissenting). 
••• See Lea.ch v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15, 18 (1957) (Harris, C.J., dissenting); 
Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 245, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535-36 (1965), overruled, Morgan v. 
Biro Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984), and overruled, Shearer v. Shearer, 
18 Ohio ST. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 310-11, 287 P.2d 
572, 583 (1955). Such factors may be exacerbated because those with the least familial re-
sources available also will be least likely to have other coverage. 
'
63 See Ra.isen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla.. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. SSS (1980); 
Robeson v. International Indem. Co., 248 Ga. 306, 308-09, 282 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1981); Tader 
v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1070 (Wyo. 1987) (Brown, C.J., dissenting). 
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tortfeasor could profit from the initial wrongdoing by sharing in 
the recovery.464 There also may be powerful temptations to fabri-
cate claims, exaggerate the gravity of the defendant's conduct and 
the severity of the damage suffered, admit liability, and conceal 
potential defenses.465 
Fraud and collusion between spouses may well succeed. Most 
married individuals are very close and will appreciate the detri-
mental implications of failure. Evidence favorable to the plaintiff 
probably will be plentiful and convincing, particularly when no one 
else witnessed the injurious activity.466 Jurors usually are sympa-
thetic to any person hurt by someone who appears to be insured.467 
Moreover, the inappropriate behavior of the litigants will be diffi-
cult to detect because the spouses usually control the facts and the 
tortfeasor has little incentive to avert the loss.468 Consequently, the 
carrier has been perceived by judges and writers as the defenseless 
target of scheming spouses.469 
The resolution of potentially fraudulent disputes can entail sub-
stantial costs: those incurred by insurers, and ultimately by policy-
... See Burns v. Burns, 111Ariz.178, 180, 526 P.2d 717, 719 (1974), overruled, Fernandez 
v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 646 P.2d 878 (1982); Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 95, 631 P.2d 646, 
650 (1981), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Vasey v. 
Snohomish County, 44 Wash. App. 83, 93-95, 721 P.2d 524, 529-30 (1986). Cf. Apitz v. 
Dames, 205 Or. 242, 274-75, 287 P.2d 585, 599-603 (1955) (discussing typical probate code 
proscription on profiting by spouse who murders spouse). 
•
4
• See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 699-700, 376 P.2d 70, 75-76, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 107· 
08 (1962) (Schauer, J., dissenting); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372, 173 N.W.2d 416, 
419 (1969); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 245, 208 N.E.2d 533, 536 (1965), overruled, 
Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co. 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984), and overruled, Shearer 
v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1070 
(Wyo. 1987) (Brown, C.J., dissenting). 
468 See Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15, 18 (1957) (Harris, C.J., dissenting); 
Ashdown, supra note 436, at 250. 
467 See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 701, 376 P.2d 70, 76, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 108 (1962) 
(Schauer, J., dissenting); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 311, 287 P.2d 572, 583 (1955). 
••• See Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15, 18 (1975) (Harris, C.J., dissenting); 
Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979) (defendant's incentive), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 886 (1980); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 245, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535-36 (1965), 
overruled, Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co. 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984), and over· 
ruled, Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985); Ashdown, supra note 
436, at 252 (spouses control facts). 
••• See Matthews v. State Farm Ins. Co., 471 So. 2d 1223, 1225 (Miss. 1985); Varholla v. 
Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 270, 383 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1978), overruled, Shearer v. Shearer, 
18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985). Cf. supra note 437 and accompanying text (future 
trust could be impaired when spouses collude). 
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holders, in litigating these cases, including money paid for judg-
ments and for settlement;m and those imposed on the civil justice 
system in processing claims and in maintaining credibility and 
public trust.471 Indeed, some authorities have asserted that courts' 
abolition of negligence immunity is simply a judicially instituted 
no-fault compensation scheme.472 
These concerns about the substantial threat of fraud in inter-
spousal claims have been addressed in numerous ways. Many 
judges and writers contend that courts in jurisdictions that permit 
interspousal tort suits have not been burdened with dishonest 
spouses, even though minimal data support these conclusions;m 
Some observers claim that when harm is perpetrated intentionally, 
spouses will not conspire because liability insurance never covers 
that type of damage.474 In negligence suits, however, other factors 
apply. Although a few judges acknowledge that this class of cases 
presents considerable potential for fraud, many have stated that 
courts should not refuse to hear every such claim:m The judges 
observe that it would be unfair to deny valid claims of numerous 
married people out of fear that some may act incorrectly476 and to 
disappoint the reasonable expectations of those who purchase in-
"" See Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979) cert. denied, 449 U.S. SSS (1980); 
Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Ky. 1953) (Sims, C.J., dissenting); Rubalcava\'. Gis-
seman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 348, 384 P.2d 389, 391-92 (1963). 
m See Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 451, 646 P.2d 878, 882 (1982); Leach v. Leach, 
227 Ark. 599, 604, 300 S.W.2d 15, 19 (1957) (Harris, C.J., dissenting) (credibility and public 
trust); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1070 (Wyo. 1987) (Brown, C.J., dissenting) (costs to 
civil justice system). Cf. Henderson, supra note 406, at 468-84, 501·05 (systemic integrity 
impugned by difficulties of defining contours of interspousal relationship). 
472 See, e.g., Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 496, 267 A.2d 481, 489 (1970) (Francis, J., dis-
senting); Ashdown, supra note 434, at 251-53; Henderson, supra note 406, at 503·05. 
473 See Mosier v. Camey, 376 Mich. 532, 548-49, 138 N.W.2d 343, 347 (1965); Baits v. 
Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 430, 142 N.W.2d 66, 73 (1966), ouerruled, Anderson v. Stream, 295 
N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980) as stated in American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 330 N.W.2d 
113 (Minn. 1983); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 652-53 (Mo. 1986); Shearer v. Shearer, 
18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 98-99, 480 N.E.2d 388, 393.94 (1985); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1016 
(R.I. 1982) (observers); infra notes 530; 532 (lack of data). 
474 See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Flores v. 
Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (1973); Givelber, supra note 361, at 55 n.65. 
"" See, e.g., Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 159, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1002 (W. 
Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982); Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 315, 
433 A.2d 859, 866 (1981). 
476 See, e.g., Campo v. Taboada, 720 P.2d 181, 183 (Hawaii 1986); Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 
Md. 242, 268, 462 A.2d 506, 518 (1983); Digby v. Digby, 120 R.L 299, 304, 388 A.2d 1, 4 
(1978); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 757-58 (Tenn. 1983) (Humphries, J., dissenting). 
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surance to pay for negligently suffered damages:m They also be-
lieve that persons hurt by another's unreasonable conduct are enti-
tled to seek redress478 and that judges cannot abdicate their 
responsibility to adjudicate potentially legitimate disputes, but 
must rely upon the safeguards of the tort litigation system to sepa-
rate fraudulent claims from meritorious ones:m 
Safeguards do exist, as early as the time of injury, to protect 
courts against fraud by spouses. For instance, independent wit-
nesses may have observed the allegedly harmful behavior,480 and 
the insured is obligated to cooperate with his or her insurance car-
rier.481 During discovery, several techniques can be employed to 
guard against colluding plaintiffs and defendants.482 Similarly, 
many procedures available at trial afford protection. For example, 
defense counsel's cross-examination may expose dishonest con-
duct.483 The testimony of spouses will be especially susceptible to 
m See Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970); cf. Beaudette v. Frana, 
285 Minn. 366, 371, 173 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1969); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 105, 300 
A.2d 637, 641 (1973) (similar allusions). 
••• See, e.g., S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Mo. 1986); Veazey v. Doremus, 103 
N.J. 244, 249, 510 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1986); Digby v. Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 304-05, 388 A.2d 1, 4 
(1978). Cf. infra note 568 and accompanying text (concept in many state constitutions). 
••• See Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 220-21, 734 P.2d 1183, 1186-87 (1987); Burns v. Burns, 
518 So. 2d 1205, 1211 (Miss. 1988); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex. 1987). Relevant 
experience is derived from states that did not use an elevated standard of care in the guest 
passenger situation or adopted it and later abolished it. See S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 
651, 652-53 (Mo. 1986); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 490-95, 267 A.2d 481, 485·88 (1970). 
Some courts and writers have argued that many jurisdictions already permit suits between 
individuals in relationships equally close to marriage, which pose equivalent danger. See 
Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 695-96, 376 P.2d 70, 72-73, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104-05 (1962); 
Campo v. Taboada 720 P.2d 181, 183 (Hawaii 1986); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 553· 
54, 388 A.2d 951, 960-61 (1978). 
••• See Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 402, 528 P.2d 1013, 1016 (1974); Merenoff v. Mere· 
noff, 76 N.J. 535, 558, 388 A.2d 951, 963 (1978); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1016 (R.I. 
1982) (this and other protective measures). 
••• See Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 111, 631 P.2d 646, 659 (1981) (Prager, J., dissenting), 
overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); cf. Nocktonick v. 
Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 769, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1016 
(R.I. 1982) (parent-child immunity cases discussing obligation and insurers' protections). 
••• See Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1979); Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 
Ohio St. 2d 152, 163, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1005, (C. Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 
1135 (1982). Cf. Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 565, 244 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1978) 
(it becomes "totally strained to believe a substantial personal injury can be faked through 
the rigors of available discovery techniques"). 
••• See Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 549, 138 N.W.2d 343, 347 (1965); Rupert v. 
Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 402, 528 P.2d 1013, 1016 (1974); Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio 
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impeachment on the basis of partiality and interest:m The trial 
judge's obligation to instruct jurors on witness credibility and re-
quirements respecting the weight of evidence remain the same in 
these cases.485 Moreover, juries generally are quite capable of ascer-
taining the falsity of claims that present as much potential for in-
correct activity as interspousal suits:'86 Furthermore, when a trial 
judge believes that jurors have failed to detect fraud or collusion, 
he or she always can modify the jury determination:m Finally, a 
number of persons may be deterred from acting improperly by the 
rigorous efforts of insurance companies and defense counsel and by 
the threat of criminal prosecution.488 
Courts and commentators have suggested that safeguards other 
than these tested devices be employed when they are found inade-
quate to protect against fraud and collusion. Judges could impose 
an elevated standard of conduct or burden of proof tailored to the 
misbehavior perceived in specific circumstances.489 The aggravated 
misconduct requirement imposed in many vehicle guest statutes 
might seem to afford a convenient antidote.490 A standard of care 
St. 2d 152, 157 n.2, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1001 n.2 (W. Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 457 
U.S. 1135 (1982) . 
... See Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 22, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1972). Cf. Guffy v. 
Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 111, 631 P.2d 646, 659 (1981) (Prager, J., dissenting), overruled, Flagg 1:. 
Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342, 
345 (Mont. 1986) (judges and juries naturally mindful of relationship and alert to improper 
conduct). 
••• See Brooks, 259 Ind. at 22, 284 N.E.2d at 797; Merenoff v. MerenotT, 76 N.J. 535, 554, 
388 A.2d 951, 961 (1978). 
•ss See Brooks, 259 Ind. at 22, 284 N.E.2d at 797; Shook, 281 N.W.2d at 620; Bums v. 
Bums, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1210-11 (Miss. 1988) (Griffin, J., dissenting); Rupert, 90 Nev. at 401, 
528 P.2d at 1015 . 
.., Courts can grant motions for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict. Experience indicates that trial judges can detect fraud in intrafamily tort litigation. 
See Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768-69, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980); Briere v. 
Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 434-35, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966); Hollister, supra note 11, at 501-02 
n.89 . 
... See Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 451, 646 P.2d 878, 882 (1982); Shook v. Crabb, 
281 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1979); Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 157 n.2, 
431 N.E.2d 998, 1001 n.2 (W. Brown, J., dissenting) (deterrent effect of perjury charge), 
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 565-66, 244 
S.E.2d 338, 342-43 (1978) (efforts of insurers and counsel). Of course, the potential for mari-
tal disharmony can be directly proportional to the rigor with which the mechanisms availa-
ble are applied. 
••• See Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969); Mereno{f, 76 
N.J. at 554, 388 A.2d at 961. 
<0o "In addition to 'gross negligence,' the required form of aggravation is variously speci-
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analogous to gross negligence should not be employed in inter-
spousal suits, however, because alternatives, such as safeguards in 
the tort litigation process, can better combat fraud.491 A few courts 
even have suggested that an insurance carrier might disclose its 
interest in the case and designate the defendant an adverse witness 
to show that the parties may be conspiring.492 Finally, numerous 
jurists have remarked that dishonest interspousal activity will be-
come a matter for legislatures, should all the protections examined 
above prove insufiicient.493 
There are additional responses to the more tangential elements 
of the fraud and collusion rationale. Some authorities have recog-
nized that this rationale and the marital harmony argument are 
essentially contradictory. One court observed: 
To the extent the threat of marital disharmony can be 
removed or reduced by the presence or availability of in-
surance, the potential for fraud is increased; conversely, 
when the threat of fraud is minimized or eliminated be-
cause there is no insurance or insurer to be victimized, 
the risk of creating marital friction is correspondingly 
augmented."94 
In response to the concern that individuals who negligently hurt 
their spouses might benefit, courts have stated that they can tailor 
appropriate relief to newly recognized causes of action. 491> More-
tied as 'intentional,' 'willful,' 'wanton,' or 'reckless' misconduct, acting 'in disregard of the 
safety of others,' 'intoxication,' or some combination of these." W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, 
supra note 2, § 34. 
491 The safeguards mentioned supra notes 480-88 and infra note 492 and in the text ac-
companying those notes should protect insurers. Insurers also can rely upon spousal exclu-
sion clauses. See infra notes 498-500 and accompanying text. Cf. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 
855, 872-88, 506 P.2d 212, 224-28, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 400-404, (1973); W. PROSSEll & W.P. 
KEETON, supra note 2, § 34 (more discussion of "collusion prevention"). 
••• See Merenoff v. Merenoft', 76 N.J. 535, 554, 388 A.2d 951, 961 (1978); Cof/inda/f er, 161 
W. Va. at 567, 244 S.E.2d at 343. Accord S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 653 n.2 (Mo. 
1986). 
••• See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 695-96, 376 P.2d 70, 73, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 105 
(1962); Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1206, 1211 (Miss. 1988) (Griffin, J., dissenting); Digby v. 
Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 305, 388 A.2d 1, 4 (1978); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 189, 500 
P.2d 771, 775 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). 
•
04 Merenoff, 76 N.J. at 552-53, 388 A.2d at 960. Accord S.A. V., 708 S.W.2d at 653 n.2; 
Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 314, 433 A.2d 859, 866 (1981); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 317 
(Tex. 1987). 
••• See, e.g., Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 113-14, 631 P.2d 646, 661 (1981) (Prager, J., 
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over, although the resolution of potentially fraudulent suits can be 
expensive, the costs are not greater than those imposed by much 
similar litigation496 or by systematically excluding an entire class of 
claimants.497 Another observation made by some judges who abol-
ished immunity is that insurers can protect themselves against 
fraudulent litigants by refusing to provide spousal coverage.498 In 
jurisdictions that permit such exclusions, however, the purpose of 
abrogation would be vitiated;'99 and a few courts have expressly 
held that spousal exclusion clauses violate public policy.Goo 
dissenting), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Flores v. 
Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 604, 506 P.2d 345, 348, cert. denied, 84 N.l\f. 592, 506 P.2d 336 (1973); 
cf. Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 451-52, 646 P.2d 878, 882-83 (1982); Freehe, 81 Wash. 
2d at 191-92, 500 P.2d at 776-77 (community property context). 
496 An example is suit filed by a passenger injured because of the insured operator's negli-
gent driving when the two parties are friends. See supra note 479 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, no evidence indicates that large costs have been imposed on the civil justice S}'S-
tem due to the processing of potentially fraudulent interspousal suits. See supra note 471. 
Cf. McCurdy, supra note 3, at 334-35; Comment, Interspousal Immunity Rule and the Ef-
fect of Liability Insurance in Automobile Accidents, 11 S.D.L. REv. 144, 151 (1966) (no 
evidence in states abolishing immunity that abrogation caused large insurance rate in-
crease). But cf. supra text accompanying note 473 (minimal data support conclusion that 
courts not burdened with dishonest spouses). 
497 Indeed, the credibility of the civil justice system and public trust, see supra note 472, 
may be undermined more by denying numerous spouses tort suits, see supra notes 474-78 
and accompanying text, especially in states whose constitutions mandate that injured per-
sons be permitted to pursue relief, see infra note 571 and accompanying text. One response 
to the concern that systemic integrity will be impugned because of the difficulty of defining 
the contours of interspousal relationships, see supra note 471, is that judges and juries can 
differentiate similar conduct involving strangers which would be actionable from that be-
tween spouses which would not. See infra notes 538-40 and accompanying text. 
••• See, e.g., Shook v. Crabb, 281N.W.2d616, 620 (Iowa 1979); Bonkowsky v. Bonkows1.')', 
69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 158 n.5, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1002 n.5 (W. Brown, J., dissenting), cert. de-
nied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982); Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 315, 433 A.2d 859, 866 (1981). Cf. 
Ashdown, supra note 436, at 254-60 (analysis of exclusionary clauses). 
499 Exclusions allow insurers to avoid compensating persons negligently injured by their 
spouses, a principal purpose of allowing interspousal claims. See infra notes 569-73 and 
accompanying text; Ashdown, supra note 436, at 255. Exclusionary clauses nre widely used 
today, see id. at 253, and most states do allow them, see infra note 500. See also Dairyland 
Ins. Co. v. Finch, 32 Ohio St. 3d 360, 366, 513 N.E.2d 1324, 1330 (1987) (Sweeney, J., dis-
senting); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. 1987) (Mauzy, J., concurring). 
000 The leading case invalidating family exclusion clauses is Meyer v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1984). Cf. Transamerica Ins. C-0. v. Royle, 202 
Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 820 (1983) (same in parent-child immunity context). A few legislatures 
have proscribed the clauses. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 632.32(6)(b) (West 1980). Most no-
fault statutes so provide. See, e.g., N.J. STAT . .ANN. § 39:6A-4 (West 1972); On. RE\•. STAT. § 
743.800 (1974). But cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elwell, 513 A.2d 269, 273 (Me. 1985); Dair)•!and 
Ins. Co. v. Finch, 32 Ohio St. 3d 360, 364, 513 N.E.2d 1324, 1329 (1987) (clear majority or 
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Because the collusion rationale does not seem to be supported by 
the experience of states eliminating the doctrine, is overinclusive, 
and frustrates achievement of the compensatory goal of tort law, 
the argument is not very persuasive.G01 Nevertheless, it is naive to 
ignore the "potential for recovery based on fraud [that] clearly ex-
ists and cannot be lightly dismissed through judicial rationaliza-
tions about the inherent ability of the system to determine the 
truth."G02 The Minnesota Supreme Court accurately summarized 
the difficulty posed by collusion when it declared that a "minimum 
challenge to judicial resourcefulness will be to act promptly and 
firmly at any appearance of ... fraudulent interspousal claims."1103 
The only additional argument that now has much vitality is that 
courts should def er to legislatures. 
3. Deference to the Legislature. Numerous judges have held that 
the abrogation issue should be resolved by legislators and not by 
courts.1104 The principal form in which the deference concept was 
cast prior to 1950, however, was as a response to the question of 
whether the Married Women's statutes prescribed interspousal 
tort claims. Cases decided before 1950 invariably included passages 
like the following: 
If such a radical change is to be made in the common-law 
rights and liabilities of married persons, [authorizing a 
wife to sue her husband for negligently inflicted injuries,] 
it must be made by clear enactment of the General As-
sembly, and not by this court in giving an unwarranted 
construction to the meaning of the statute law relating to 
the property rights of married women. GOG 
courts uphold clauses). 
001 See infra note 561 and accompanying text (persuasiveness); infra notes 569-73 and 
accompanying text (compensatory goal). 
00
• Ashdown, supra note 436, at 251. Ashdovm did say, however, that "indictment of im· 
munity-free systems may be premature" because "there is no evidence that fraudulent or 
collusive actions have increased in jurisdictions" abolishing immunity. Id. 
00
• Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969). 
004 The election of judges in some states adds an interesting dimension to the deference 
question. See, e.g., MONT. ConE ANN. § 3-2-101 (1981); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2. For valuable 
treatment of many issues considered here, see R. KEETON, supra note 339. 
000 Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291, 293, 117 A. 357, 358 (1922), overruled, Digby v. Digby, 120 
R.I. 299, 388 A.2d (1978). The passages always appear in early cases but they also are in 
some more recent opinions. See, e.g., Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fin. 1979), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980); Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, 644-45 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865); 
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The authors of those opinions also seemed to be saying that legis-
latures, by passing such measures, effectively had "preempted" ju-
dicial alteration of the immunity concept.1106 
Judges writing decisions after mid-century offer additional rea-
sons for acceding to legislatures. Many courts have premised def er-
ence on the authority possessed by legislators1107 or on the need for 
certainty in the legal system.1108 Numerous judges have found the 
abolition of immunity to have such farreaching implications1:1oa or 
to be so affected with a public interest in marriage1110 that it must 
be left to legislatures. Courts also have evinced concern about the 
comparative qualifications of the two branches of government. 
Legislative bodies are said to be better equipped to investigate and 
study issues pertaining to abrogation, m free of the constraints that 
litigants impose in a specific judicial proceeding,m and more com-
petent to treat abolition comprehensively. This last idea is espe-
cially significant because abrogation could affect many areas of law 
McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 219-21, 231-33, 135 P.2d 940, 944-45, 950 (1943). Of 
course, when a statute proscribes immunity the "rule is not for judicial discard without 
compelling reasons." Peters v. Peters, 63 Haw. 653, 658, 634 P.2d 586, 590 (1981). 
006 The authors simply proclaimed that the Acts did not abrogate immunity and rarely 
treated immunity as a public policy issue. See, e.g., Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 428, 107 
N.W. 1047, 1048 (1906), overruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373 n.10, 173 N.\V .2d 
416, 420 n.10 (1969); Von Laszewski v. Von Laszewski, 99 N.J. Eq. 255, 133 A. 179, 180 
(1926). Indeed, there is a sense in which Acts not specifically prescribing tort suit were 
treated as a sixth traditionally espoused reason for retention. 
007 See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 697-99, 376 P.2d 70, 74-75, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 
106-07 (1962) (Schauer, J., dissenting}; Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1217 (Miss. 1958) 
(Griffin, J., dissenting}; Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 814 (Mo. 1959), cert. denied, 
361 U.S. 964 (1960), overruled, Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1986); Stoker 
v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah 1980) (Crockett, C.J., dissenting). 
•
0
• See, e.g., Robeson v. International Indem. Co., 248 Ga. 306, 309, 282 S.E.2d 896, 899 
(1981); Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 96, 631 P.2d 646, 651 (1981), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 
241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 351, 
384 P.2d 389, 393 (1963). 
•
08 See, e.g., S.A. V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W. 2d 651, 655-56 (Mo. 1986) (Welliver, J., concur-
ring in part); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 525-31, 105 S.E. 206, 211-14 (1920) (Walker 
& Hoke, JJ., dissenting). 
010 See, e.g., Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 162 (Del 1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 
931 (1980); Peters v. Peters, 63 Haw. 653, 659, 634 P.2d 586, 590 (1981); Guffy v. Guffy, 230 
Kan. 89, 97, 631 P.2d 646, 651 (1981), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 
1183, 1190 (1987). 
011 See Robeson, 248 Ga. at 310, 282 S.E.2d at 899; Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 282-
88, 462 A.2d 506, 524-27 (1983) (Couch, J., dissenting); S.A. V., 708 S.W.2d at 655-56 (Black-
mar, J, concurring}. 
••• See Alfree, 410 A.2d at 163. 
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and policy, particularly those in which elected representatives al-
ready have spoken. Gia 
Judges in a substantial majority of jurisdictions, however, have 
not deferred to the legislatures. These courts have determined that 
immunity was not statutory. Instead, they found that immunity 
was created and preserved by the judiciary, or originated at com-
mon law and, therefore, could be modified on policy grounds by 
courts. Gi4 They assume that those Married Women's Acts that fail 
to prescribe expressly interspousal tort suits do not address immu-
nity with sufficient precision to preclude subsequent judicial 
modification. GIG 
There are numerous additional responses to the deference argu-
ment that relate less directly to the Married Women's Acts. Altera-
tion of immunity is neither more radical nor engenders greater un-
certainty than modification of many other tort rules that 
originated at common law.G16 Courts also need not accede on the 
•
13 See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 697-99, 376 P.2d 70, 74-75, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 
106-07 (1962) (Schauer, J., dissenting); Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 813 (Mo. 
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1960); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 759 (Tenn. 1983) 
(Harbison, J., dissenting). The insurance and family law fields are classic examples. 
014 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 449, 646 P.2d 878, 880 (1982); Townsend 
v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 649-50 (Mo. 1986); Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342, 344 
(Mont. 1986); Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 99, 480 N.E.2d 388, 394 (1985); Flagg v. 
Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 222, 734 P.2d 1183, 1188 (1987); Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1208 
(Miss. 1988). Cf. Digby v. Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 301, 388 A.2d 1, 2 (1978) (judicial abdication 
by refusal to reconsider unsatisfactory court-made rule). See generally Fernandez v. Romo, 
132 Ariz. 447, 448-49, 646 P.2d 878, 879-80 (1982); supra note 123 and accompanying text 
(although tort immunity arguably "statutory" to same extent any rule that existed at com· 
mon law was made so by passing common law "reception" statute; immunity technically not 
a common law rule as such). 
••• Such treatment is appropriate given the lack of clarity regarding legislative intent as 
to tort immunity. See supra notes 66-114 and accompanying text. If legislators did not ad· 
dress immunity, they could not have meant to "occupy the field." Indeed, the Oregon Su· 
preme Court recently stated that tort immunity was not a "matter in which the legislature 
has purported to pre-empt the field." Heino v. Harper, 306 Or. 347, 378, 759 P.2d 253, 271 
(1988). In any event, courts today should not be bound by unclear, old statutes; judges 
simply should treat immunity, like any other tort doctrine said to arise at common law, as 
one to be modified on public policy grounds. 
••• For example, the remaining immunities and contributory negligence have been modi· 
fied by courts in many states. The California Supreme Court has altered each. See Li v. 
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (contributory 
negligence); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (abro· 
gating parent-child immunity); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 
457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (abrogating governmental immunity), modified sub nom. Corn· 
ing Hosp. Dist. v. Super. Ct., 57 Cal. 2d 488, 370 P.2d 325, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1962); Malloy 
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basis of legislatures' relative competence. The problem of abroga-
tion, in contrast to questions like the adoption of no-fault compen-
sation, is not complex and requires minimal data for its resolution. 
Indeed, most of that small number of important policy issues to be 
addressed can be treated more effectively by judges than legisla-
tors. Disputes involving questions of marital harmony constitute a 
staple of state court workloads. Moreover, judges have greater ex-
perience with fraud in the tort litigation process, know more about 
the difficulties presented by excessive and trivial claims, and have 
greater familiarity with the relief actually provided by the alterna-
tive remedies.1517 Numerous fields of law and policy said to be influ-
enced by abolition would be affected only slightly.1118 Furthermore, 
in those few remaining areas in which abrogation might have more 
impact that courts cannot handle proficiently, legislatures always 
can augment judicial pronouncements.1519 
Thus, the litany of reasons recited for deference is less convinc-
ing than the opposing arguments. An explanation for this is that 
courts may have resolved the abolition issue on more "substantive" 
grounds, such as marital harmony, and then conformed their treat-
ment of deference to that determination.1120 Moreover, the defer-
ence rationale could be applied to most requests to recognize new 
causes of action, and, in this way, is similar to the contention that 
abrogation would "open the floodgates" of litigation. 
4. Quantity and Quality of Litigation. Judges have feared that 
v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951) (abrogating charitable immunity). There is no 
reliance interest worthy of protection because few spouses modify their behavior to accord 
with interspousal tort rules. Cf. supra note 498 (insurers can exclude spouses or modify rate 
structures). 
•
17 The traditional arguments favoring immunity are discussed in the rest of this subsec· 
tion of the Article. Courts also are as competent as legislatures to treat the traditional ideas 
favoring immunity's abolition, discussed infra notes 546-78 and accompanying text. 
•
1
• For example, issues of insurance law are said to be affected. Most would be influenced 
indirectly, however, and those affected more directly can be otherwise treated. See supra 
notes 489-92 and accompanying text. 
•
10 For instance, issues of family law are said to be affected. Some, such as whether inter-
spousal communications are privileged, now have been resolved, but others may warrant 
legislative treatment. 
•
20 See infra note 564 and accompanying text. Cf. Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 97, 106-07, 
631 P.2d 646, 651, 656 (1981) (Prager, J., dissenting), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 
225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987) (authors of majority, dissenting opinions reach opposite 
conclusions on deference by relying upon ideas at different pages of same book by Judge 
Cardozo). 
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abolition would result in too many suits and would permit frivo-
lous or trivial claims. An early opinion addressed the issue of ex-
cessive litigation: 
If the wife can sue the husband, he can sue her. If an 
assault was actionable, then would slander and libel and 
other torts be . . . . The statute of limitations could not 
cut off actions . . . with divorces as common as they are 
now-a-days, there would be new harvests of litigation 
521 
In examining the problem of meritless claims, most courts only 
provide examples, expressing concern about matters like petty do-
mestic quarrels. 522 Several judges have conjured up a "parade of 
horribles," such as imposing liability upon one who leaves shoes 
where his or her spouse can trip over them.523 A recent illustration 
is the claim filed by a wife against her husband for injuries she 
sustained because he failed to shovel their sidewalk. G2" Another po-
tential difficulty is vindictive intentional tort actions pursued upon 
divorce. 525 Professor McCurdy found that courts apparently are 
saying that it would be "undesirable to make possible liability for 
assault and battery every time one spouse touches the other, or 
liability for negligence every time the household is improperly 
managed. "526 
The cases afford little additional guidance, especially regarding 
•
21 Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 308 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 
A.2d 71, 71 (Me. 1980). Later cases add little. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 
611, 617-18 (1910). Cf. infra note 547 and accompanying text (judicial economy argument 
for requiring spouses to seek relief from tortious injury under divorce law). 
••• See, e.g., Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 82, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (1898) (suit over 
"every real and fancied wrong"), overruled, Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 
(1971); Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 391, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (1920) (suits by "peevish 
fault-finding husband ... or ... nagging ill-tempered wife"), overruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 
285 Minn. 366, 373 n.10, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10 (1969). Cf. Harris v. Harris, 252 Ga. 387, 
389, 313 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1984) (Weltner, J., dissenting); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 653 
(Mo. 1986) (uninvited kiss upon unconsenting brow could be assault). 
••• See, e.g., Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 22, 25, 539 P.2d 566, 574, 577 
(1975) (Shepard, C.J.; Bakes, J., dissenting); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 499, 267 A.2d 481, 
490 (1970) (Francis, J., dissenting). 
•
24 The case is Brown v. Brown, 381 Mass. 231, 231, 409 N.E.2d 717, 717 (1980), 
••• See, e.g., Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Ky. 1979); Weicker v. Weicker, 
22 N.Y.2d 8, 11, 237 N.E.2d 876, 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (1968). 
••• McCurdy, supra note 2, at 1053. Accord Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 402, 87 
P.2d 660, 667 (1938). 
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the implications of "opening the floodgates." Many courts seem 
concerned about maintaining the integrity of the civil justice sys-
tem. 527 A few have mentioned the problems entailed in distinguish-
ing similar behavior between strangers which would be tortious 
from that involving spouses which would not/28 and a number ap-
pear troubled by the same uncertainties that traditionally have 
plagued judges when they are asked to modify a longstanding tort 
doctrine. 529 
There are numerous responses to these considerations. No evi-
dence suggests that the elimination of interspousal immunity actu-
ally has fostered too much litigation or encouraged frivolous or 
trivial suits. A number of courts have observed that states abolish-
ing the doctrine have not been inundated, although minimal evi-
dence appears to underlie these assertions.1130 Even were the 
caseload larger, potentially legitimate claims should not be ex-
cluded because they might be burdensome: fundamental purposes 
of the judicial system are to afford individuals a "day in court" and 
to redress injury. 531 
A few judges maintain that jurisdictions abrogating immunity 
•
27 Courts are concerned about the need for judicial economy and efficiency and maintain· 
ing credibility and public trust. See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, 252 Ga. 387, 389, 313 S.E.2d 88, 
90 (1984) (Weltner, J., dissenting) (every cruel word discussed for days before jury, consum-
ing court time and taxpayer resources). 
028 The idea, mentioned first a century ago, see Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 34 
(Davis, J., dissenting), reu'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882), has been raised recently, see, e.g., S.A.V. v. 
K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 656 (Mo. 1986) (Welliver, J., concurring); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 
N.J. 535, 555-59, 388 A.2d 951, 961-63 (1978). Cf. Henderson, supra note 406, at 501-05 
(interspousal tort suit requires defining contours of relationship). 
••• "Fear of the new" seems to be particularly troublesome. Cf. W. PROSSER & W l'. KEE· 
TON, supra note 2, § 4, citing L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 77-99 (1930) (courts always dread 
"flood of litigation" involving problems they are not prepared to treat). In fairness, however, 
burdening an overworked judiciary with trivial cases certainly is a valid concern. See supra 
note 527. 
030 See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal Rptr. 102, 104 (1962); 
Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1979); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 403, 528 
P.2d 1013, 1016 {1974); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 105, 300 A.2d 637, 641 (1973); Freehe 
v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 188, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 
Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). Cf. infra note 532 (lack of data) • 
.. , See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); infra notes 570-71 and 
accompanying text. The requirement that spouses seek relief from tortious harm in dissolu-
tion proceedings, see supra note 521, may conserve some judicial resources. But the savings 
will be small, and the requirement may have disadvantages. See infra notes 542-63 and 
accompanying text. Should interspousal tort litigation increase caseloads, courts could apply 
ameliorative measures. 
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also have not been overrun by spouses pursuing frivolous litigation, 
although, here as well little data seem to support the observa-
tions.1132 Moreover, similar tort doctrines have been altered with 
minimal apparent consequence.1133 The prosecution of insignificant 
actions frequently should be deterred by the good sense and re-
straint of married persons and their attorneys534 and by the diffi-
culty of securing judgments that make suit worthwhile.113G Should 
the threat of nonmeritorious claims materialize, protections of the 
tort litigation process can be invoked. 1136 For instance, most safe-
guards used to combat fraud could be equally efficacious in this 
•
3
• See Klein, 58 Cal. 2d at 694, 376 P.2d at 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 104; Guffy v. Guffy, 230 
Kan. 89, 111-12, 631 P.2d 646, 660 (1981) (Prager, J., dissenting), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 
241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 403, 87 
P.2d 660, 668 (1938). Accord McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1053. The difficulty with the judi-
cial observations, see text accompanying this note and supra note 530, is that they appear 
not to be based upon reliable evidence. Several cases rely upon prior decisions: Shook citing 
Richard, Rupert citing Freehe, and Guffy citing Richard and Rupert. The earlier decisions, 
in tum, rely upon commentators. See, e.g., Richard, 131 Vt. at 105, 300 A.2d at 641; Freehe, 
81 Wash. 2d at 188, 500 P.2d at 775. A few courts simply conclude without substantiation 
that there is nothing detrimental in the experience of states abolishing immunity. See, e.g., 
Klein, 58 Cal. 2d at 694, 376 P.2d at 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 104; Richard, 131 Vt. at 105, 300 
A.2d at 641. No systematic study apparently has been undertaken. See Letter from Marilyn 
M. Roberts, Research Director, National Center for State Courts, to Carl Tobias (April 22, 
1981). 
•
33 Parent-child tort immunity provides the most relevant example. See Rupert v. 
Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 403, 405 528 P.2d 1013, 1016, 1018 (1974) Cf. Anderson v. Stream, 295 
N.W.2d 595, 600 (Minn. 1980); Hollister, supra note 11, at 525-27 (minor adjustments): W. 
PROSSER & W:P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 4, at 23-24 (other tort areas). 
•
3
• Cf. Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 433, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (1966) (same in context of 
parent-child tort immunity), overruled, Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980), 
as stated in American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 330 N.W.2d 113 (Minn. 1983); id., 273 
Minn. at 430, 142 N.W. at 73 (lawyers unlikely to encourage meritless suits when contingent 
fee arrangement exists). 
•
3
• See Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 234, 361 P.2d 941, 944 (1961). Litigants must 
(1) hire counsel, (2) prove injury and damage, and (3) have incurred damages that, and ho 
married to someone whose assets, make litigation worthwhile. Cf. Baits, 273 Minn. at 430, 
142 N.W.2d at 73 (holding that family members unlikely to incur large legal expense whon 
no promise of success exists). 
•
3
• See S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 654-55 (Mo. 1986) (Welliver, J., concurring in 
part); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 188, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972), overruled, Brown v. 
Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). Some courts mention specifically the de· 
fenses of assumption of risk and consent, see, e.g., Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 315-16, 433 
A.2d 859, 867 (1981); Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d at 188, 500 P.2d at 775, or adjusting the duty of 
care to the " 'give-and-take' of married life," S.A. V., 708 S.W.2d at 653. The protections 
also can apply to the vindictive intentional tort action pursued upon divorce. See supra note 
525 and accompanying text. 
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context.537 Furthermore, judges and juries generally should be able 
to distinguish similar behavior between strangers which would be 
actionable from that involving spouses which is not.ll38 Several ju-
rists and the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts re-
cently have addressed this difficulty, although they have "not yet 
worked out a full analysis of the proper legal treatment."ll39 None-
theless, both have developed numerous suggestions for handling 
the problem, and it appears solvable.540 
Therefore, the "floodgates" argument, like the fraud idea, does 
not appear to be substantiated by the experience of jurisdictions 
abrogating immunity. Its application would be overinclusive and 
would violate basic tenets of the legal system, while most difficul-
ties posed would be amenable to resolution. Consequently, the ra-
tionale has virtually no strength today. Indeed, it may have been 
employed to buttress other rationales, particularly marital har-
mony, as the following quotation suggests: 
[Abolition would] open up a field for marring or dis-
turbing the tranquility of family relations ... by dragging 
into court for judicial investigation at the suit of a pee-
vish, fault.finding husband, or at the suit of a nagging, ill-
tempered wife, matters of no serious moment, which if 
permitted to slumber in the home closet would silently 
be forgiven or forgotten. 541 
037 See supra notes 480-92 and accompanying text. 
038 See Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 545-46, 138 N. W.2d 343, 345 (1965); S.A. V., 708 
S.W.2d at 653; Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 403-04, 87 P.2d 660, 668-69 (1938). 
03
• REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 895F (1979). The Restatement drafters and the 
New Jersey Supreme Court have provided especially cogent treatment and recommenda-
tions. See id.; Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 535, 388 A.2d 951, 951 (1978). Cf. Heino v. 
Harper, 306 Or. 347, 377-78, 759 P.2d 253, 270-71 (1988) (subscribing to treatment. and of-
fering additional suggestions). 
Mo Certain difficulties do remain. For example, the Restatement's "reasonable spouse" 
approach may need elaboration, and its explanations or available defenses are unclear. 
Moreover, Merenotf's application of vestigial immunity to trivial claims is unwarranted, 76 
N.J. at 555, 388 A.2d at 961. In response to the uncertainties that plague judges when asked 
to modify traditional tort doctrines, see supra note 529 and accompanying text, some have 
said that often these fears are inflated and courts "find some workable method of !lfi'ording 
redress." W.P. KEEToN, supra note 3, § 4, at 23-24. Accord Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 
395, 403, 87 P.2d 660, 668 (1938); L. GREEN, supra note 529, at 77-99. Cf. supra notes 496-97 
and accompanying text (response to concerns about integrity of civil justice system, see 
supra note 527). 
Ml Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 391, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (1920) (emphasis added), ouer-
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5. Alternative Remedies. A final argument to which "no court in 
this day and age subscribes seriously [is] that the abrogation of 
marital immunity for tortious injury is 'unnecessary' because re-
dress for the wrong can be obtained through other means."11' 2 
Judges deciding early cases, however, found that immunity should 
be recognized because married people could secure adequate relief, 
primarily through criminal litigation and civil actions for di-
vorce.1543 Thus, in 1877, the Maine Supreme Court observed that a 
"married woman has remedy enough [in] the criminal courts [and] 
can prosecute at her husband's expense a suit for divorce."G" Per-
haps the most comprehensive description of the idea appears in 
the majority opinion in Thompson: 
Nor is the wife left without remedy .... She may resort 
to the criminal courts, which, it is to be presumed, will 
inflict punishment commensurate with the offense com-
mitted. She may sue for divorce or separation and for ali-
mony. The court, in protecting her rights and awarding 
relief in such cases, may consider, and, so far as possible, 
redress her wrongs and protect her rights. 114n 
More recently, the Florida judiciary articulated a variation on the 
old theme, proclaiming that women intentionally hurt by their 
spouses during marriage can be awarded compensation in the dis-
solution decree. 1146 By stating that spouses must seek relief under 
ruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373 n.10, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10 (1969). Accord 
cases cited in supra note 522 . 
... Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 556, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (1978). But see Burns v. 
Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1213-14 (Miss. 1988) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (subscribing to alterna-
tive remedy argument) . 
... Other alternatives are said to be "private sanctions," such as refusing sexual activity. 
See Merenoff, 76 N.J. at 556-57, 388 A.2d at 962. Cf. Note, supra note 422, nt 1655-59 
(discussing many related ideas not developed in cases) . 
... Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 
A.2d 71, 71 (Me. 1980). Accord Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 36, 103 P. 219, 221 (1909), 
overruled, Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 684, 376 P.2d 65, 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97, 97 (1962); 
Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 83, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (1898), overruled, Rosko v. 
Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971) . 
... Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 619 (1910); accord Drake v. Droke, 145 Minn. 
388, 391, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (1920), overruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373 n.10, 
173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10 (1969); Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1213-14 (Miss. 1988) 
(Griffin, J., dissenting); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 72, 100 So. 591, 592 (1924) • 
... See Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 21 (Fla. 1982). Cf. S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 653 
(Mo. 1986); Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 433-34, 400 A.2d 1189, 1196 (1979) (wife's tort suit 
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divorce law, so that all disputes between them might be resolved in 
a single proceeding, the Maine and Florida courts suggest a judicial 
economy argument. 547 But other jurists say little more, particularly 
about the sufficiency of the redress available or why spouses should 
be relegated to the criminal and divorce courts.548 
The alternative remedies contention can be countered in several 
ways. The relief ostensibly provided is essentially illusory. Crimi-
nal and divorce law might not apply to the challenged behavior. 
For example, no jurisdiction makes ordinary negligence a crime or 
a ground for dissolution.1549 Similarly, a majority of states still does 
not permit prosecution of husbands for rape of their wives.1uio Even 
if the conduct is covered, many may be unable to pursue the rem-
edy afforded. For example, criminal prosecution would not off er a 
realistic solution for women who want to continue living with their 
husbands.15151 For other women, incarceration of the offending 
spouse could excuse him from providing necessary support to his 
wife and their children.5152 Moreover, imposition of a fine could de-
plete already scarce family resources.15153 Divorce also may not be an 
option for numerous spouses. They could be deterred by religious 
convictions, economic constraints, the wish to preserve the family 
unit, or pressures that relatives, friends, and employers can 
relevant to divorce proceeding). 
041 See Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 23-24 (Fla. 1982); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 
(1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 71 (Me. 1980). Cf. Tevis v. Tevis, 
79 N.J. 422, 434, 400 A.2d 1189, 1196 (1979) (presenting tort claim in divorce action avoids 
prolongation and "fractionalization" of litigation). l\farital harmony remains paramount for 
these courts. 
048 These judges also appear troubled primarily about conjugal tranquility. See, e.g., the 
cases cited in supra note 544. 
040 See Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 556, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (1978); Hack v. Hack, 
495 Pa. 300, 311 n.10, 433 A.2d 859, 864 n.10 (1981); W. PROSSER & W.P. KmmlN, supra 
note 2, § 122. Cf. Finley, supra note 404 (helpful treatment of ideas in this paragraph). Of 
course, states permitting "no-fault" divorce do not require parties to prove grounds for dis-
solution. See, e.g., S.A. V., 708 S.W.2d at 653 n.3. 
••
0 This has changed considerably since 1980. Compare Barry, Spousal Rape: The Un· 
common Law, 66 A.BA J. 1088 (1980) (status then) with Note, supra note 389, at 1258-62 
(current status). 
051 See Comment, Interspousal Tort Immunity-California Follows the Trend, 36 S. CAL. 
L. REv. 456, 466 (1963); Comment, supra note 447, at 259. 
••• See Comment, supra note 551, at 466; Comment supra note 447 at 259. Although the 
text accompanying this note is the only specific reference to the alternative remedies' impli-
cations for the spouses' children, they apply to much of the remaining analysis. 
•
53 See supra note 430 and accompanying text. 
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exert.654 
When married persons can seek an alternative remedy, impor-
tant types of redress might not be provided. For instance, neither 
criminal nor divorce law typically permits compensation for dam-
ages555 or affords much deterrence.556 When a desirable remedy ex-
ists, it can be notoriously difficult to secure, as experience with the 
pervasive problem of conjugal violence illustrates.m 
Indeed, requiring husbands and wives to pursue redress through 
criminal and divorce actions may deny them any meaningful relief 
and, thus, effectively disrupt marital harmony more than allowing 
tort claims. 558 But even were more satisfactory redress available, 
the validity of relegating married individuals to alternative reme-
dies is questionable. Very few other classes of potential litigants 
are similarly constrained.559 Moreover, constitutions, statutes, or 
cases in every jurisdiction specifically provide that all persons are 
entitled to seek redress for tortious harm. 560 It also is difficult to 
understand why spouses should be restricted to relief that essen-
tially ends the relationship when preservation of marriages is the 
principal justification for immunity's continued application. 561 Per-
004 See Comment, supra note 551, at 462-63; Comment, supra note 447, at 259 (first foe· 
tor); supra note 430 and accompanying text (second factor); supra note 450 and accompany· 
ing text (divorce statistics). 
••• See Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 546-47, 138 N.W.2d 343, 346 (1965); S.A.V. v. 
K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Mo. 1986) (Welliver, J., concurring in part); Kobe v. Kobe, 61 
Ohio App. 2d 67, 70-71, 399 N.E.2d 124, 126 (1978). But see supra note 546 and accompany· 
ing text . 
.. e "[Immunity] permitted the wifebeater to practice his twisted frustrations [knowing] 
any criminal penalty would ordinarily be a modest fine." Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. 
Va. 557, 567, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343-44 (1978). Tort law is unlikely to deter spouses who engage 
in conjugal violence. See Marcus, supra note 413, at 1661-62; infra note 598 and accompany· 
ing text. But tort law might help some of the many victims by affording compensatory relief, 
see infra note 573 and accompanying text, or by deterring some wife beating, see infra note 
568. Cf. Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 401, 87 P.2d 660, 666 (1938); Goode v. Marti-
nis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 234, 361 P.2d 941, 944 (1961) (alternative relief "may be adequate to 
prevent future wrongs"). 
••
1 See Marcus, supra note 413. 
••• See supra note 413 and accompanying text. 
••• Cf. supra note 450 and accompanying text (litigants' tranquility irrelevant in tort suits 
between strangers). One class even more constrained is parents and children who injure one 
another, but immunity as to them apparently is eroding more rapidly than interspousal 
immunity. See F. HARPER, supra note 27, at § 8.11; Hollister, supra note 11. 
OGo See infra notes 570-71 and accompanying text. 
061 See, e.g., Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 546, 138 N.W.2d 343, 345-46 (1965); Frcehe 
v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 188, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 
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haps judges espousing the alternative remedies idea have been at-
tempting to protect conjugal peace by making relief so costly or 
illusory that no one would seek it. 662 
Thus, this rationale, while one of the first to be enunciated, is 
now the least convincing.663 All five of the ideas, however, lack sub-
stantiation, are overinclusive, internally inconsistent, contradic-
tory, and ultimately unpersuasive.66' Yet, these considerations do 
not mean that the responses to them or the rationales supporting 
abrogation are completely satisfactory. Those arguments and re-
sponses to them are examined next. 
B. Reasons for Abolition of Immunity and Responses to Those 
Reasons 
As seen above, numerous courts that eliminated interspousal im-
munity rationalized this result simply by relying upon the Married 
Women's Acts or by repudiating the policies enunciated for the 
doctrine's continuation.666 Many other judges, however, developed 
affirmative policy arguments for recognizing interspousal suits. Al-
though these concepts have not always been articulated clearly, the 
foremost are that abolition would permit the purposes of modern 
tort law to be realized and the individual rights of women to be 
Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). Cf. Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 126, 140 P. 1022, 
1023-24 (1914) (criminal and divorce suits most public, embarrassing and divisive). In states 
unwilling to abolish immunity totally, permitting intentionally harmed \\ives to recover 
compensation upon divorce, see supra note 546 and accompanying text, could protect some 
tenuous marriages, afford compensatory relief, conserve judicial resources, and have some 
deterrent effect. Of course, divorce is the price of these benefits, and this option might en-
courage dissolution. See Counts v. Counts, 221 Va. 151, 155-56, 266 S.E.2d 895, 897-98 
(1980). Cf. Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 757 P.2d 1180 (1988) (permitting intentional 
interspousal tort suit for claim not raised in divorce proceeding). 
06
• A few judges mention the reliers illusory nature, see, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 201 
Ala. 41, 44, 77 So. 335, 338 (1917). Responses to concern about conserving judicial resources, 
see supra note 547, are that important purposes of the judicial system nre to afi'ord a "day 
in court" and to redress injury, see supra note 531 and accompanying text. The "private 
sanctions," mentioned supra note 543, simply "do not add up to an enforceable civil right of 
recovery for damages." Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 557, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (1978). 
063 Rationales other than the five analyzed support immunity, but none has been enunci· 
ated as explicitly or as often as those five. See, e.g., supra notes 153-55 and accompanying 
text. 
... Writers perceptively observe that judges make broader presumptions than factual gen-
eralization reasonably supports and depend on superficially pertinent concepts to conceal 
other policies. See McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1052-54; Note, supra note 422, at 1663. 
06
• See, e.g., supra notes 245-58 and accompanying text. 
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vindicated.1166 
1. Tort Law Purposes. The abrogation of immunity facilitates 
realization of numerous goals of tort jurisprudence. Courts men-
tion occasionally the notion of holding responsible each individual, 
regardless of marital status, for his or her own harmful conduct.667 
The policies of punishing and deterring injurious interspousal be-
havior are enunciated less frequently, although they have special 
significance when harm has been perpetrated intentionally.1168 The 
principal concern today, however, is providing married people 
wrongfully hurt by their spouses an opportunity to recover 
compensation.1169 
A number of judges who rely upon this rationale fail to explain it 
comprehensively, apparently deeming more expansive treatment 
unnecessary. Some merely proclaim that an important goal of tort 
law is to afford anyone harmed by another's blameworthy conduct 
the chance to pursue monetary relief.1170 Numerous courts cite state 
••• Courts rarely espouse explicitly ideas on the rights of women, see infra notes 590·97 
and accompanying text, but concern about such rights may underlie abrogation. Other poli· 
cies have been developed. For example, some courts advocate that immunities should be 
retained only for compelling policy reasons. See Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629, 351 
N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 192, 500 P.2d 771, 777 (1972), 
overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). Others believe that 
abolition will keep the peace. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
061 See, e.g., Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 98, 631 P.2d 646, 651-52 (1981) (Prager, J., 
dissenting), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Lewis, 
370 Mass. at 629, 351 N.E.2d at 532; Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d at 191-92, 500 P.2d at 777. Cf. 
Finley, supra note 380 (advocating broader "responsibilities" approach). 
068 See Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 28-29, 33 (encouraging preservation of 
peace, prevention of cruel acts), rev'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 
523, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920); Coffindafi'er v. Coffindafi'er, 161 W. Va. 557, 567, 244 S.E.2d 
338, 343-44 (1978) (cases enunciating policies); supra note 448; infra note 570 and accompa· 
nying text (wife battering so ubiquitous as to compel intentional tort suit's recognition if 
only to offer possible deterrent). 
••
9 For a classic statement of the compensatory goal, see James, supra note 396. Cf. supra 
notes 396-406 and accompanying text (more discussion of goal and its "triumph"), Of 
course, abolition would facilitate realization of tort law's other generic purposes, such as 
promoting safety; however, courts rarely mention them. Cf. James, supra note 396; W. PROS· 
SER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2; M. SHAPO, supra note 396, at chs. 3-4, 11 (more discussion 
of generic purposes); Smith, The Critics and the 'Crisis': A Reassessment of Current Con· 
ceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 765, 766 (1987) (arguing that torts' primary func· 
tion should be resolving disputes arising from perceived breaches of important societal 
norms, not compensation, deterrence or punishment); Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Femi· 
nist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL Enuc. 3 (1988) (advocating application of feminist theory 
to doctrinal tort law); Finley, supra note 404 (same). 
070 See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976); Townsend v. 
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constitutional or statutory provisions similar to that in the Ne-
braska constitution: "[A]ll courts shall be open, and every person, 
for any injury done him in his land, goods, person or reputation, 
shall have a remedy by due course of law, and justice administered 
without denial or delay."1171 
A few judges, refuting the conjugal harmony argument, have 
contended that allowing spouses to seek reparations can actually 
promote marital peace because such suits might alleviate the finan-
cial burden imposed by harm for which damages otherwise could 
not be recovered.1172 A smaller number appear to believe that the 
damage award in a tort case may be the only form of relief availa-
ble to battered wives.1173 
The compensation concept, however, seems to be premised pri-
marily on the widespread existence of liability insurance. Indeed, 
some courts candidly rely upon such coverage, 1174 although most are 
less explicit.11711 Judges who adopt the compensation argument be-
cause of the availability of insurance apparently think that many 
married individuals negligently hurt each other and that vehicular 
or household insurance coverage will pay for most of this damage 
as well as the defendants' litigation expenses, and thus minimize 
the potential for connubial discord.1176 A few courts even state that 
Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Mo. 1986); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 402, 528 P.2d 
1013, 1016 (1974); Vea:z.ey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 249, 510 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1980). 
••
1 NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 13, cited in Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 545, 279 N.W.2d 382, 
386 (1979). Many judges rely on similar provisions. See, e.g., Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 
16, 24, 284 N.E.2d 794, 798 (1972); Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (Miss. 1988); 
Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 106, 300 A.2d 637, 641 (1973). A few judges do not premise 
the "open courts" idea on constitutional authority. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 
49, 89 A. 889, 892 (1914); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 320 (TeL 1987). Indeed, its origin 
may be the Magna Carta. 
072 See, e.g., Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342, 345 (Mont. 1980); Veazey v. Doremus, 
103 N.J. 244, 249, 510 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1980). 
073 See, e.g., Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1980); Coffindaffer v. Cor-
findaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 567, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343-44 (1978). 
"'' See, e.g., Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 194, 183 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1971); Coffindaf-
fer v. Coffindaffer, 161 \V. Va. 557, 566, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978). 
"'" But recent cases are most explicit. See, e.g., Miller, 721 P.2d at 345; Veazey, 103 N.J. 
at 249, 510 A.2d at 1190; Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 2d 94, 99-101, 480 N.E.2d 388, 394-
95 (1985). 
••• See, e.g., Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 449-50, 646 P.2d 878, 881-82 (1982); 
Miller, 721 P.2d at 345; Digby v. Digby, 120 R.L 299, 304, 388 A.2d 1, 3 (1978). To the 
extent the compensation idea is premised on insurance, it does not apply to intentional 
behavior. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 699-700, 376 P.2d 70, 75, 26 Cal. Rptr. 
102, 107 (1962). This does not denigrate intentional tort suit; indeed, unnvoilnbility of insur-
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it is unfair to penalize spouses who have purchased insurance to 
cover this very eventuality.1177 
There are numerous responses to the idea that permitting inter-
spousal suits facilitates vindication of the compensation goal. n79 
One is the contention that providing for recovery in the tort sys-
tem is unnecessary or unwarranted. Authors of early opinions ob-
served that spouses should forgive one another for harm inflicted 
wrongfully1179 or that adequate relief could be secured through al-
ternatives to tort litigation, such as divorce.1180 Today, there is 
widespread insurance coverage for the special damages that negli-
gently harmed spouses incur,681 while pain and suffering are said to 
be intangible, difficult to measure, and less appropriate for com-
pensation in this context.1182 
Even when there is substantial need for married individuals to 
pursue compensation, additional considerations may be more com-
pelling. Allowing husbands and wives to .seek monetary damages 
can threaten conjugal tranquility.1183 In fact, pursuit of an inten-
ance adds a punitive element to any recovery. See Givelber, supra note 361, at 54·55; supra 
note 568 and accompanying text. 
077 See, e.g., Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970); Shearer v. 
Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 101, 480 N.E.2d 388, 395 (1985). But cf. Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 
89, 95-96, 631 P.2d 646, 650 (1981) (Prager, J., dissenting), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 
216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987) (recovery fair if accident coverage, unfair if liability 
insurance). 
078 There also are responses to the policies favoring abolition that are not related to tort 
law's generic purposes or its compensatory goal. See supra notes 566-68 and accompanying 
text. None warrant textual treatment, however, because they consist primarily of the five 
policies favoring immunity's retention, discussed supra notes 419-564 and accompanying 
text. 
070 See, e.g., the cases cited in supra note 148. But see infra note 612 and accompanying 
text. But cf. supra note 445 and accompanying text (tort suit can promote harmony by 
eliminating economic burden). 
080 See, e.g., the cases cited in supra notes 543-45. But see supra notes 549-58 and accom· 
panying text. 
08
' Most spouses have medical insurance and many have wage loss protection. Most 
homeowners' insurance policies provide some medical coverage, and no-fault automobile 
benefits are available in numerous states. See supra note 398 and accompanying text. 
082 See M SHAPO, supra note 396, at 5-176 to 5-183 (discussion of criticisms of pain and 
suffering damages); Rheinstein, Challenge and Response in Family Law, 17 VAND. L. REV. 
239, 247-48 (1963) (impropriety in interspousal context). Those spouses least able to afford 
expenses imposed by negligently caused injury, however, are also least likely to have other 
coverage. Furthermore, spouses who have coverage are entitled to seek damages because 
they have paid for coverage. See supra note 577 and accompanying text. Cf. M. SHAPO, 
supra note 396, at 5-201 to 5-207 (similar idea as to collateral benefits rule). 
083 See supra notes 419-37, 448 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 438·47, 449· 
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tional tort action by a battered woman is more likely to end the 
marital relationship than to provide significant compensation.0sc 
Permitting personal injury suits could result in frivolous claims as 
well as excessive litigation.585 Perhaps most significant, however, is 
the argument that spouses will collude, undermining familial trust 
and the integrity of the tort law system.088 Indeed, judges who sub-
scribe to the compensation rationale on the basis of the prevalence 
of insurance give credence to the fraud contention.087 Concomi-
tantly, the allegation that courts allowing suit effectively impose a 
no-fault compensation system implicates the idea of deference to 
the legislature. 588 
2. Individual Rights. Few jurists have articulated very explicitly 
or comprehensively the idea that affording women tort suits facili-
tates the vindication of their rights.589 As early as 1920, however, 
one judge eliminating immunity declared that "wives are no longer 
chattels [that] need to beg for protection for their persons" but are 
voters who "can command it."590 There have been similar pro-
nouncements since then.591 Some courts have premised abrogation 
on specific constitutional provisions, such as those entitling tor-
tiously harmed people to seek relief without qualification, espe-
cially as to marital status.592 Similarly, the United States Court of 
56 and accompanying text. 
084 See infra note 618 and accompanying text. 
""" See supra notes 521-29 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 530-41 and ac-
companying text. 
08
• See supra notes 457-72, 502-03 and accompanying text (interspousal collusion). But 
see supra notes 473-501 and accompanying text (erosion of familial trust and tort law 
system) . 
.. , See supra notes 574-77 and accompanying text. 
088 See supra note 472 and accompanying text (no-fault allegation); supra notes 504-20 
and accompanying text (deference). 
08
• For helpful analysis of the debate over the efficacy of a rights strategy for women, see 
C. MAcK!NNoN, supra note 448, at 32-45; Finley, supra note 380; Freedman, supra note 408; 
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); Littleton, Recon-
structing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1279 (1987); Olsen, supra note 411; Note, supra 
note 408. Cf. infra notes 614-19 (in tort immunity context). 
•
90 Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920). See also Schultz v. Schultz, 
34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 33 (earlier allusion), reu'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882). 
••
1 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 449-50, 646 P.2d 878, 880-81 (1982); 
Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 395, 87 P.2d 660, 660 (1938); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 
Wash. 2d 183, 186-87, 500 P.2d 771, 773-74 (1972), ouerruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 
2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). 
••• See supra note 571 and accompanying text. But see Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 
425, 15 P.2d 922, 922 (1932), ouerruled, Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342 (Mont. 1985); 
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently invoked the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment to invalidate Illinois' 
statutory proscription of interspousal tort litigation. noa Although 
judges are unlikely to acknowledge openly that abolition consti-
tutes state intervention in the family, affording individual rights to 
certain members against others, these are important consequences 
of abrogation. Gs• 
Because so few courts have enunciated expressly or thoroughly 
the individual rights notion, most judicial responses to the concept 
have been indirect. Had jurists answered directly, the responses 
probably would have been couched principally in terms of the mar-
ital harmony contention.GsG Even judges who might have been will-
ing to accord females rights in other contexts may have been reluc-
tant to do so within the family. Another response, especially to the 
equal protection idea, is that a wife should not be afforded a tort 
cause of action because her husband does not have one against 
her.Goa Moreover, the notion that abolition involves state interven-
tion in the family to provide wives with rights would off end many 
jurists. Gs7 
In summary, these concepts may be somewhat more persuasive 
than the litany recited for immunity's continued application. 
Neither set of arguments is compelling, however. Nevertheless, ab-
rogation does at least afford certain benefits in specific situations. 
It is appropriate, therefore, to analyze some significant conse-
quences of fully abolishing the doctrine. 
Ill. IMPLICATIONS OF TOTAL ABOLITION 
Much of the analysis in the initial two Parts of this Article illus-
Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 290-97, 287 P.2d 572, 574-77 (1955). 
••• Moran v. Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245, 1245 (7th Cir. 1984). Accord Jones v. Jones, 376 S.E.2d 
674 (Sup. Ct. Ga. 1989). Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1211 (Miss. 1988); Price v. Price, 
732 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. 1987). But see Williams v. Williams, 108 Ill. App. 3d 936, 936, 439 
N.E.2d 1055, 1055 (1982), modified, 98 Ill. 2d 128, 455 N.E.2d 1388 (1983); Vnrholln v. 
Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 270-71, 383 N.E.2d 888, 889-90 (1978). Cf. Pniewonsky v. 
Paiewonsky, 446 F.2d 178, 178 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972); Smith v. 
Smith, 240 Pa. Super. 97, 97, 361 A.2d 756, 756 (1976) (rejecting claims premised on due 
process or equal rights provisions). 
••• See supra notes 392-94 & 414 and accompanying text. 
••• See supra notes 419-56 and accompanying text. 
••• See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
••• See supra notes 415-17 and accompanying text. 
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trates that courts and legislatures in jurisdictions that retain im-
munity should eliminate it totally, and complete abrogation is in-
dicated and likely by the turn of the century. Thus, it is important 
to explore what the ultimate demise of immunity might portend, 
particularly for the tort law system and for women, wives, mar-
riage, and the family. 
A. Implications for the Tort Law System 
The impact of complete abolition on the tort law process ·will be 
relatively insubstantial, although on balance there will be greater 
benefit. Elimination of the doctrine will facilitate realization of 
many tort law goals. When spouses willfully hurt one another, per-
sonal injury suits afford possibilities for punishment and deter-
rence and some likelihood of compensation. Moreover, intentional 
tort litigation may be the sole relief available to battered wives. 
Abrogation of negligence immunity provides the opportunity to re-
cover compensatory damages, alleviating the potential economic 
burden that could be imposed. It also may have some deterrent 
effect. 
Certain purposes of tort law, however, will not be achieved, and 
there may be detrimental implications for the system. Compensa-
tion, deterrence, and punishment are unlikely to be attained in 
many of the intractable cases of wife battering.1598 Providing access 
to the courts for interspousal tort disputes will increase the 
caseload, if only minimally. There will be occasional frivolous or 
vindictive suits or ones involving the type of interspousal behavior 
that makes it difficult for trial judges and juries to ascertain 
whether liability should be imposed.1199 More frequent and more 
troubling, however, will be situations in which married individuals 
successfully defraud insurers. Most of these difficulties could un-
dermine public trust in the tort law system, but all are amenable 
to amelioration. 600 
B. Implications for Society 
Abrogation may have numerous salutary effects for women, 
wives, marriage, and the family. It could enhance the dignity of 
••• See supra notes 555-57 & 568; infra notes 604-05 & 618 and accompanying text. 
•
99 See supra notes 521-25 & 528 and accompanying text. 
600 See supra notes 481-92 & 538-40 and accompanying text (ameliorative measures). 
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married people by recognizing that husbands and wives are sepa-
rate, unique individuals with their own rights which they do not 
forfeit upon marriage. When the state denies an innocent party 
hurt by another's blameworthy behavior access to its civil justice 
system on the basis of marital status, the harmed spouse's full 
worth as a human may be diminished and that individual's unique, 
independent identity compromised. 801 Because society expresses 
respect for people by treating each individual with equal regard,002 
it should extend to every community member the complete pano-
ply of rights accorded all others, including a cause of action for 
personal injuries suffered.803 
These considerations have especially telling application to the 
intentional infliction of harm. Such conduct is morally wrong. It 
invades the valuable dignity interest in freedom from willful inter-
ference with one's person and involves the type of disregard for the 
integrity of another human that ought to be unacceptable in a civi-
lized society. Moreover, behavior that the community ordinarily 
considers so reprehensible as to warrant criminalization should not 
be excused from civil liability.804 Wife battering is so ubiquitous in 
the United States as to compel recognition of an intentional tort 
cause of action, if only to a:ff ord one possible means for deterring 
the heinous conduct. 
801 Many courts have said that an individual's right to pursue relief in tort should not ho 
denied because of marital status. See, e.g., MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 75 (Mo. 
1980); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 557, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (1978); Hack v. Huck, 495 
Pa. 300, 303, 433 A.2d 859, 860-61 (1981). Moreover, when the state stumps its imprimatur 
upon the unequal treatment of any citizen it diminishes the respect of citizens for govern· 
ment. Cf. Karst, "A Discrimination So Trivial": A Note on Law and the Symbolism of 
Women's Dependency, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 546, 552 (1974) (very destructive when judiciary 
places special imprimatur of legitimacy on symbolism of women's dependency). Tho govorn· 
ment additionally denigrates the injured person by allowing the individual to suo his or hor 
spouse in property or contract, but not in tort. See Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 19·20, 
284 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1972); Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Mo. 1986); 
Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 97-98, 480 N.E.2d 388, 392-93 (1985). Cf. supra note 
456 and accompanying text (widespread recognition of interspousal property and contract 
suits). 
802 Many writers have addressed this idea. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEIU· 
OUSLY 223-39 (1977). 
•
0
• Most state constitutions provide a right to seek redress for personal injuries. Sec 
supra note 571 and accompanying text. 
80
' Of course, one difficulty in analogizing from criminal to civil law is that certain con· 
duct that is criminal between strangers is not criminal between spouses. See, e.g., supra 
note 550 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, it is married women who typically are relegated to 
"second-class citizenship" by application of immunity. In over-
whelming numbers, married men commit the intentional torts, es-
pecially battering,605 operate the vehicles in which spouses ride,600 
and are responsible for a significant percentage of household 
accidents. 
Abrogation offers additional benefits that clarify, alter, and even 
can reverse certain deleterious images of women. By continuing to 
treat interspousal injury as a private, domestic matter, immunity 
perpetuates an antiquated world view that considered married in-
dividuals as one autonomous unit-the man; wives as property to 
be managed by their husbands; and such harm the personal busi-
ness of the head of the household. In contrast abolition allows inju-
rious interspousal activity to become public. It acknowledges the 
public nature of the harm done to the individual, as well as to fam-
ily, friends, and society. Abrogation also provides a public forum in 
which disputes can be aired without resort to force607 and in which 
spouses who commit torts can be held accountable for their wrong-
doing. 608 Publicity even may deter others from engaging in similar 
behavior. 609 
In addition to "de-privatizing" injurious conduct between hus-
bands and wives, abolition can modify somewhat family hierarchy 
by affording rights to both spouses.610 Moreover, abrogation ac-
knowledges that the altruistic image of wedlock nearly always de-
manded sacrifice by the wife611 and that forgiveness, while integral 
to the institution of marriage, simply is insufficient when serious 
600 See Marcus, supra note 413, at 1661-62, 76-77; supra notes 156 & 312 (early inter-
spousal tort suits). 
•
06 In interspousal tort immunity cases involving vehicular collisions reported since 1920, 
wives comprised more than 75% of the plaintiffs. 
607 See supra notes 260 & 443-45 and accompanying text. Cf. Olsen, supra note 65, at 
1529-38, ("de-privitization" and legalization of family); 1\1. SHAPO, supra note 396, at 3-16 to 
3-20 (tort law as "grievance mechanism"). One problem, of course, is that force already may 
have been used. 
608 See supra notes 567-68 and accompanying text. 
609 See supra note 568 and accompanying text. Cf. MacKinnon, supra note 146, nt 656-57 
(trenchant analysis of devastating effect the "private" has hnd on women); infra note 613 
and accompanying text (abolition could cause intentional interspousal activity to lose social 
approval). But see infra notes 618-19 and accompanying text. 
610 See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1532. 
611 See id. at 1523; supra notes 148 & 605-06 and accompanying text. 
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misbehavior or severe harm is involved.612 Abolition, therefore, 
could alter the perception of married women as weaker beings with 
fewer rights and cause such activities as wife battering and marital 
rape to lose some of their social approval.613 
Notwithstanding these benefits, there are disadvantages and lim-
itations. Legalization can endanger family solidarity and altruism 
by enforcing individual rights against the family.614 This kind of 
state intervention equalizes the results of interspousal interaction, 
but does not democratize the family.615 It promotes individualism, 
but particularizes and may legitimate, instead of eliminate, hierar-
chy. 616 Thus, legalization and intervention, in the context of tort 
immunity's abolition, may not improve husband-wife or male-fe-
male relationships or familial existence, or substantially emanci-
pate or empower married women, but merely serve to perpetuate 
and justify the status quo.617 The problem of wife battering illus-
trates these constraints. Abrogation frees battered women to exer-
cise a right that, if pursued, effectively ends the marriage, is un-
likely to provide much compensation in any event, and contributes 
to the isolation of women.618 Abolition thus does little to prevent 
or deter battering in specific instances or in society, and even may 
812 See supra note 148, and accompanying text (forgiveness idea). Cf. Marcus, supra note 
413; Note, supra note 408 (insufficiency where wife battering or marital rape). 
813 See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1529-38. Cf. Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986) 
(when males prosecuted successfully for rape, men learn that rape is not appropriate 
behavior). 
814 See Minow, supra note 9, at 893-94; Olsen, supra note 65, at 1530-38. For helpful 
analyses of limitations entailed in a rights-based approach, see the sources cited in supra 
note 589. 
81
• See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1530-38. Cf. Minow, supra note 9, at 893-94 (family law 
measures can liberate individual family members from hierarchical control by one but can 
also neglect communal life). 
818 See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1530-38. For helpful analysis of individualization, see C. 
MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 87-90; Note, supra note 389, at 1266. For helpful analysis of 
particularization, see C. MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 83-90. For helpful analysis of legiti-
mation, see id. at 159-74; Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis• 
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV, 1049 
(1978); Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme 
Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265 (1984). 
617 See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1530-38. Accord as to sexual harassment in the workplace, 
C. MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 83-90, 158-61; as to marital rape, Note, supra note 408, at 
1265-66, 1273. 
818 See supra notes 409-16 & 428-29 and accompanying text (ending the marriage), Cf. 
Olsen, supra note 65, at 1533 (wives' exercise of rights could isolate or could empower 
women); C. MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 83-90, 158-61 (similar as to sexual harassment). 
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serve to legitimate the domination experienced by wives who 
"choose" to remain in marriages in which they are beaten.619 In-
deed, the tort law remedy, by individualizing and personalizing 
marital rape and wife battering, can obscure the fact that millions 
of women in bedrooms and homes throughout the nation are raped 
and beaten by their husbands and, therefore, that this is gender-
based discrimination. 620 
Thus, intervention in the family and its legalization and de-priv-
itization, as reflected in abrogation, offer benefits. There are, how-
ever, disadvantages, so that the change cannot be accepted without 
qualifications.621 Abolition is like similar liberal reforms. It does 
not affect substantially, and even may deflect consideration of, 
more fundamental issues within marriage, such as power alloca-
tion, and within society, such as how male-female relationships 
•
1
• See Olsen, supra note 65; at 1537 ("wife who does not pres5 criminnl assault charges 
against battering husband ... may be blamed for allowing herself to be a victim" or does 
not seek divorce "may be said to have consented" to abuse); C. 11.fAcKINNON, supra note 146, 
at 83-90, 158-61 (similar to sexual harassment). 
620 Professor MacKinnon incisively explains these ideas in the context of sexual harass-
ment, which explanation is equally applicable to marital rape and wife battering: 
[T]ort is conceptually inadequate to the problem of sexual harassment to the 
extent that it rips injuries to women's sexuality out of the context of women's 
social circumstances as a whole ••.• Unsituated in a recognition of the context 
that keeps women secondary and powerless, sexual injuries appear as inciden-
tal or deviant aberrations which arise in one-to-one relationships gone wrong. 
[Sexual harassment) is not merely a parade of interconnected consequences 
with the potential for discrete repetition by other individuals •••• Rather, it is 
group-defined injury which occurs to many different individuals regardless of 
unique qualities or circumstances, in ways that connect with other deprivations 
of the same individuals, among all of whom a single characteristic-female 
sex-is shared. Such an injury is in essence a group injury. 
C. MAcKlNNoN, supra note 146, at 171-72 (emphasis in original). Accord Olsen, supra note 
411, at 431-32; Note, supra note 408. 
•
21 See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1559-60; cf. Note, supra note 408, at 1273 (similar to 
rights approach to marital rape). Cf. C. 11.fAcKINNON, supra note 146, at 1-7; Law, Rethink-
ing Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1007-08 (1984) (extending to women 
rights that men have fails to develop rights recognizing women's experiences); Schneider, 
supra note 394 (same, and advocating litigation strategy recognizing women's needs); West. 
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHL L. REv. 1 (1988) (advocating truly feminist jurispru-
dence}; Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989) (sameness/differences 
debate). Professor Finley, supra note 380, at 1165 n.198, captures well what these, and many 
other, writers say in different ways: "[l]t is necessary to analyze the ultimate goal-mere 
access to male prerogatives, or a more profound change in values, structures, and policies" 
in treating issues facing women. Cf. infra note 623 (discussing numerous approaches). 
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might be improved.622 Nevertheless, while work continues on these 
essential questions, abrogation can afford advantages in specific 
situations, it can challenge the points at which power a:ff ects the 
daily existence of people, and perhaps it can bring about that in-
cremental adjustment of power which leads to more fundamental 
change.623 
Thus, for the tort law system and society, the potential benefits 
of total abolition outweigh its detrimental aspects. Accordingly, 
complete abolition is appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Interspousal tort immunity has enjoyed a long, rich history, but 
the rule is now one of the truly "sick men" of American tort juris-
prudence for whom the requiem may soon play. The story of the 
doctrine affords insights on judicial decisionmaking, tort law devel-
opment, and societal views of women, marriage, wives and the fam-
ily. Nonetheless, the demise of immunity is unlikely to empower 
females, improve significantly their circumstances within the fam-
ily, or enhance substantially relations between men and women. 
•
22 This is an important thesis of Littleton, supra note 589; C. MACKINNON, supra note 
146; Olsen, supra note 65; Note, supra note 408. Accord POLAN, supra note 146, at 299·300. 
•
23 For example, some wives battered during marriage by their husbands may be able to 
recover compensation after divorce. Cf. Note, supra note 408, at 1273 (rights approach can 
attack points at which power affects daily lives of, and take step toward power equality 
between, men and women). For examples of valuable work on the more important questions, 
see sources cited in supra notes 589 & 621-22. 
